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The studies reported here derive from the attempts of 
Eysenck and Furneaux to overcome some of the many limitations 
which inhere in the construction, application and interpretation 
of intelligence tests. 
In the first section of this thesis, some of the specific 
deficiencies of intelligence testa are identified and discussed. 
This is followed by a critical examination of the concept and 
measurement of speed. It is concluded that both are inadequate 
and that despite much research, we are not yet able to appreciate 
the role of speed in test performance. 
Studies of reaction time are examined in relation to both 
intelligence and personality, and detailed consideration is given 
to the viability of an information theory interpretation of 
reaction time. Problems of methodology and interpretation are 
identified and these are found to militate against unequivocal 
conclusions. 
Finally, the concepts of accuracy and continuance and 
a:: sociated empirical studies are considered. Again, unequivocal 
conclusions fail to assert themselves. 
The second section describes Furneaux's analysis of problem 
solving and the attempt to utiliso his difficulty scaling procedures 
on data gathered using computer administered tests (specially 
arranged versions of the Mill Hill and Matrices). In the course 
of presenting his approach, certain practical and empirical 
limitations are identified. It was found that only limited scaling 
was possible but that for a proportion of the items of both tests, 
there was a strong linear relationship between time difficulty 
and item solution speed. 
The present study failed to find evidence of a relationship 
between reaction time data transformed to an information theory 
based index and mental speed. Only equivocal evidence was obtained 
when these indices were correlated with measures of intelligence. 
Finally, some of the findings were consistent with predictions 
derived from Eysenck's theory of personality. 
To my parents, 
to Zillah and Jacob, and 
especially to Sarah. 
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This thesis is presented in two major sections. The first is 
concerned with setting a theoretical and empirical framework 
for the research reported in Section B. 
This section provides an introduction to the research problems 
and then considers some important problems in contemporary 
intelligence measurement, as well as some of the solutions 
proposed by various research workers. Special emphasis is given 
to the measurement of difficulty and to the concept and measure- 
ment of speed. The relationship between speed and intelligence, 
and between speed and personality is then discussed.. The section 
is concluded with an examination of the literature on persistence 
and accuracy. 
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2. INTRODUCTION: A STATE? FNT OF THC RMEARCH PROBLEMS. 
In a paper published in 1967 Eysenck (1967a) presented a 
number of major criticisms of contemporary approaches to the study 
of intelligence. This paper brought together the theoretical 
arguments and empirical evidence for his view that psychometrics 
had "become almost completely divorced" from the mainstream of 
experimental psychology. Research had become overly dependent 
on factor analysis which could not on its own provide the answers 
that psychologists sought in their study of intelligence. Eysenck 
further asserted that the basis of intelligence measurement, the total 
test score, confounded a number of components and was thus unsuitable 
as the basic unit for the analysis of test performance. Finally, he 
noted the lack of concern with "mental speed" and suggested that it 
should be "restored to its theoretical pre-eminence as the main 
cognitive determinant of mental test scoring ability". 
The psychological study of intelligence has many facets, ranging 
from problems of definition, measurement and structure to such issues 
as inheritance and the social implications of intelligence testing. The 
decades which followed the establishment of intelligence as an important 
psychological concept have, with few exceptions, witnessed major and 
minor controversies about one or other of its facets. ' While it is 
unlikely that many of the problems will be answered in the foreseeable 
future, some of the more fundamental issues have at least been identified. 
Butcher (1968) has pointed out that from the point of view of the 
scientific study of intelligence, what is needed is a law or set of laws 
which can act as the basis for major advances in our understanding of 
intelligence. Such laws would, according to Butcher, help establish 
an acceptable definition of intelligence which would then facilitate 
further developments. The work of Furneaux (1961) was seen as a 
potentially important approach in relation to this problem, although 
at the time he made his comments Butcher was, not able to assess the 
significance of Furneaux's work. As he says - 
"It is not immediately obvious whether or not 
this finding (of Furneaux's)' is of far-reaching 
importance for the purposes we have been considering, 
nor even (without replication, in other experiments) 
whether it attains the status of a psychological 
law at all, but it certainly cries out for fuller 
investigation! '. (Butcher, l968, p. 35-36). 
*My addition 
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After presenting his criticisms of contemporary approaches 
to the study of intelligence, Eysenck (1967a) outlined the main 
features of his own approach. Of central importance to it is 
Furneaux's (1961) work. Furneaux's difficulty scaling procedures 
not only take account of some of the criticisms made of the total 
score unit, but also show that difficulty and log time to correct 
solution are linearly related. The import of this relationship is 
expressed as follows - 
"The increase of log latency with increase in 
item difficulty turns out to have the same slope 
for all individuals tested, and is thus a 
constant, one of the few which exist in psychology". 
(Eysenck 1967a). 
Despite the obvious significance of this finding, there were no 
attempts at replication until the late 1960's, even though Furneaux 
had begun to publicise his work as early as 1948 (Furneaux 1948,1950,1952). 
This delay was partly due to the length of time it took for the actual 
procedures to be published (Furneaux, 1961) and because, as Butcher (1968) 
remarked, the paper which reported this main finding was "decidedly 
obscure" in its presentation. 
Eysenck's approach to the measurement of intelligence is, as he 
recently noted (Eysenck 197,. x), a departure from traditional 
psychometrics. As such, its viability is dependent on the support it 
receives from adequate validation studies. In particular, the 
theoretical and empirical superstructure needs to be well supported 
at its base. It is for this reason that the Furneaux model and the 
empirical relationships which it generates need to be critically evaluated, 
especially by empirical studies aimed at testing its resillience under 
different conditions. A major purpose of the present investigation 
is to provide such an evaluation. Although there have been studies a« 
supporting some elements of the Eysenck-Furneaux approach (e. g Farley 196(L) 
only two studies known to the present writer have attempted a direct 
yý 
test of the Furneaux model. The present'study if one of these. The 
second was carried out by Brierley (1969). Both studies were run 
concurrently (see Brierley 1969, p. 164) although the latter included 
tests of the Furneaux model as part-of a broader investigation 
otherwise unrelated to the present study. 
An associated feature of Eysenck's (1967a) approach is the 
attempt to reinstate 'speed' as a major variable in the study of 
intelligence. The relationship between log. latency and item 
difficulty derived by Furneaux serves to buttress the importance of 
speed but further evidence is needed, together with a theoretical 
framework which can serve to link problem-solving speed with other 
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measures of quickness. A theoretical. link was suggested by Furneaux 
in the same paper which presented the problem-solving model. 
Furneaux treats problem-solving (item solution) as a special case 
of multiple-choice reaction time. The problem solving process requires, 
as one of its components, a search for the solution, As conceptualized 
by Furneaux, the search process involves a series of operations each 
component of which occupies a fixed time. The more difficult the 
problem, the greater will be the number of components required and 
thus an increase in the time required for the search. Furneaux 
developed this model on the basis of work described by Hick (1952), 
Hyman (1953) and others. These studies had demonstrated that choice 
reaction time was linearly related to the complexity of the choice 
situation. This complexity can be transformed into an information- 
s 
theory unit, the bit. In the case of simple reaction time, /bits of 
information are involved. One bit of information is present when two 
alternatives are presented, two bits when there are four possibilities, 
three bits when there are eight choices, and so on. By using a choice 
reaction time task involving 0 to 2 or more bits, it is possible to 
compute a 'rate of gain' measure which is the slope of the best fit 
line through the mean reaction time for each set of choices. 
While simple reaction time does not show a strong relationship 
with intelligence, there is evidence of a relationship between 
intelligence and the rate of gain measure in choice reaction time 
(Roth 1964). This evidence is seen by Eysenck (1967a) as indicating that 
reaction time experiments do not, as previous studies suggested, 
contradict a theory in which speed is a central concept. Also, Roth's 
research has important implications for the choice reaction time 
model of problem solving put forward by Furneaux. At the time that the 
present study was instigated, Roth's (1964) research had not been 
repeated; nor had there been any attempt to examine the relationship 
between 'speed' as defined by Furneaux and a measure of rate of 
information processing. The investigation of such relationships is 
however crucial if problem solving speed is to be given the status 
accorded it by Eysenck. Hence, a further problem for investigation 
in the present study is the nature and strength of the relationship 
between problem solving speed and 'rate of gain' of information. 
It is generally recognised that non-cognitive factors can 
influence performance on tests of intelligence (Gaudry and Spielberger 
1971; Naylor 1972). However, there are few major theories of 
personality which make explicit the role of personality in test 
performance. Similarly, there are few substantial theories of 
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intelligence which try to incorporate personality variables in their 
formulation. Two outstanding exceptions however are Eysenck (1967a) 
and Cattell (1971). Both have consistently attempted to integrate these 
two areas of psychology although Cattell's approach does not as readily 
generate testable predictions about test performance as does Eysenck's 
(see Eysenck 1967a, for example). One of the important features of 
Furneaux's model is its inclusion of personality parameters in its 
formal structure. 
Furneaux (1956) has published a number of tests based on his 
theoretical ideas and these tests have been applied to different personality 
groups to test hypothesis about personality-performance relationships 
(Farley 1966. However, there has never been a detailed examination of 
the relationship between personality variables and the parameters derived 
from a direct application of the Furneaux model. Furneaur did not use 
his difficulty scaling procedures to scale the items of his published 
tests (Brierley 1969). Thus, while both Furneaux (1961) and Eysenck 
(1967a, 1974 explicitly recognise the importance of personality factors 
in test performance there is a need to investigate such relationships 
directly in relation to the measures derived in the course of difficulty 
scaling. This was the third main goal of the present study. 
The research reported in this thesis was conceived and developed in 
1967 and completed by mid-1968. It was carried out in the 
Department of Psychology at the University of London Institute of 
Psychiatry as part of the department's ongoing programme of investigations 
into the measurement of intelligence. 
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II. THE CONTEXT 
I. The Form of Intelligence Tests. 
Mental testing, as a branch of psychology, grew out of 
experimental psychology. There was, as 
Boring (1957) notes 
it ..... no schism 
in the 1890's" (p. 571). Yet within the next two 
decades the mainstream fragmented to the extent that experimental 
psychology and mental testing now require separate historical 
analyses. As Boring (1957) puts it: "And does the history of 
mental testing belong in the history of experimental psychology? 
Not really ..... " 
(p. 570). The events that led to the separation 
constituted what Kuhn (1971) might regard as a minor revolution 
in the history of psychology as a science, even though the revolution 
itself was technological rather than scientific. Taking Kuhn's (1971) 
analysis further, it can be suggested that at the turn of the century, 
mental testing was in a state of crisis, at least in so far as the 
psychology of intelligence was concerned. This aura of crisis is 
well illustrated by Spearman's (1904b) review of the early attempts 
to relate mental test scores to various criteria of academic competence. 
"Thus far, it must be confessed, the outlook 
is anything but cheerful for experimental psychology 
in general. There is scarcely one positive ccnclusion 
concerning the correlation between mental tests and 
independent practical estimates that has not been with 
equal force flatly contradicted; and amid this discordance, 
there is a continually waxing inclination - especially 
among the most capable workers and exact results - 
absolutely to deny any such correlation at all. " 
(Spearman 1904b) 
The early crisis was helped towards a resolution by a number. 
of important papers. Two were published by Spearman (1904a, b) and 
one by Binet and Simon in 1905. Together, these papers had a number 
of ramifications, perhaps the most important of which were the 
foundations that they laid for applied intelligence testing, psychometrics, 
and the various theories of intelligence that have been associated 
with correlational psychology. 
With certain exceptions, notably Binet and Ebbinghaus, most 
of the tests used in the early period of mental testing were single 
tests directed mainly at measuring sensory and motor processes and 
memory. These tests were derived from experimental psychology 
laboratories and were used in the study of inheritance (exemplified 
in the work of Galton), in the prediction of academic success or in 
other aspects of research on individual differences (Boring 1957; 
Freeman 199). 
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The tests used by Ebbinghaus and those being developed by Binet 
were aimed at the 'higher mental processes'. By 1898, according to 
Boring (1957), it was possible to show that insofar as item content 
was concerned, the Binet-type item had "won out". However, not 
everyone was prepared to concede a victory to Binet. Spearman (1904b) 
after reviewing the work of Binet and Henri published in 1895, noted 
an unacceptable "new feature" in their tests: 
"Hitherto, these had been of the most elementary 
and unequivocal nature possible, as befits the 
rigour of scientific work..... Binet and Henri appear 
now to seek tests of a more intermediate character, 
sacrificing much of the elementariness, but gaining 
greatly in approximation to the events of ordinary 
life. The result would seem likely to have more 
practical than theoretical value". 
In this early period, the tests were not organised into scales, 
and if a number of them were administered concurrently, the scores 
were not combined (Freeman 1939). The development of a scale which 
produced a total score is generally attributed to Binet and Simon. 
However, as Wolf (1973) indicates in her biography of Alfred Binet, 
the idea probably originated in the set of tests used by Blin and 
Damaye for their diagnosis of subnormality. Their tests, produced 
before the 190,5 scale, yielded a total score and were sufficiently 
developed to provide a crude range inc? icating 'normal' performance. 
The development of the first scale of intelligence was not a 
"fortuitous event" (Wolf 1973). For over two decades, Binet had been 
searching for a procedure which would enable a discrimination to be 
made between the then accepted medical classification of three grades 
of mental deficiency. The central idea of the 1905 scale published by 
Binet and Simon was that individuals of different degrees of intelligence 
at the same level of maturity could be distinguished by the number of 
tests they can pass. The component tests of this scale were graded 
according to difficulty level and the notion of an age-scale was 
already present (Freeman 1939). 
Taken separately, neither the content of the items nor the idea 
of a scale was novel. The novelty was to be found in their combination 
and in the provision of explicit instructions for administration and 
scoring. "What had been a 'test' now became a sub-test or item of a 
scale which as a totality yielded a composite measurement of a complex 
function". (Du Bois 1970, p. 36). 
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On the 1908 scale and later editions of the Binet, mental age was 
computed by first finding the basal age and then adding one year for 
each five items passed above that level. This procedure of adding 
together disparate items to produce an agglomerate score is of 
paramount importance because it represents an approach to 
quantification which has affected the scoring of psychological tests 
ever since. 
Further early developments served to consolidate some of the 
characteristics of early tests. The first point scale was developed by 
Yerkes, Bridges and Hardwick. Instead of mixing items at one age level, 
it grouped together items of homogeneous content graded in difficulty 
within sub-tests. The total score was then related to a table of norms 
from which a mental age was obtained. In principle, it did not differ 
from the Binet tests. 
A second important development, group tests, also occurred in this 
early period. Although Otis is credited with this 'invention', there is 
some controversy as to who was responsible (Linden and Linden 1968). 
As an innovation, group testing facilitated data collection; an advantage 
that was fully exploited during the First World War (Boring 1957; 
Freeman 1939; Du Bois 1970). As will be seen later, group tests also 
created certain problems which have tended to be ignored in investigations 
of intelligence. 
2. Some Inadequacies of Intelligence Tests. 
The inadequacies of intelligence tests have been commented on 
periodically. Thorndike et al. (19?, 7), while recognising that the then 
eSi 
current tests were an improvement on their predeciors, nevertheless 
recognised three sources of deficiency. According to their view, the 
tests were ambiguous in content, their units arbitrary and the results of 
uncertain significance. In 1925. Thorndike had suggested that ability 
should be analysed into level, range and speed. It was acknowledged 
that for practical purposes, a test battery which combined speed, level 
and range (or extent) in unknown amounts might well be useful. However, 
"For rigorous measurements ..... it seems desirable to treat these three factors separately, and to know 
the exact amount of weight given to each when we 
combine them". (Thorndike at al. 1927, p. 25). 
Furneaux's (1961) ancestry is readily discernable in this statement, 
although the components he selected as important differed somewhat from 
those emphasised by Thorndike. Like Thorndike, Furneaux also recognised 
the practical utility of the combination of 'unknown amounts' of the 
components. 
20 
For Thorndike, the measurement of extent and speed posed no 
problems. The former could be accomplished by simply counting the 
number of tasks correct in a sample of problems from all areas of 
intellectual functioning. Speed too is readily measured. The 
measurement of difficulty however, posed the greatest problem. If 
difficulty could be properly measured, 'level' would readily succumb 
to measurement, and it would then also be possible to quantify 
'extent' and 'speed' at any level. Hence, for Thorndike, the 
quantification of difficulty represented the central task in the 
measurement of intelligence. This problem will be considered later. 
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In 191A Spearman criticised the "hotchpotch" procedure employed 
in scoring intelligence tests. What he failed to see was the 
relevance of his comments for the tests of homogeneous content which 
he used. Spearman's concern was the crudity of the procedure inherited 
from Binet, "the prevalent procedure of throwing a miscellaneous 
collection of tests indiscriminately into a single pool... "(p. 71). 
Spearman, like Thorndike, also recognised the need, as part of a 
scientific approach, to "dissect" the subject matter under investigation. 
The problems entailed in the use of an agglomerate score, and the need 
for 'dissection' have been re-emphasised in the more recent critical 
analyses of intelligence tests put forward by Furneaux (1961) and 
Eysenck (1967a, 1973a). 
The fundamental criticism advanced by Eysenck concerns the assumption 
that equal scores on a test are intellectually equivalent. According 
to common usage, it is assumed that if-individuals obtain the same 
total score on a test, then such scores have equivalent psychological 
significance. While this may be true in a probabilistic sense, if 
the scores were arrived at in different ways, such equivalence is 
questionable. 
Eysenck (1967a) illustrates thelproblems in the following way. 
For any given test item, the possible outcomes are 'correct', 'incorrect', 
'abandoned' and 'not attempted'. If each individual obtains the same 
total score, and provided this score is below the maximum, it is possible 
that they have done so using quite different routes: Person A gets two 
correct and fails the remaining three items; Person B also gets two 
correct (different to thoseof A)', gets one wrong, decides not to attempt 
one and abandons the remaining item. Even this diversity of pattern 
is oversimplified. Any correct solution could be a 'lucky guess' and one 
that it incorrect a 'mistake' which might be uncovered by close 
questioning of the subject. Eysenck (1967a) asks "Can it really be 
maintained that the mental processes and abilitios....... are identical, 
merely because they obtained the same final mark? " 
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Thorndike and his co-workers were aware of this problem, 
although they discerned it in a somewhat different context, that of 
the measurement of speed. Because of the importance of their analysis 
for Furneaux's approach, the comments of Thorndike et al. (1927) are 
quoted in full - 
"In the measurements that are actually used it 
is customary to have the time a mixture of (1) 
the time spent in doing some tasks correctly, 
(2) the time spent in doing other tasks incorrectly 
and (3) the time spent in inspecting other takks and 
deciding not to attempt them. This confusion may be 
permissable, sir even advantageous, in the practical 
work of obtaining a rough measure of intellect at 
small expense of labour and skill, but for theory at 
present and for possible improvement of practice in 
the future we need to separate the speed of successes 
from the speed of failures". (p. 33). 
As Eysenck (1973a) notes, Thorndike never followed through the 
implications of his critique. Instead, it was Furneaux (1961) who 
attempted to incorporate these as part of his procedure for the analysis 
of item solutions. This involved replacing 'inspection time$ by "the 
time spent in attempting a task and deciding to give up attempts at 
solution". (Eysenck 19732 p. 191). 
The need for a detailed conceptual analysis of item solution 
as a pre-requisite of a scientific approach was a theme in the writings 
of both Spearman and Thorndike. This theme was taken further by 
Furneaux (1961). Like his predecessors, Ferneaux accepted that the 
empirically established relationships between I. Q and other criteria 
justified the practice of crude testing. What remained as unsatisfactory 
was the incompleteness of the ensuing description of test-taking behaviour. 
Furneaux argued that the success of applied testing may simply be a 
consequence of the tests and the real-life situation reflecting an even 
closer relationship between only certain aspects of test-taking and 
real-life performance. The remaining components of the test score then 
simply act as a source of error. For Furneaux, the appropriate scientific 
goal is to minimize the error by a process bf maximizing the number of 
categories into which test-taking behaviour can be classified and 
ultimately scored. These categories should be refined to the point that 
further sub-division is no longer possible. Hence, for Furneaux - 
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"...... the only really satisfactory approach 
to the study of test-taking behaviour is 
that of the thorough-going logical atomist" 
While he never formulated it as such, what Furneaux appeared 
to be aiming at was a fractionation of the observed score variance 
into its component sources of variance, a model compatible with 'the 
analysis of variation'. The major constituents to emerge in 
Furneaux's model were speed, accuracy and continuance. The nature 
and inter-relationships of these components will be considered 
in later sections of this thesis. 
Thus far, it has been noted that a schism between mental testing 
and experimental psychology developed early in the history of 
psychology. Although the importance of mental testing as an applied 
aspect of psychology has been readily accepted by its critics, they 
have at the same time seriously questioned its scientific status. 
In doing so, these critics have advanced alternative conceptualizations 
considered to be more consistent with a scientific approach. 
Spearman's (1904b) prognostication - that the Binet-Simon 
style tests were "likely to have more practical than theoretical 
value" - appears not to have been falsified. The Binet Test has 
undergone several revisions (Terman and Merrill, 1960) 
and together 
with a number of tests modelled on the same pattern, continues to be 
used fcr'mcst practical purposes in the various fields of applied 
psychology. The practical value of these tests cannot be denied. 
Their theoretical significance is questionable even though a number of 
test authors have made excursions into debates on the nature of 
intelligence (e. g Wechsler 1958). The mental test tradition, as 
this stream may be called, also played an important part in the 
development of test theory (Gulliksen 1950; Lord and Novick, 1968) 
and for this reason as well is"of significance. Any theory of 
intelligence can only be tested by recourse to some form of psychological 
test and test theory provides, the guiding principles for their 
construction and evaluation. 
From the point of view of the experimental psychologist:. concerned 
with intelligence, the mental-test tradition has provided a particular 
style of item and procedures for constructing and evaluating tests. 
Although it also provided atest format and a stimulus to use the 
total score, these features have served to cloud rather than clarify 
the task of the experimentalist. 
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3. The Limitations of Factor Analyses of Test Performance. 
The proponents of a scientific approach have also had to 
contend with the second major stream in the psychology of intelligence, 
that encompassed by factorial analyses of intelligence tests and 
factorial conceptions of ability. Fron the point of view of those 
espousing a scientific approach, the contributions of the 'factorists' 
have not been given much weight (Eysenck 1967a, Furneaux 1961). 
If we follow Boring's (1957) historical analysis, this second 
main stream of development must find its source in Darwin's 
Trigin of the Species', published in 1859. Tez\years later, Galton's 
'Hereditary Genius' appeared followed in 1883 by 'Inquiries Into Human 
Faculty and its Development'. This book by Galton "has sometimes been 
regarded as the beginning of scientific individual psychology and of 
mental tests" (Boring, 1957, p. 483). 
The major technical innovation was the invention of the technique 
of correlation by Galton and its refinement by Pegrson. It was 
Pearson who also invented a technique of factor analysis, later rediscovered 
by Thurstone (Burt 1949). Factor analysis, according to Burt was used like 
other mathematical calculations "merely as aids to ver#fying...... 
hypotheses which they had already reached on broader grounds". 
The philosophical conceptions of mind and intelligence, as they 
had evolied by the end of the 19th centuryycan be broadly divided into 
those which regarded mental processes in unitary terms, those which 
regarded mind as a set of faculties, and those which conceived of the 
intellect as being : hierarchically ordered, the latter an. Qecletticzriew 
advocated by McDougall. Historically, and to some extent today, the 
faculty view finds it major proponents in North America whereas the 
heirarchical conception, with its lineage traceable through McDougall, 
Burt and Vernah, is more common in this country (Vernon 1961). 
Spearman's position, particularly in its early expression, was 
somewhat anomalous. In his early writings, he was an advocate of what 
he called the 'theorem of intellective unity'. He had adopted the 
terms 'general ability' and 'general intellectual power' directly 
from Galton's writing on inheritance, as he did the terms 'special 
aptitudes' or ' special powers'. In his later years, as is 
generally known, he accepted more explicitly the heirarchical 
structure (Spearman and Jones 1950). In this sense, his views can 
be aligned with those who adopt a factorial conception of intelligence. 
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Spearman did not regard the Binet tests as scientifically 
respectable (Spearman 1904b), and in his research continued to 
employ tests of homogeneous content. In a second paper (Spearman 1904a), 
he also advocated the use of correlational techniques, suggesting 
that these might have the important theoretical consequence. 
of being able to reveal the 'hidden underlying cause of the variations. 
While both Spearman and factor analysis begin with correlations, 
technically they soon part company. As Burt (1949) has pointed out, 
Spearman only partially accepted the work of Galton and Pearson 
because he believed that there was a basic difference between the 
physical measurements used by Galton and Pearson and psychological 
measurements. It is possibly for this reason that he devised the 
rank-difference technique and the correction for attenuation. Further, 
as Burt states "the novel feature in his procedure consisted not in 
'factor analysis' as now understood, but rather in a method which has 
a close affinity with so-called 'canfonical analysis"', Finally, 
Spearman made little use of the word 'factor': it is as Burt (1949) 
states "scarcely mentioned". 
Factor analysis has had a significant influence on the study of 
intelligence. This influence persists (Cattell 1971; Guilford 1967; 
Guilford and Hoepffner 1971) and may well be extended even further with 
the availability of computer based data analysis. Whether or not it 
can be regarded as part of experimental psychology is an open question. 
Boring (1957) while recognising its technological importance does not 
consider it appropriate to include factor analysis and the theories it 
generates as part of the history of experimental psychology (see p. 481). 
The important limitations of factor-analysis are now well known 
(Butcher, 1968; Heirm. 1970) as are the limitations which emerge when 
attempts are made to interpret the results of factorial studies (Vernon 1961). 
While recent developments in factorial techniques are likely to remove 
some of the significant technical difficulties (Lawley and Maxwell 1963) 
a number of problems will remain, particularly with regard to already 
published studies. 
Furneaux (1961) has pointed out some of the problems of 
interpretation that accompany factorial solutions. He suggests, for 
example, that apparently established group factors may well be artifacts,. = 
In examining data from Thurstone's Primary Mental Abilities, reanalyses 
by Eysenck (1939), Ferneaux suggests that different interpretations of 
the data are possible. Whereas the analysis suggested a differentiation 
between Visuo , Spatial and Arithmetical tests, an alternative explanation 
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could be that the differences arose because the tests defining 
these factors differed in the extent to which they measured speed 
and accuracy. 
Criticisms of this type can of course be applied to all of the 
research on intelligence, and particularly the multitude of studies 
which base themselves on factor analysis. The validity of such 
criticisms is however very much dependent on the empirical and 
theoretical status of the alternative framework. If 'speed' and 'accuracy' 
are psychologically, rather than only linguistically meaningful 
concepts, then, as Furneaux suggests, most of the factorial work 
"will eventually have to be repeated". 
Eysenck's critique of factorial approaches is directed partly 
at the use of crude scores - the 'hotchpotch', at the way in which 
factorial approaches have become "divorced from both psychological 
theory and experiment", and at the failure to recognise that despite 
it's usefulness as a tool, the technique cannot cope with the various 
fundamental demands placed on it. 
In presenting this historical overview of psychological approaches 
to intelligence, there is a risk of imposing a structure-where no such 
structure exists. Theoreticians and research workers thrive by 
adopting the ideas of others so that it can be inappropriate to isolate 
the strains in what is essentially a hybrid. With this risk in mind, 
two dominant strains in the study of intelligence have been identified, 
the tradition of mental testing and the approach based on factor 
analysis. From the point of view of those particularly inclined to 
align themselves with a scientific approach, neither of the dominant 
traditions is considdred to be satisfactory . 
4. The 'Scientific' Approach to Intelligence Measurement. 
Among the critics of both traditions, there is. a lineage with 
several characteristics. Not only? hey espouse a scientific approach 
but also advocate the single test item as the basic unit for the 
analysis of test performance. An outstanding feature of this group 
is the emphasis which is given to the role of 'speed' in test 
performance. A]llthree characteristics are illustrated by the 
jents - following state 
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"Thesd more recent researches have been 
conducted, for the most part, by the 
individual method of timing and have 
conformed to scientific testing procedure's 
(McFarland-1928). 
it.... speed is so important in the intelligent 
act that it has seemed to us the first factor 
to be studied if we are ultimately to come 
at an understanding of the nature of 
intelligence". 
(Peak and Boring-1926). 
Relatively few studies have been carried out within the framework 
of this-approach, and there have been even fewer attempts to develop a 
substantial theoretical framework to encompass such research. Among the 
outstanding studies are tlAose of Peak and Boring (1926), Sutherland (1934), 
Slater (1938), Tate (1948), Cane and Horn (1951), Furneaux(1961), Russell (1968) 
and Brierley (1969). Some attempts at theorising are apparent in the 
work of Thorndike (1925), Thorndike et al. (1927) and Thurstcne (1937), 
but the most substantial analysis is that developed by Furneaux (1961). 
His work has also influenced a number of subsequent approaches, notably e 
those of White (1973 and Van der Von (1971')1974) among others. 
The Furneaux Eysenckfcritique. of the two dominant traditions in 
intelligence testing are important because they highlight some generally 
recognised problems with these approaches. As both these writers 
appreciate, a negative critical appraisal, by itself, is of limited 
scientific value. It is more helpful to be able to replace inadequate 
approaches, models or theories by something which is more powerful. In 
part as well, the relevance of their criticisms is continent on the 
validity of their own theoretical framework and its empirical substrate. 
Furneaux's work on problem-solving described in his 1961 paper is regarded 
as providing not only the theoretical model but also the empirical basis 
for the Furneaux-Eysenck approach. Consequently, it reinforces their 
critical appraisal of the two mainalternatives. A heavy burden is thus 
placed on the work of Furneaux in'particular. ''To the extent that his 
findings can be shown to'have"some generality beyond-the tests, methods, 
subjects and circumstances 'peculiar to his 
study, then it will indeed 
be necessary to reconsider current theories and approaches to intelligence. 
The investigations described in this study were designed in part as a 
test of the generality of Furneaux's approach. 
The power of the Furneaux model is threefold. Firstly, it appears to 
overcome one of the fundamental problems in test construction, that of 
item-difficulty scaling. Secondly, it incorporates speed as an integral part 
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of the problem-solving process. Thirdly, it makes conceptual 
provision for non-cognitive, particularly personality, influences on 
test scores. Before describing the model, it is necessary to examine 
some related problems. 
5. The Problem of Difficulty. 
According to standard procedures, items are considered to be of 
equivalent difficulty if equal percentages pass irr fail the item. While 
this procedure may be adequate for most of applied measurement, it has 
one fundamental failing. It does not take account of the possibility 
that the 50 or other per cent who pass item 'a' may be quite distinct 
from the 50 per cent who pass item 'b'. Yet 'a' and 'b' would be 
defined as being of equivalent difficulty. Such an assumption is hard 
to justify. Even if there is some overlap of individuals who pass both 
items, the assumption of equal difficulty is still not easily justified. 
Such difficulty indices are of necessity sample dependent; to 
obtain generalizable difficulty values necessitates representative or 
substantial random samples. This solution is costly and open to the 
effects of population structure changes which can then invalidate the 
indices. 
Once it is recognised that equating tests for difficulty is problematic, 
given that the difficulties of the components are crude, subsequent 
interpretation of test scores becomes questionable. If a battery of 
tests with varying difficulties is given to a group, than, say, the 
interpretation of a factor analysis becomes, at the very least, a 
complicated exercise. If Test 'A' is 'easy', then it could involve the 
use of a different set of skills to those required for test 'B', a more 
'difficult' test. The resulting factor structure might be quite 
different to the structure which could have emerged with tests of 
equal difficulty. 
Some findings reported by- McDonald, (1965) illustrate some of the 
problems. After carrying out-a principal components, analysis on the 
test results of two groups of, subjects (on the Progressive Matrices), 
the second component to emerge for one of the groups (the younger of 
the two) was identified as a difficulty factor. Using a procedure 
for non-linear factor analysis, McDonald found that the apparent 'difficulty' 
factor was a curvature component "not identifiable as such by 
conventional factor-analytic techniques". Apart from the questions 
which these findings raise for factor analysis in general, it appears 
that the underlying assumption that the items, with some 
misplacements, increase in difficulty, is not supported, at least 
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not for the younger subjects (mean age 13.96 years). 
Furneaux (1961) has suggested that the concept of item 
difficulty was introduced to account for the introspective observation 
that the "sense of effort associated with attempts to solve some 
problems is stronger than that associated with others". 
In 1903, E. L. Thorndike confronted his contemporaries with a 
number of problems, the foremost being that of discoverin adg 
units of mental measurement. 
"Educational science needs lists of words in spelling, 
of examples in arithmetic, algebra and geometry... etc: 
so chosen that any one will be of approximately the 
same difficulty as any other...... The service 
rendered to physical science by the inch, the ounce, 
the ohm, the ampere..... should be duplicated in 
mental science.... Until we have such units all 
our investigations rest on insecure foundations". 
(p. 169-170). 
In 1903, Thorndike was optimistic about the emergence of 
a solution to the difficulty problem, suggesting that "any trained 
student" who possessed ingenuity and a "knowledge of elementary 
statistics" would overcome the problem of scaling. Over seventy 
years have passed and the problem is still with us. As Angoff (1971) 
states - 
"There is little question that educational and 
psychological measurement would be vastly 
improved if its scales could be expressed in 
terms that everyone would agree represent 
equal units of ability". 
Contemporary test theorists know, as did their predecessors, 
what they are aiming at. An acceptable scale would be constructed in 
such a way that if a person passes an item of given difficulty, he 
will pass all items that are less difficult; if he fails an item of 
given difficulty, he will also fail any item of greater difficulty. 
In his early writings, Thorndike (1903) accepted a measure of 
relative status as a"form of measurement, recognising at the same 
time that it'was not very satisfactory. As an interim solution, he 
proposed the use of equal percentages passing as'an approximate 
unit. This proposal was followed up in his later works (Thorndike et 
al. 1927), but even then, the perfect scale was not achieved. Thus, 
while the scale then developed (the CAD) was "at all points more 
accurate than the best scales previously available", it still needed 
to be "improved by more extensive experimentation'. (p. 1f72). 
In developing the CAVD, Thorndike et al. (1927) drew a 
distinction between item difficulty and intellectual difficulty. 
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In doixg so, they diveft9d attention from the problem of item 
scaling. Thus they asserted 
if.... for e'very theoretical and practical purpose 
in the measurement of intellectual difficulty, we 
should use collections of tasks rather than 
single small tasks. We ought to measure the 
difficulty of single tasks, but we can profitably 
measure intellectual difficulty only in the case 
of composites which contain enough kinds of tasks 
to represent a fair sampling of all intellect as 
it operates at that level....... g. (p. 133) 
Item difficulty was computed by solving the equation 
Mt +A salt 
where M is a measure of central tendency 
t is a given task 
A is a factor the sign and magnitude of 
which are based on R, the percentage 
passing the item 
s. d. is the variability for the group. 
Thorndike's reasons for rejecting the single item as the focus 
of difficulty scaling included their low correlation with his 
criterion of intellect (the total score), their heterogeneous 
variance, the restricted range of intellect sampled by such items 
and their proneness to being influenced by transient effects and 
special knowledge. Single items, according to this view, measure 
"but a small part of intellect plus a large error" (p. 117). His 
solution to the difficulty problem was to combine four sets of 
common content items (10 each from C- Sentence Completion,, A- 
Arithmetic, V-Vocabulary and D-Comprehension) to create a composite. 
Difficulty was then determined by the percentage of his criterion 
group who passed the composite. For an individual to pass the 
composite, he had to pass 50 per cent of the items. The difficulty 
level of the composite could be changed by juggling the items. 
Thus, a given composite could be made up of items of widely Varying 
'difficulties'. A similar procedure was employed for the age level 
scaling of the Stanford-Binet in its various revisions (Ternan, and 
Merrill 1960). Although adifferent procedure was used for scaling 
the Wechsler tests, these too, like-most tests of intelligence, 
rest on the common technique of scaling by means of percentage 
passing. 
Subsequent attempts (e. g Thurston 1928) to overcome the 
'difficulty' problem have met with little success. Gulliksen (1950), 
in his discussion of item analysis within the framework of classical 
test theory has surveyed a variety of procedures for difficulty deter- 
mination. None has succeeded in overcoming the common limitation 
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of variation in item-parameters as a function:. , of the ability 
level of the group. Such problems have led to a variety of 
alternatives including the use of multiple indices (e. g Heim 1970, 
Anstey. 1966), but as yet no substantial advances have been made 
(Angoff. 1977)" 
A more recent view of the problem of 'difficulty' has been 
presented in the information theory approach of Newell and Simon (1972). 
They describe their tasks as being "moderately difficult problems of a 
symbolic nature"(p. 3). The time taken to solve problems is regarded 
both as an important aspect of difficulty as well as being an index of 
difficulty. However, they recognise that 'difficulty' requires 
reconceptualisation in the framework of their approach. 
"In constructing a theory of problem difficulty we 
should like to identify those aspects of task 
environment and the problem solver that are the 
major determinants of difficulty - whether measured by 
solution time or any of the alternative measures" (p. 9)). 
'Difficulty' in the Newell and Simon formulation has to be viewed 
in terms of the interaction between the task environment and the 
programme of an information prodbssing system. Task environment is 
conceptualised as a set of methods for problem solution together with 
an "executive structure" for selecting and applying these. An 
important determinant of difficulty is what Newell and Simon call the 
problem space. This is the set of possibilities for solving the 
problem as seen by the problem solver. The methods at the disposal of 
the solver are used to examine the elements of the problem space one 
at a time. In the simplest case, the entire problem space is searched 
using the methods available to the problem solver. In this instance 
"time to solution will be roughly proportional to the total size of 
the space". The "problem solving mechanism" proposed by Furneaux (1961) 
has similar features to that proposed by Newell and Simon. At this 
point however,: -their analysis of problem or item difficulty has no 
immediate implications for. determinpmg item difficulty. The suggestion 
that it can be roughly indexed by time taken is not novel. 
An interesting but somewhat limited approach to item difficulty 
is presented in the work of Elithorn and his `colleagues for the 
Perceptual Maie Test (Smith et al, -undated; Davies and Davies 1965; 
Elithorn et al. 1966). The test is made up of a triangular lattice 
with dots at a number of the -ntersections. The subject is required to 
trace a path from apex to base, passing through a given number of dots, 
while moving in a forward direction. 
31 
What is called the "subjective difficulty" of the maze, can be 
varied in four ways. These are the physical dimensions of the maze, 
the size of the background lattice, the number of the target dots on 
the lattice and the arrangement of the dots. Although subjective 
difficulty can be specified very precisely, the 'diffictiLty, of each 
maze appears to be based on the standard 'percentage passing, formula 
(Smith et al,. undated). 
An alternative approach to assessing the difficulty of each maze 
was proposed by Davies and Davies (1965). It is based on the idea that 
each maze has a large number of distinguishable pathways. The 'difficulty' 
is then related to the number of paths through the maximum number of 
dots on the solution path. The subject obtains a score based on the 
'difficulty' of finding a path through the number of dots attained. 
This procedure differs from the original in that a graded score is 
possible for each maze. Elithorn simply scored for pass or fail. 
Davies and Davies (1965) define 'empirical difficulty' as the percentage 
of subjects who pass the maze. The two measures 'difficulty' and 
'empirical difficulty' correlated + 0.77, _. _ 
increased to +0.94 if 
the dot saturation of the lattice and the branches at each choice point 
on the correct paths were included in the computation. 
While the Perceptual Mazes lend themselves well to precise 
specification of various parameters, the procedures employed are not 
transferable to the types of test item found in common intelligence 
tests: they cannot provide a generalised solution to the difficulty 
problem because item structure in the usual intelligence test is not 
obviously reducible to the same elements. 
Item analysis is concerned with selecting test items in such a 
way that the test will have certain specified characteristics, in 
particular, that the final test will have high validities and 
reliabilities. According to Gulliksen (1950), there are more than 
twenty methods of item analysis. The determination of item difficulty 
is a major component in each. Seen from the standpoint of conventional 
test design, difficulty determination and scaling procedures are 
important because of their impact . on. validity and reliability. 
For 
most practical purposes in testing, the inadequacies of such 
procedures have not been absolutely crucial, as witnessed by extensive 
applied testing. However, they have severely restricted the interpretations 
of test scores and have hampered research on intelligence, again mainly 
because interpretation is complicated . 
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Most discussions of 'difficulty' seem to assume that an item 
or problem has something which can be called 'its difficulty'. 
Brierley (1969) and others have questioned this - 
"The principal reservation one must have concerning 
the problem of difficulty scaling is that of the 
reality of an intrinsic item difficulty". 
(Brierley. 1969). 
Similar reservations have been expressed, implicitly or 
explicitly, by several writers (Campbell 1961,1964; Cane and Horn 1951; 
Heim,. 1970). Campbell (1961) for example has examined the determinants 
of item difficulty in relation to a number of factors - 
(a). Extrinsic factors 
(i) the context 
(ii) familiarity of content 
(iii)non-intellectual factors 
(b). Intrinsic factors 
(i) item qualities (complexity of content, abstractness, 
novelty). 
(ii) item layout 
Campbell (1964) in a later paper also raised the question of the 
extent to which many items (particularly of the series type used by 
Furneaux) are prone to the effects of chance strategies which can then 
have a pxtfound effect on the success of the subject. Taking series items 
as one example, she points out that a number of rules for solution is a to 
available but only one is, in the view of the test constructor, correct. 
Brierley (1969) cites an additional factor, that of irrelevant 
information introduced to complicate the item. As an instance, he suggests 
a letter series item in which the rule is given by alternate letters, 
the others merely serving to complicate the task. 
Cane and Horn (1951) found that the position of an item in a test 
did not affect its conventional difficubty. However, the time spent on the 
item was related to its position. Open-ended questions led to shorter 
solution times than did multiple-choice items. 
Dunn and Goldstein (1959) varied a variety of item features (number 
multiple choices per item, irrelevant rmesq grammatical changes) and found 
that while they produced changes in conventional difficulty, validity and 
reliability of the items were not appreciably changed. 
A number of studies by Heim and her colleagues (see Heim 1970) have 
examined a variety of influences on conventional difficulty as well as 
difficulty indexed by solution speed. For example, Heim (1955,1957) 
has found that successful solutions are proportional to the difficulty 
of the context: an easy test preceding a more difficult test led to a 
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smaller percentage correct in the latter. Speed was also affected 
in that easy ite, is would be answered more slowly if they were preceded 
by a hard test. However, the less intelligent subjects produced inconsistent 
findings. 
A further issue is the extent to which 'complexity' and 'difficulty' 
are synonymous. Porebski (1954) suggests that they are the same but that 
complexity may be introduced by irrelevant features or by requiring the 
subject to have at his disposal other skills(e. g a 'good' short term 
memory). The information theory analysis of Newell and Simon (1972) 
presents a different conceptual analysis of the same issues. 
Thesd various assessments of the effects of contextual factors on 
conventional difficulty indices provide some support for the view that 
such indices are sensitive to context. However, they do not resolve the 
issue as to the independent existence of 'intrinsic difficulty'. Were it 
not for the work of Furneaux (1961), Elithorn and his colleagues (Jones 
et al. - undated) and Davies and Davies (1965), it would be possible to 
reject the notion of intrinsic difficulty and simply focus on conventional 
indices and their empirical relationships and determinants. 
The work of Elithorn, and Davies and Davies does however point to three 
classes of difficulty, one of which appears to be 'intrinsic difficulty'. 
Jones et al. (undated) distinguish between subjective and empirical 
difficulty. As was noted previously, the subjective difficulty (complexity? ) 
can be varied along any or all of four dimensions (physical dimensions, 
lattice size, number of dots and arrangement of dots). Empirical difficulty 
refers to conventional indices. The Davies and Davies (1965) procedure 
for indexing the properties of an individual maze leads to what they call 
calculated difficulty. This index completely describes the structural 
properties of a given maze. The important point is that the calculated 
difficulty is invariant. It depends entirely on the maze itself and not 
on the context or on any other factor extrinsic to the item. In this 
sense, it is possible to view each maze as having an intrinsic property 
which appears to be directly related to what is generally regarded as 
'difficulty'. It is unfortunate that Davies and Davies (1965) did not 
attempt to examine the scalability of the, calculated difficulties but 
simply treated them as tanks. Also, as noted earlier, conventional 
items do not readily lend themselves to such structural specification 
although it might yet be possible to treat, say, letter series items to a 
similar analysis. This could be accomplished by quantifying the number of 
alternative correct solutions and the number of elements in the item as 
well as the distractors. It might be possible to examine the 
34 
predictive power of such an index, the goal being to demonstrate that 
such indices conform to the ideals of scaling described earlier in this 
Chapter (Angoff, l971). Such an exercise is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
Furneaux's (19$3. ) solution of the difficulty problem is important 
because it circumvents the major limitations of conventional difficulty 
scaling. His solution will be considered in greater detail in a later 
chapter. At this point it is sufficient to note that his procedures 
are claimed to produce indices which are independent of the standardisation 
group, that they are based on an unambiguous measure, solution time, 
and that his indices enable the prediction of performance at different 
levels of difficulty. 
6. Recent approaches to the analysis of mental test scores. 
Dissatisfaction with classical approaches to mental test scoring has 
led to the development of a number of different models (Lord and Novick 1968; D+d 
White 19734, van der Ven 1971,1974; Iseler 1970; Lord 1974, among others). 
The majbr shift of emphasis in all these more regent approaches is away 
from the older determintstica models to approaches based ox probability 
models (Lord and Novick 1968; Lord 1974). Of the xewer models, those of 
g a+ý& 
White (l97fº), Iseler (1970) and van der Yen (197) have been particularly 
influenced by Furneaux's conceptual analysis. None has attempted to apply 
Furneaux's scaling procedures. 
Possibly the most w4del: r"ihvestigated of the current approaches are 
those subsumed under the generic title of 'item characteristic curve theory' 
(icc) (Lord 1974). These models usually have two basic components, the 
ability of the individual and a vector of containing parameters that fully 
characterize the item. It is then assumed that the probability of a 
correct response depends. only on the level of ability of the individual 
and on the item parameters. In its simplest form, no assumptions are made 
about any characteristics of the individual. More complex forms of the 
model have been developed by a number of writers (e. g Birnbaum 1968 - is 
Lord and Novick 1968). For example the $three parameter' version of the 
model has as its parameters the discriminating power of the item, item 
difficu'ty and the probability of a correct answer for individuals at the 
lowest levels of ability. 
The development of these models, has, according to Lord (1974), been 
held back at the empirical level because of the problem of estimating the 
characteristic curve of individual items. These DroblemR ATT1ost+ ,,.. W ý.. 
have been overcome and there is accumulating evidence on the validity and 
usefulness of this approach. However, it appears that more research : on 
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these models is still needed (Lord 1974). 
The approach adopted by Iseler (1970) has been briefly described by 
Eysenck (1977, p. 192). The original presentation, in German, due to both 
the language and mathermatics, is beyond the comprehension of the present 
writerl 
van der Ven (1971,1974) has dcveloped a probabilistic model for time 
limited tests which conceptually, has been strongly influenced by Furneaux. 
However, in its most recent form (van der Von 1974), the author has run 
into difficulties because of the lack of appropriate measures of what he 
calls mental effort". Thus, this model is as yet incompletely specified. 
All of these approaches are limited in the sense that they do not 
extend themselves beyond the traditional scope of psychometrics: speed 
is not considered as an important factor and scope for personality 
variation is not incorporated in the formal models. The major exception 
atýb 
is to be found in the work of White(197 : -'' 
White's model has been strongly influenced by Furneaux's conceptual 
analysis as well as the more recent approaches to test theory. Unlike other 
probabilistic models, White assumes the availability of three sets of data, 
whether or not an item was correct, whether or not it was abandoned, and the 
response time. The model also assumes that for each subject there are "three 
unobservable random variables", speed, accuracy, and persistence. For each 
problem, it is assumed that there are two "unknown parameters", difficulty 
level and discriminating power. In addition to these unknowns, White 
also introduces the concept of "effective ability", which is a function of 
the speed and accuracy of the subject, and of the time that has elapsed since 
the presentation of the item. Again, the mathematics underlying this model are 
beyond the competence of this writer. 
White's model has been tested out on data from the present study (see 
White 19731). The results appear to be encouraging although some problems 
remain. Ass a result, White (personal communication), is currently 
modifying the model. 
7. Conclusions. 
The approach to intelligence testing which developed from the Binet tests 
has proved to be adequate for many practical purposes. While applied 
testing has accommodated (more or less) to the limitations of the various 
procedures, the proponents of a scientific approach to intelligence have 
persistently expressed dissatisfaction with these procedures. In addition 
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to the crudity of measurement several generations of critics have 
highlighted the problem of "difficulty", and various models have been 
developed in order to circumvent or solve this problem. In recent 
years substantial advances have been made. Among the many solutions 
which have been investigated, only that of Furneaux appears to be 
complete, although, as will be seen in a later chapter, there has been 
very little work on it since the 1961 paper. Of the newer approaches, 
that of White (19731 comes closest to the specifications of 
Eysenck. Like Furneaux's model, that proposed by White incorporates a 
speed component as well as components which give scope for integrating 
intelligence measurement within the compass of personality. 
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III. THEORIES RELATING INTELLIGENCE AND PERSONALITY 
There are many psychological theories of personality but very few 
which have attempted to systematically incorporate intelligence (or 
intelligence test performance) within their respective frameworks. The 
two major exceptions are lfysenck (1947,1913) and Cattell. Guilford's work 
has spanned both personality and intelligence, but he appears to have 
made no formal attempt at integration and his recent work on intelligence 
has been strongly criticised (Eysenck 1967a; Horn 1973). His work is 
considered briefly before the more detailed exposition of the views of 
Cattell and Eysenck. 
Guilford's "Structure of Intellect' model of intelligence is essentially 
a classifying system which predicts that 120 functionally independent 
factors will be found when the appropriate tests are given. Each factor is 
defined on the basis of the intersection of components from each of three 
dimensions, made up of five mental operations, four content componentd, 
and six product components (Guilford and Hoepfner 1971). Little attention 
is given to speed, and the 'cube model' has been criticised by Eysenck (1967a). 
However, the most telling criticisms have been proposed by Horn (1973). In 
a series of empirical investigations, Horn found that the factor-analytic 
babis of Guilford's model is "not appreciably better than the support that 
genera e 
can be provided for theories/by random procedures". Given these comments, 
as well as the points already considered, no further attention is given 
to Guilford's work here. 
In a recently published book, Cattell (1971) has attempted to draw 
together research on human abilities. In this section, his views on speed 
and its relationship to ability and personality will be discussed. Reference 
will also be made here to two major reviews published by Horn (1970,1972) 
who has been particularly important in developing Cattell's theoretical 
and empirical approach. 
Cattell provides a, list. of,. at this stage,; tentative empirically 
based primary abilities. Among. those factors which receive the strongest 
confirmation and which-also have comparatively; substantial variances are 
ý, ý .. ý, 
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U. I (4) Perceptual Speed (Identified in more 
than 30 studies) based on tests involving 
the comparison of similarity in visual 
material and configurations, mirror reading 
and dial recognition. - 
Speed of closure'(Visual Cognition, Gestalt 
Perception) based on 9 studies including 
such tests as Street Gertalt and speed of 
dark adaptation. 
Among the "lesser, narrower, less substantiated primaries" is 
U. I. 71 Motor speed. 
At least five broad factors have emerged when the intercorrelations 
bee v% 
among primary factors haveLfurther investigated in the ability realm. 
Cattell (1971) identified these as 
Fluid General Intelligence 
Crystallized General Intelligence 
Power of Visualization 
Retrieval Capacity or General Fluency 
Cognitive Speed 
(p. 106) 
Associated with this pattern is the theory of crystallized (gc) 
and fluid (gf) abilities which asserts that there are two major attributes 
which have a significant impact on performance on intellectual tasks. 
These influences operate somewhat independently (Horn 1972) throughout 
development and are said to represent the basic components of intelligence. 
Fluid intelligence is manifested primarily in tasks which are relatively 
uninfluenced by culture. They are either novel or overlearned. 
Crystallized intelligence reflects the individual's use of concepts and 
aids derived from the culture. Both involve the same-processes of 
reasoning, relation perceiving, abstracting and the like-but differ mainly 
in the extent to which they involve culture- specific learning. Some 
cäfferences exist between Horn and Cattell (Horn 1972). In Cattell's 
views, gf is regarded as more explicitly related to hereditary 
phsyiological influences. gf and go have been studied in relation to a 
variety of associated functions, the details of which are presented in the 
reviews by Cattell and Horn. For example, there is evidence that they 
show a differential age decline as well as being differentially influenced 
by damage to the nervous system. In terms of actual tests, the Matrices 
load on gf whereas verbal tests such as the Mill Hill Vocabulary have been 
found to load on gc. Cattell (1971, p. 107) notes that the Furneaux 
speed and Level Tests are most strongly loaded on gf. 
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The third of the major factors, Visualization covers a variety 
of performances involving spatial manipulation (e. g gorm-boards) and 
includes' flexibility of closure' and 
'"perecptual 
speed' as correlates. 
The fourth broad factor involves retrieval of material 'from memory 
storage', sometimes called fluency but not analogous to the primary 
factors of the type thich are loaded by word fluency tests. 
The fifth broad factor, speed of cognitive (gs) performance, poses 
the greatest difficulty in trying to characterise it. As Cattell points 
out, it has a long history, and is the- factor supposedly discussed by 
Spearman. Its "existence" was detected in the "early and thorough" 
(Cattell, 1971, p. 107) studies of Bernstein (1924). Parenthically, it 
should be noted that-it is extremely hazardous to attempt to place 
any reliance on Bernstein's study, a hazard which Cattell consistently 
ignores. The quality of Bernstein's research is such as to make any 
conclusiam derived from it exceedingly suspect. 
Cattell notes. that an early conception of gs placed it in the realm 
of personality - temperament factors and that recently, Horn has suggested 
that it is an index of motivational strength operating in the actual 
test situation. Cattell's views are somewhat complex. 
The correlational evidence according to Cattell (1971, p. 64) points 
to a number of different speeds rather than a single general speed. In 
addition, our conception of speed is complicated by both semantic confusion 
and the variety of scoring procedures used. The two major indices, 
e 
number correct and time taken ge rally correlate positively. More 
substantial correlations are found between scores on timed and untimed 
tests provided that subjects are asked to work quickly and that they are 
homogeneous with respect to age (Cattell 1971, p. 65). However, under 
speeded conditions, when intelligence and the effects of other primary 
factord are partialled out "two or three generalized speed measures remain',, 
Even when such corrections are not mada, and the speed stress is not 
introduced, a tempo factor still emerges-represented by the work of 
$imoldi (1951) and associated with the personality factors U. I. 30 
(Aloof Independence) and U. I 33 (Depression Elation). 
In addition to tempo, Cattell implicates two further sources of speed 
differnce. The first is identified by U. I. 22 (C. ortertia), the characteristic 
level of cortical alertness of the individual and the second U. I 16 
(Assertive Ego) manifest as ambition in the test situation. 
In summarizing the evidence, Cattell asserts that anything that is 
general in cognitive speed (the cognitive speed factor of Bernstein (1924)) 
is temperamental or motiv9tional in origin and is associated with U. I (22) 
or II. I (16). However, the U. I (22) temperamental component"... actually 
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extends in a confusing fashion along the frontier between ability and 
temperament traits" (p. 65). Even though it's contribution to "variance 
in high level abilities is quite small". Cattell suggests that it 
should be included in any discussion of abilities in that it has an 
influence on perception and executive performance. In attempting to 
P°s'ts 
clarify his distf 'tion, Cattell thus temperamental-cognitive 
speed as distinct from the speed which arises through temperamental 
tempo, motivation level and mood. It's peculiar property is that it 
"appears only when ability scores are made under "speed" instructions and 
in scoring a timed performance" (p. 65). In a later discussion of this 
component, Cattell maintains that it affects speed in a broad spectrum of 
abilities, such as numerical performance, social skills, perceptual speed 
and especially mechanical speeds such as writing (p. 107). This component 
in turn makes only a minor contribution to speed in intelligence-demanding 
tasks, or what Cattell refers to as "power intelligence". This further 
type of speed iP "largely an expression of the same ability as is 
measured in fitness and error-freeness of response". This concgption of 
speed is similar to Spearman's view and is supported, according to Cattell 
by it being located within gf rather than gs in the second order factor 
pattern. It is the component identified by Furneaux as intellectual 
speed. The nature of this conception of speed is best illustrated by the 
following - 
"...... By any reasonable perspective this simple 
speed factor is a distinctly broader factor even in 
the cognitive realm itself, than are the two 
intelligences. For example it operates even more 
obviously in mechanical and perceptual performances 
than in intelligence. Speed measured in successful, 
intelligence problem-solving is local to intelligence 
(being zero if a person cannot solve the problem! ). 
If intelligence is considered speed at all, it is speed 
in more complex performances than those that are 
typically strongly loaded by gs". 
Cattell (1971), p. 108. 
Three important features emerge from this brief examination of 
Cattell's work. Firstly, his approach is essentially structural in 
that it attempts to isolate the major elements and examine their inter- 
relationships. Secondly, his; review of relationships among the ability 
factors points to the possibility of two äonceptions of speed, that 
contained in gf and that in gs at-the second order. (It is unfortunate 
that Cattell has called gs "cognitive speed" as this factor is loaded by 
tasks such as 'writing speed' and 'cancellation speed'). The implications 
of the second feature will be considered later. Finally, Cattell attempts to 
include, his personality factors in discussing the relationships. 
The model of personality formulated by Eysenck (1967b) proposes a 
number of basic personality dimensions, the most important of which are 
41 
extraversion (E) and neuroticism (N). His approach differs from 
that of Cattell in a number of ways, particularly in the level of 
analysis employed. Whereas Cattell is mainly concerned with traits, 
9 
Eysenck's approach is essentially typological. Eysenck and Eysenck(1960), 
iii a large scale study employing items from the work of Guilford, 
Cattell and Eysenck found that at the level of higher order factors 
E and N emerged consistently for both men and women. Bronson (1969) 
in her various studies of personality in children has also identified 
her factors with Eysenck's E and N dimensions. Brody (1972) in his 
recent review of various personality models has concluded that 
".... There does seem to be support for the 
view that the dimensions of introversion-extraversion 
and neuroticism seem to be present in aU systematic 
dimensional analyses of personality..... that 
the measures of these dimensions of personality 
developed by Eysenck do in fact get at some very 
fundamental characteristics of individuals". 
(P"190) 
There would thus seem to be little doubt that the Eysenck model, 
despite its competitors, provides the best current framework for an 
examination of personality factors in Intelligence test performance. 
ti This view is further reinforced by Eysenck's, (1947,1967a, 1967b, 197j 
consistent attempts to relate these two aspects in his more general 
efforts to bring the psychology of intelligence into the domain of 
experimental psychology. 
Eysenck's theory to account for the structure of individual differences 
in personality is based on a two component physiological model 
(Eysenck 1967b) of arousal activation. Eysenck proposes two mechanisms 
linked respPctively, to the reticular formation and visceral brain. 
Individual differences in extraversion are accounted for in terms of 
reticular effects on cortical arousal whereas individual differences 
in neuroticisms are accounted for by visceral brain influences. The 
hypothesis further asserts at introverts are characterised by higher 
arousal levels than are extraverts, the majority of people, being 
ambiverts, are intermediate. Individuals with low N scores are 
charcterised by low levels, and high N scorers, by high levels of limbic 
activation. These systems are postulated to function independently 
except on occasions when strong emotions are generated U the individual. 
Such emotions can then have strong arousal effects on the cortex, 
produced directly or through the reticular formation. According to 
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Taken from Eysenck (1967a) 
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of strong emotion - low arousal. However, high arousal - low emotion 
is possible. A complete statement of the theory and both supporting 
and contradictory evidence are given in Eysenck (1967b). 
While the basic theory summarized above appears uncomplicated, 
developing predictions and translating them into operations is a complex 
task. Eysenck (197 has noted some of these complexities. Predictions 
would ideally need to take into account the basic personality characteristics 
of subjects, momentary states of arousal, stimulus produced arousal, 
experimentally induced arousal, the role of instructions, temporal 
rhythms and task complexity. A further set of complications is introduced 
by the possibility of non-linear regression among the variables 
incorporated in any study. Eysenck (1967b) has asserted that non-linearty 
is likely to be the rule rather than the exception and that research 
designs need to incorporate some version of the Yerkes-Dodson law as a 
consequence. Yates (1973) has listed a number of predictions about 
personality effects on motor tasks taking some of these moderating factors 
into account. Eysenck (1967a) has also discussed such effects in relation 
to intelligence test performance. 
There are a number of other aspects to the theory which are important 
in relation to the present study. 
The Eysenck-Furneaux approach to the measurement of performance on 
intelligence tests has already been discussed. Eysenck has further 
proposed a model of the structure of the intellect which is reproduced in 
Figl. The three major dimensions encompass mental processes, test content 
and quality. From the diagram, it would appear that Eysenck views speed- 
power as a single dimension. This is not made explicit in his discussion 
(Eysenck 1967a) but he does assert that "mental speed and power are 
fundamental aspects of all mental work.... " qualified to some extent by 
the processes and materials involved. Speed is regarded as a major 
source of variation, and the work of Furneaux is taken as demonstrating 
the ßindamental nature of speed within this conception. 
Regarding the theoretical relationship between speed and intelligence, 
Eysenck adopts Furneaux's suggestion that in problem solving, some kind of 
scanning mechanism functions to select a solution. The speed at which this 
mechanism operates determines the probability of a correct solution "being 
brought ito focus more or less quickly". To this conception is added the 
notion of information procdssing, in the form of the hypothesis suggested by 
Roth's (1964) work, so that intelligence is conceived of as the speed of 
information processing. The rate of processing is indexed by the slope of 
the regression line fitted to choice reaction time data transformed into 
bits. This view was implicit in Furneaux's postulated mechanism but at 
the time he developed his theory, Roth's study was not published. As 
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FIGURE 2. Thurstone's (1937) 'Ability Surface' 
Taken from Thurstone (1937) 
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noted elsewhere, the data published by Roth are taken as support for Eysenck's 
theory. 
At the empirical level speed is indexed by the mean of the log solution 
times to a set of 'easy' test items. This 'speed' appears not to be 
differentiated from 'speed' in a variety of other psychological tasks. In 
this respect, the Eysenck-Furneaux conception of speed is unlike that of 
Cattell. In fact, the notion of 'speed' poses a number of conceptual and 
operational difficulties and these will be considered shortly. 
While speed receives some specification within the Eysenck model, power 
is less clearly formulated. Power can in practice be defined in a variety 
of ways, ranging from scores on untimed tests (Porebski 1960) through scores 
on tests-which include timed components (e. g the Wechsler Tests-Wechsler 1958) 
to the models of Thurstöne (1937) and Brierley (1969). These last two models 
are considered briefly in the next paragraphs before returning to Eysenck's 
approach. 
L. Thurstone, in a theoretical paper published in 1937, examined the 
relationship between ability, motivation and speed, with a view to appraising 
"ability as power" independent of speed and motivation. As part of his model, 
he proposed a three-dimensional surface with difficu$ty defining one axis, and 
response time and probability of success defining the other axes. 
One of the major problems, according to Thurstone, wqs that associated 
with conventional definitions of speed as the number of easy take completed 
in unit time. As he saw it, the problem was whether high speed can be taken 
as an index of the ability to complete more difficult tasks without there being 
any time limits. 
The three dimensional surface (see Fig. 2) is generated by assuming that a 
subject-with fixed motivation attempts a large number of tasks at each level of 
difficulty. All tasks are of a standard type. Their difficulty is calibrated 
on some scale using the percentage correct in a standard group as the index of 
difficulty. 
From Fig. 2 it can be seen, that: for a. fixed response time, any increase in 
difficulty will lead to a decrease in proportion correct;. as. _the.: amount of 
time 
allowed is increased, with difficulty held constant, the probability of success 
will increase. It will also be seen that, like Furneaux (1961), normal ogives are 
assumed to express relationships between response time and probability of 
success, and between difficulty and probability of success. 
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The plane AB in Fig. 2 is at a point corresponding to a large valve of T, 
response time. The ability surface (curve) at this point has a median 
indicated by point C and this in turn corresponds to a difficulty level 
at which the probability of success is . 5. According to Thurstone, if T is 
already a generous time allowance, any further increase in T will have relatively 
little effect on the "psychometric curve" ACB. On the basis of these 
assumptions, Thurstone is then able to propose a definition of "power or 
altitude. which is independent of the speed of any performance". 
"The ability of an individual subject to perform 
a specified kind of task is the difficu4ty E at 
which the probability is I that he will do the task 
in infinite time". (original in italics) 
A practical procedure for determining E by means of interpolation is 
described by Thurstcne. That is, various points can be determined experimentally, 
for example, by measuring response times at different difficulty values. 
Brierley (1969) has criticized this approach on several grounds. For 
instance, the model disregards the effects of continuance at high levels of 
difficulty which is likely to produce distortions in the data. These 
distortions would in turn affect the adequacy of any interpolation which is 
attempted. As a consequence, the ability surface becomes much more complex 
than Thurston realised. A further limitation of Thurstone's model is his 
failure to be consistent in. his definition of P. At one point he refers to P as 
the probability "that the individual subject will successfully complete a task" 
and later, he refers to P as "the proportion of successful solutions". 
Despite its limitations, Thurstone's model, with the exception of 'power', 
can fit Furneaux's theory quite closely (Brierley 1969). It gives rise to three 
dimensions which can be scaled (accuracy, time, difficulty) which enable an 
ability surface to be generated. Any given point on the surface will depend 
on the time limits (defined externally or internally), item difficulty. ' 
continuance, and so on. However, it seems., highly unlikely-that such a surface 
would ever be achieved in practice JBr any individual. It would be very 
difficult indeed to so manipulate practical, testing so as 
ito 
achieve error-free 
solutions at varied item difficulties, 
-for example., pT  
Despite the limitations of the Thurstone's model, "Brierley (1969) 
argues for a multi-dimensional concept, of power-based on time, difficulty 
and accuracy. He suggests that if reliable and practicable units can be found 
for these dimensions, the generation of an ability surface is possible. 
Drawing on the power concept in physics, Brierley defines 'power' as the 
work done in unit time. It is equal to the product of the number of unit 
solutions achieved A difficulty x time -1. This formulation does have a 
number of practical obstacles. The most important of these is that of 
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defining a unit task. Although there has been an attempt to fractionate 
test items into units (Restle and Davis 1962) its outcome was suggestive 
rather than definite. Brierley therefore accepted that for the present, 
it will have to be aasumeddthat items of approximately equivalent difficu$ty 
will have to be used. The second major problem, that of difficulty scaling 
and the determination of item difficulty, can be resolved by using 
Furneaux's (196, ) procedures. Using this model of power, Brierley (1969) 
was able to demonstrate that diagnosed neutotics performed significantly 
less efficiently than did normal subjects. The details of Brierley's 
investigation are described elsewhere in this thesis. 
The work of both Thurston and Brierley would suggest that 'power' is 
a complex concept without a generally accepted definition (see Heim 1970). 
As noted earlier, Eysenck's conception of power does not emerge clearly in 
his writings. 
Eysenck (1967a) in a detailed exposition of his views on test 
performance has also examined the relationships between learning and 
intelligence and learning and personality. Several studies are cited which 
link learning, intelligence and personality via his theory and as certain 
hypotheses in the present research are directly related to these, his 
hypotheses and the relevant evidence will be considered here. 
Eysenck hypothesises that introverts should be superior to extraverts 
in terms of acquired knowledge. This deduction follows from two propositions, 
firstly that they have greater cortical arousal than extraverts and secondly, 
that this enhances their consolidation processes. Hence, on a task which 
samples such learning, for example, the Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale, 
introverts should achieve higher scores. Two studies (Eysenck 1947 p. 124-125 
and Farley, unpublished - quoted in Eysenck 1967a) produced evidence 
consistent with this hypothesis. However, in neither study did the effect 
of age appear to be considered, so that the data do not necessarily provide 
unequivocal support for-the primary hypothesis. 
Other studies of test performance and personality have also produced 
results consistent with various hypotheses derived from Eysenck's theory. 
There is some evidence that given the opportunity, extraverts tend to opt for 
speed.. whereas ; introverts prefer accuracy, although the evidence on the 
latter consists only of a non-significant trend (Eysenck 1967a). 
predictions with regard to N appear to be much more complicated but 
under appropriate conditions, such as stressed testing, the hypothesised 
curvelinear relations emerge in the data. Eysenck (1967a) also notes that 
if the situation is not perceived as anxiety producing individual differences 
in N are unimportant. In later sections of this thesis detailed consideration 
will be given to studies of the relationship between E, N and intelligence. 
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The more pervasive role of N in test performance has been exemplified 
in a study carried out by Lienert (1963)9the data from which were 
subsequently reanalysed by Eysenck and White (1964). Lienert (1963) was able to 
show that children who differed in N also generate data on tests that then 
lead to differences in the patterns of correlation and factorial solutions. 
In their re-analyses of the same data, Eysenck and White (1964) were able 
to demonstrate a more clearly marked factorial structure in the stable than 
in the labile children. 
In the most recent statement of his view of intelligence, Eysenck (1973 
has attempted to relate the studies of cortical evoked potentials and 
intelligence to his theory. A number of investigations have now found 
significant correlations between potentials evoked by auditory and visual 
stimuli and intelligence, measured on a variety of tests. 
Shucard and Horn (1972) correlated visual evoked potential latencies 
with scores on a battery of primary mental ability tests. The tests were 
selected to give measures of the major second order factors (G, Gf, Gc etc. ). 
108 subjects, of both sexes, ranging in age from 16 to 68 years were tested. 
The Furneaux Speed and Level tests were included in the battery. Shucard 
and Horn found evidence of low but reliable correlations between the latency 
of the average evoked potential and various measures of ability, long latencies 
being associated with low ability and short latencies with high ability. The 
correlations ranged between +. 05 and -. 32, the majority being around -. 15 
(For 100 subjects, an 'n'of . 195 or greater is significant at the . 05 level). 
In their overall analysis, the correlations between Of and Gc with the latency 
measures were similar and there were significant correlations with simple 
cognitive processes such as perceptual motor speed. 
When age was partialled out of the correlations, only those correlations 
between an overall measure of G, Gf and Go remained significant. The 
correlations between Of for intellectual speed (Gfsp) and level (Gflv) were 
reduced to non-significance (from -. 21 to -. 13 and from -. 20 to -. 13 
respectively). No attempt was made to examine the data for sex differences, 
even though there is sufficient evidence of such differences on a variety 
of cognitive measures (Cooley and Lohnes 1968). 
Hendrickson (1972), studying a group of 93 paid adult volunteers, used 
auditory evoked potentials correlated with the verbal, spatial and total 
scores of the AH4. Virtually all of the correlations she found were 
significant at the . 05 level, ranging from -. 3 to -. 5 for latency and -. 22 to 
-. 37 for amplitude with total score. Age effects were examined in her study 
but were found to have no appreciable effects on the correlations. Hendrickson 
has suggested that in part, the reason for the higher level of correlation 
is due to the more adequate measurements obtained from auditory as opposed to 
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visual stimuli. 
Bysenck (19744k has suggested that the measures of evoked potential 
may reflect the speed of processing information as it enters the 
cortex, thereby bringing this work into the theoretical framework which 
he has proposed for intelligence. 
Among the more important problems raised by the $ysenck-Ferneaux 
approach are those of the general validity of Furneaux's work, the 
empirical evidence proposed as supporting predictions from Eysenck's 
theory as these affect test performance, and the concept and measurement 
of speed. These problems are considered in the next Chapters. 
.. ý 
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IV. THE PROBLEMS OF SPEED. 
1. The Conceptual Problem 
The problems inherent in conventional tests led Furneaux (1961) 
to conclude that some other approach to intelligence testing should be 
devised. In effect, this involved "setting on one side the whole of the 
approach to cognitive function which originated with Binet" and which had 
"come to be taken for granted ever since". The alternative approach 
devised by Furneaux was based on evidence (Slater 1938; Tate 1950; 
Furneaux 1948) that studies of response rate were "simple, unambiguous and 
theoretically and practically relevant". Further, measures of response-rate 
also appeared to be such that they were not easily "redefined in terms of 
sets of simple determinants.... " These somewhat bold assertions are 
considered in this and the next Chapter. 
The investigation of individual differences in the timing of stellar 
transits - the personal equation - probably represents the earliest of the 
systematic attempts to examine speed in human abilities (Boring 1957). 
Galton's interest in individual differences encompassed speed of reaction 
and in one form or another, psychologists have retained an interest in the 
speed of mental functioning up until the present day. This is witnessed 
by the ongoing research on speed of reaction in the elderly (Botwinick 1973), 
temperamental differences in speed (Eysenck 1967; Cattell 1971) and in the 
current research on reaction times (Laming 1968; Smith 1968). 
Before 1900, much of the research on speed was focussed on individual 
differences in reaction time and the factors which influenced reaction speed. 
After 1900, there emerged a newer trend that began to focus on speed in 
relation to mental ability. As McFarland (1928) points out in his review of 
research on the role of speed in mental ability, the emphasis shifted to 
investigations of the relationship between "quickness" (as measured by 
reaction time) and "brightness", indexed by school performance and teachers 
judgments. 
With the development of tests of intelligence, a new criterion of 
"brightness" became available to researchers, and it was with such criteria 
that relationships with reacticO time were sought. This research has 
persisted although its focus is changed. Much of the current research on 
reaction time and intelligence is concerned with aging, reaction time being 
regarded as the major index of speed decline in the elderly (Botwinick 1973). 
Earlier studies were concerned mainly with younger subjects and the problems 
they investigated bad a different theoretical orientation. 
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A further aspect of research on speed emerged with the advent of 
group tests of intelligence and their widespread use during the First 
Wmrld War (Boring 1957). Psychologists and testhrs alike became concerned 
with the effects of imposing time limits to facilitate data gathering and 
a number of studies were instigated in an attempt to evaluate the effects 
of time limits (May 1921 - see McFarland 1928; Ruch and Koerth 1923; 
Jones 1959). 
Thorndike and his colleagues (1927) were responsible for one of the 
major theoretical analyses in which they posited various dimensions of the 
intellect, among which was 'speed'. Their analysis had an important impact 
on a number of researchers (e. g Peak and Boring 1926) both at1the time of 
their exposition and subsequently (Furneaux 1961; Eysenck 1974). Several 
other important theoretical analyses and empirical studies also appeared 
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in the following decade (Spearman 19w; Thurstone 1938). 
The last of the major foci for studies of speed probably had its 
origins at the beginning of this century when speed as a special ability 
was being investigated (Tate 1948). 
The nature of the problem of speed is illustrated by Hunsicker's(1925) 
comments, viz: 
"The history of mental measurement shows few if any 
questions that have given rise to more general and 
persistent inquiry than has this one, the relation 
between rate and ability..... there is full agreement 
that there are individual differences in rate of work 
and individual differences in ability .... The relationship 
between these two variables is the crux of the 
disagreement. Is there any relationship ? If any, how 
much? Is the quality of one trait revealed in the 
quality of the other ? Is rate of work any indication 
of mental ability ? If it is, of what significance is 
the fact for mental measurements? " 
Although the approach to these questions has changed since they were 
summarised by Hunsicker (i. e. the use of factor analysis) the questions 
11 themselves have not changed. In one form'or another, they'-ha Ve persisted 
through the years (Spearman 193t; Spearman and Jones 1950; Tate 1948; 
Lord 1956; Jones 1959; "Brierley 1960,1969; Cattell 1971, among others), and 
despite the substantial bödy'of research, psychologists appear still to 
be confronted by "this vexed question of speed" (Cattell'1971, p. 64). 
It might be presupposed that in talking about 'speed, psychologists 
have at their disposal a common basis for doing so. That is, that they have 
available a clear operational definition of speed that is generally accepted 
and one which acts as a referent for their academic discourses. It is only 




Spearman (19. V) has stated that 
"As regards the measuring of spg"ed, there is 
no great difficulty; for (with suitable 
arrangements) not much risk is run in 
inferring the duration of a person's mental 
processes from the time he takes to respond 
to the stimulus". (p. 245) 
This seemingly simple prescription conceals a number of major 
problems: it presupposes that all the mental processes between 'stimulus 
and response' are directed at 'problem solving' and that there is a 
suitable procddure for measuring these. Neither of these suppositions 
is acceptable, for reasons which will be presented below. 
Peak and Boring (1926) have described some of the possibilities that 
might account for a difference in the amount of time required by two 
subjects to solve a test item. As they state, "the loss of time may be 
interstitial or it may be inherent in the intelligent act". In the 
interstitial case, the time difference arises because the slower subject 
while performing the relevant operations at the same speed as the fast 
subject, lost time "by irrelevant activities or by self distraction". 
In the alternative case, according to Peak and Boring, the time loss may 
"be inherent in the intelligent act, if, as far as the analysis can be 
pressed, it aan be found that the constituents of the act occur more slowly 
in the poor subject than in the good subject..... Such a localisation we 
think of as a first step toward a solution of the problem of the nature of 
intelligence". On the basis of their investigation, unfortunately confined 
to only 5 subjects, Peak and Boring concluded in favour of the latter view. 
It is also unfortunate that these workers did not attempt to develop a theory 
to account for their findings. Until the appearance of Furneaux's(1961) 
analysis of problem solving, there was no significant attempt to develop 
such a theory. 
Another of the findings of Peak and Boring, that of a significant 
correlation between item-solution time on a test of intelligence and a 
measure of reaction time, inspired a number of attempts at replication 
(Goodenough 1935; Farnsworth et a).; 1927; Lemmon 1928), all of which failed 
to confirm their results. However none of these other studies recognised 
the most important feature of the original, namely, that the index 
correlated with reaction time was based on individually timed items. 
Instead, they correlated time to complete the test, and total scores, 
with their own measures of reaction time. 
The Peak and Boring study was published at a time when most 
psychologists appeared to have a fairly clear conception, at least at the 
operational level, of what constituted a test of speed. The conventional 
speed tests required subjects to engage in repetitive activities, such as 
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letter cancellation, detecting differences in simple shapes, adding 
3 digits, and so on. (Burt 1909; McCall 1916; Highsmith 192 ; Hunsicker 1925). 
In 1943, Cattell defined speed as the "rate ä repetitive performance, 
where all content material is perceptually given, through all cognitive 
levels". Thurston (1937) regarded speed in terms of "the number of tasks 
that are completed in unit time, and these tasks are usually easy". A 
similar definition, emphasizing the easiness of tasks has recently 
been presented by Anastasi (1968), and most of the published studies on 
speed employ tests which conform to these prescriptions (e. g. Egan 1959; 
Lord 1956; Lohnes 1966). In the majority of studies, no attempt is made to 
time individual items and it is implicitly assumed that inter-item time 
is a legitimate component of 'mental speed'. While technical difficulties 
in item-time measurement are no doubt important when items are answered 
rapidly, this is not the case when more difficult tests (such as "power" 
or "level" tests) are used. However, even when such tests are used, it is 
usually 'total time to complete the test' or 'number of items solved on a 
time-limit test'that provides the index of speed. 
A somewhat different approach to the measurement of 'mental speed', 
following the influence of Peak and Boring, is also evident in the research 
literature. A number of investigators have used individual item times in 
their studies (Sutherland 1934; Slater 1938; Tate 1948; Cane and Horn 1951; 
Furneaux 1961; Russell 1968; Brierley 1969). These studies have also 
employed items of the non-repetitive type at different levels of 'difficulty', 
either on their own or alongside conventional speed measures. Such a 
divergence in trends was noted by McFarland in 1928 . 
Perhaps this bifurcation was a reflection of the personalities of the 
researchers, extraverts opting for the conventional procedures, infroverts 
for the individual timing approach; 
The characteristics of these two distinct trends in research can be 
summarised in terms of differences between the timing procedures used, and 
the content and difficulty levels of the items. What they share is the 
concept and problem of 'speed'., 
At an empirical level, one of the fundamental questions is the 
equivalence of these divergent procedures. It will be argued in the 
next chapter that, given the techniques for speed measurement employed in 
conventional speed tests, such equivalence will be difficult to establish 
so long as researchers adhere to certain procedures for gathering their 
data. Before doing so, it is necessary to consider certain conceptual 
problems. In doing this the writer is adopting Furneaux's (1961) approach, 
that of the "logical atomist" but one who'is also influenced by the work 
of Peak and Boring. 
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Item solution time, test completion time or rate are gross 
measures. They span a sequence of events which may be different 
for the individuals being measured and yet lead to a conclusion that 
they have produced equivalent performances. A crude example will 
illustrate this. Individual 'A' completes an item in 10 seconds, as 
does individual 'B', except that the latter happened to break the point 
of his pencil and had to get another before he could record his response. 
Individual 'B' actually took only three seconds to get the solution but 
spent the rest of the time exchanging pencils. Are we to conclude that the 
speed of B is equivalent to that of A? 
While the above example can be dismissed as an instance of 'random 
error' in the time measurement, it is readily replaced by a more 
relevant psychological analysis, derived from the study of reaction times 
and the fine-grain analysis of certain motor acts such as tapping 
(Frith 1973; Spielman 1963). 
In the study of reaction times, a number of investigators have been 
concerned to divide up the total time (T) into at least two components, 
the time occupied in executing the motor act and the time occupied by 
the 'mental events'. Birren (1964) has reported that the Movement Time in 
simple reactions is not appreciably altered (i. e the muscular reaction) as 
individuals get older. The age effects on reaction time appear to be 
more a consequence of the other aspects of reacting. (These findings are 
discussed in greater detail in the chapter devoted to reaction times). 
For present purpodes, it is sufficient to note the sub-division of T 
into Movement Time (MT) and the Reaction Time (TR) 
i. e T= MT + TR 
In his study of problem solving, Furneaux (1961) attempted to remove 
the equivalent of MT from the item solution times by special measures 
takeh before the problems were submitted to his subjects so that his 
time measures were in effect those equivalent to TR in the above equation. 
While such a refinement may seem of minor significance when dealing with 
events of extended duration, for example 2 or 3 minutes, MT or its 
equivalent, may occupy a substantial proportion of T when the full 
sequence is 60 seconds or less. 
The components of TR have been the subject of a number of conceptual 
analyses in studies of choice reaction time. These will also be described 
in greater detail in a later chapter. For present purposes, it will be 
sufficient to describe that presented by Smith (1968) in his review of 
research on choice reaction times, a paradigm which is more appropriate 
to test-item solution than is simple readtion time. 
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In addition to MT, Smith (1968) identifies four components: 
1. The raw stimulus is "preprocessed"" until a 
representation of it is formed. 
2. The preprocessed stimulus is then compared with 
some other model in memory. On the basis of these 
comparisons, the stimulus is categorized. 
3. An appropriate response is selected. 
4. The response to be executed is programmed. 
A theoretical analysis such as this is useful in helping to 
conceptualize the possible sequence of events although even at this 
sipple legel, there are a number of problems. For example, theoretician 
are as yet uncertain of which, if any, of these stages occurs in parralel 
with one or more of the others or whether the events are serial. 
Whatever the case may be, there seems to be agreement that choice 
reactions can be conceptualized in terms of a number of components 
each spanning some period of time. This type of approach has of course 
been used by a number of writers. Welford (1969) for example, has 
outlined the difficulty in deciding which of a number of components is 
primarily responsible for the observed slowing in the sensory motor 
performance of older people. In discussing the possible sources, he 
suggests that similar factors may be responsible for the slowing also 
observed in "mental tasks". Welford (1969) has listed the component 
processes as including : 
1. Recovery of material from memory 
2. Short term retention 
3. Strategies of action 
On the basis of the foregoing, it would not be inappropriate to 
conceptualise TR as being comprised of a number of components (c) which 
take time to occur, viz 
TR. =Cl+C2+C3- Cn 
so that, T now becomes 
T=MT+Ci+C2+C3+--+C 
For the present, the above'equation' should not be regarded as an 
algebraic statement but as a shorthand psychological formulation. 
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The analysis of T can be taken at least one stage further. In 
problem solving, not all of the 'C' components need necessarily be 
involved in the mental processes doing the actual solving. Component Cl 
might be 'trying to understand what the problem actually is', C8 might 
be the 'checking mechanism' suggested by Furneaux (1961). For purposes 
of discussion, let C4 be that component in which the 'brain is working on 
the problem'. Now, possibly in the same way that vigil ace cannot be 
sustained indefinitely, or that even in such a simple task as tapping 
a stylus on a metal plate, there are gaps in performance (Frith 1973) 
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TABLE 1. An illustration of how hypothetical time components 
could summate to produce identical solution times, despite the 
components themselves being different. 
Component Solution 





1 22 5 1 10 
2 11 6 2 10 
3 15 3 1 10 
In the above table, only some of the C component times have 
been utilised and the W and B component times have been summed. 
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it is probable that there will be "gaps" or "blocks" (Bills 1931) 
which arise during C4. These may arise because of something analogous 
to work produced fatigue, distractionc, some micro-rhythm of the type 
described by Wolff (1967) or even the sort of mechanism which governs 
intermittent visual fixfations (Shackel 1967). On the further assumption 
that we are able to discriminate and hence time the "work" and "rest/ 
interruptions" in C41 we would be able to express C4 as made up of a 
number of components. Thus 
C4 = W1+B1 + W2 + B2 +--- Wn + Bn 
where 
W1, W2, etc. = are the times spent in actual work on 
problem solving 
B19B2 etc = are the interrupt times 
Hence, T1 can2 now be re-written as 
T=MT + C1+C2+C3 + (W1+Bl+W2+B2+--+Wn+Bn)+C5+---+Cn 
The magnitude of T will also be a function of some effect of the 
"perceptual complexity" of the problem. To express this, it may be 
necessary to introduce a constant multiplier for some of the C components, 
or to add a constant to others. Different constants may be required for 
yet other C components depending on the difficulty of the item, and so on. 
The main point to arise from this excursion intb psycholagical atomism 
is "Which of these components times (one, some, or all) is to provide the 
index of speed? " 
In his 1967 paper, Eysenck presented a table illustrating this question 
for total score. A similar table has been drawn up to illustrate the same 
point with reference to 'speed'. (See TABLE 1. 
) 
The atomization of T has been confirmed to a general statement about an 
individual item time. No attempt has been made to include the additional 
components that might arise when the total time (TT)-to complete-a test is 
being considered. In this case TT would be comprised of T's for each item 
as well as the times taken between. items. Also, it is possible that 
certain of the components of T might not be called into operation once the 
subject has had some practice at solving problems of a certain type. 
The analysis of problem solving processes is not yet sufficiently far 
advanced for any pronouncement to be made on the validity of the foregoing 
suggestions. There does however appear to be some agreement that a 
multicomponent model is relevant to complex motor performances and to 
choice reaction times (Welford 1969; Smith 1968). There is furL. her a,, 
suggestion that such a model is appropriate for mental tasks (Welford 1969). 
Furneaux's (1961) speculations about the nature of the problem-solving 
mechanism would also support this contention. Similarly, some of the 
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models described by Newell and Simon (1972) and others are 
conslstant; with such a formulation. Newell and Simon (1972) describe 
various information-processing systems (IPS) which involve multi-component 
processes, as is illustrated in Fig-3. 
Thus, while a multi-component model seems to be appropriate, it is 
difficult to specify which of the many possible components is to be 
regarded as providing a basis for speed measurement. It should be 
emphasised that the preceding discussion has been mainly concerned with 
the time to solve the single item, and that even at this level, there 
are a number of complications in conceptualising 'speed'. These 
complications are extended when the unit becomes 'the number of items 
completed or solved' in a given period or some transformation of this index. 
In the final analysis however, the major constraint resides in the 
technology and data gathering procedures used. These are considered next., 
2. The Measurement Problem 
"The inconsistencies and contradictions in the 
voluminous literature suggest that either 
speed is an unstable dimension of intellect 
or that inappropriate units and methods of 
measuring it have been frequently employed". 
(Tate 1950) 
In the previous chapter an attempt was made to clarify the concept of 
mental speed. Such clarification, is essential if suitable measurement 
procedures are to be devised. Tate's (1950) comments, noted above, serve to 
illustrate some of the problems that can arise in the absence of an 
appropriate procedure for measurement. Before anything can be concluded 
about speed, it is also necessary to have an appropriate technique for 
measurement. 
In the view of the present writer, it is essential to have a measurement 
technique which ensures an isomorphism between what psychologically is 
supposed to be measured and what the instruments measure. 
The procedures for measuring 'speed' can be classified into those which 
time solutions to individual items and those which record the time to 
complete a block of items. In the latter case, researchers then proceed 
to derive some index of rate, exemplified by average item solution time, 
total time to complete 'n' items, number of items completed in 'n'minutes, etc. 
Either type'of index can be obtained from group or individual testing 
situations, and in some studies (e. g. Peak and Boring 1926), mixed procedures 
are used to obtain the required indices. The various combinations are 
presented in Table 2' with illustrative studies referenced in the cells. 
In this section, it will be argued that none of these procedures provides 
the "proper" basis for the measurement of speed. This will be followed by a 
statement on what, in view of the present writer, the 'proper' procedure 
should be if we are to Proceed to examine the role of mental speed in 
problem solving. 
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TABLE 2. Procedures for measuring speed. 
INDEX TYPE 
TEST Individual Time 
SITUATION 
Peak & Boring (1926) 
Individual 
Brierley (1969) Test 
Group Furneaux (1961) 
Test Slater (1938) 
Block Time 
Peak & Boring (1926) 
Lord (1956) 
Flanagan et al. (1964) 
Note. Studies repeated in the cells employed both 
types of procedure. 
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Although group-administered tests obviously facilitate an efficient 
collection of data, the group testing situation has a number of inherent 
problems which adversely influence the quality of data collected. Some 
of these problems are especially important in speed measurement irrespective 
of the type of index ultimately used in the data analysis. Other, 
problems differentially affect individual item and 'block of items' times. 
Evidence for these statements is somewhat limited, mainly because authors 
generally fail to comment on these in the published studies. However, the 
nature of the difficulties can be assessed from a number of pub]ished 
reports (Hunsicker 1925; Tate 1950; Lord 1956; Lohnes 1968; Russell 1968; 
among others), as well as from more general analyses of group testing 
(Hei: m l970; Vernon 1960; Cronbach 1970; Anastasi 1968). 
Hunsicker (1925) employed both group and individual data collection 
procedures. In describing her study, she noted that even though her groups 
were in the process of being tested, they were "in the main, although not 
entirely free from interruptions ". She also expressed her concern with 
the "dishonesty" which arises in a group test setting,, siting as evidence 
one (unreferenced) study which revealed that "fifty per cent of the class 
had cheated". The Hartshorne and May (1928) studies clearly indicated the 
severity of this problem on even simple 'speed' tests. As they noted - 
"..... even such slight changes in the situation 
as between crossing out A's and putting dots in 
squares are sufficient to alter the amount of 
deception both in individuals and in groups". (p. 382). 
This problem is not confined to children or to era. In his 1956 study, 
Lord pointed out that for one of his measures of speed - viz. the number 
of the last item attempted - there is ".. reason to believe that many or all 
of the examinees who answered the last item of the speeded tests skipped 
many items or responded at random", despite being instructed not to do so. 
Hunsicker (1925) also cites evidence for the unreliability of data 
obtained from group testing. After assessing the various procedures for 
collecting group data, she states 
"Not one has been found which gave evidence when 
in actual use, of any fair degree of control of 
elimination of irrelevant factors. In all likelihood, 
group testing by its very nature increases not only 
the number but the effect of disturbing elements in 
the situation". 
After comparing her group and individual data, she states further 
"..... the cone-ldbion seems beyond cavil that the group method is not 
dependable for securing measures of rate". As a consequence of the 
problems encountered, Hunsicker discarded her group data. 
A more recent example of such difficulties is provided by data from 
Project Talent (Flanagan et al. 1964; Lohnes 1966; Cooley and Lohnes 1968). 
In discussing the low reliabilities of the speed data, Lohnes (1960 
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states that these were "brought about by widespread discrepancies in the 
timing of the tests in different schools" (p. 4-9). A similar difficulty 
was reported in one of the Project Talent follow-up studies (Shaycroft 1967, 
cited iii Cooley and Lohnes 1968) where the poor stability of the speed 
test scores was attributed to "anomalies in retest administration" 
(Cooley and Lohnes 1968, p. 1-16). Such difficulties arose despite the 
apparent sophistication of the tests and the careful plans made for their 
administration (Flanagan et al. 1964). 
The above observations are consistent with what is known about the 
limitations of group tests when examiners are required to impose several 
short time-limits in the course of testing (Anastasi 1968). Characteristically 
speed tests are of short duration (Highsmith 1925; Bernstein 1924; Lord 1956; 
Flanagan et aL. 1964) and are thus particularly prone to unreliability in 
their administration. 
The more general limitations of group test procedures have been amply 
documented (Anastasi 1968; Cronbach 1970; Heim. 1970; Vernon 1960) and need 
not be detailed here. As these aforementioned authors note, they are 
useful for screening purposes but inadequate for precise measurement. 
Insofar as the measurement of speed is concerned, group tests cannot 
provide an appropriate basis for the measurement of performance; they may 
either depress relationships or distort them. 
Group testing, despite its limitations, has been used to provide 
solution times for individual items by use of special timing devices or 
other procedures (Sutherland 1934; Slater 1938; Tate 1948; Cane and Horn 1951; 
Furneaux 1961; Russell 1968). Different techniques have been used to measure 
these times. Slater (1938), following Sutherland (1934) used three sets of 
cards numbered 0 to 9. The cards were placed on a table in such a way that 
one number from each set was visible to the testees. Subjects were 
required to record the numbers displayed when an item was completed. One 
card was turned by hand every two seconds so that a crude item time was 
measured. 
Tate , (1948) had items individually typed on cards. The subject 
wrote his answer and the time announced by the testor on each card. 
Furneaux (1961) employed a mechanical device which was other wise similar 
to that used by Slater (1938). Other timing procedures have been used, 
notably that by Russell (1968). In this study, a special cyclometer 
displayed a set of three numbers, each varying in an apparently random 
fashion but Chang in - ate aýýfýxedr; pýtý. At the beginning, and after completing 
an item, the subject was required to look at the screen and record the number 
displayed. By a special decoding procedure, the time to work through a 
complete item could be computed. 
Although such times are reported as 'solution times, this description 
is far from acceptable. Such times represent the duration of a sequence 
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of activities, from turbing a page, reading the problem, thinking 
about its answer, checking the answer and then recording it, together with 
any of a number of other irrelevant acts, such as correcting the solution, 
succumbing to distractions, changing pencils, among others. While 
obviously better than the gross rate measures commonly used, these times 
are nevertheless crude. Even using a cyclometer of the type described 
by Russell (1968), having to read the time adds time which is irrelevant 
to the problem solving process. Russell (1968) affirms "... it must be recognised 
that the time score is not a pure measure of the time to solution of 
individual items". 
Brierley (1969) reports a brief investigation which he conducted into 
the time of irrelevant activities. In answering the Matrices, he estimates 
that "more than 3 minutes may well be spent simply turning pages and writing 
answers". It is further assumed that in these procedured the subjects will 
hegin working on the problem immediately it comes into view. Such an 
assumption has not to this writer's knowledge been supported by appropriate 
studies. 
In an attempt to overcome some of the difficulties introduced by inter- 
stitial activities, Furneaux (1961) used a special correction factor. This 
time constant was individually determined on the basis of subsidiary studies 
of the dame subjects used in the main investigation, the constant being 
sub-tracted from the individual item times. While this is a refinement, 
it still does not insure accurate individual item times. Indeed, it is not 
possible to know how Furneaux (1961) determined such a correction factor as 
he does not give further details. In any case, such irrelevant activity 
times need to be partialled out of the data for each of the items that is to 
be used in reaching the answers to the research problems. 
Some of the problems inherent in testing large groups can be overcome by 
testing small groups of four to six subjects. Hunsicker (1922) employed 
this ppocedure as did Cane and Horn (1951). These last mentioned authors 
devised an ingeneous apparatus which enabled them to get fairly accurate 
measures of individual item times. Their apparatus consisted of a kymograph 
with seven recording pens. One pen made a mark every 5 seconds. The 
remaining pens were connected to Answer Recorders, one for each of six subjects. 
Test items were contained in a booklet. When the subject had recorded a 
written answer on the answer recorder, he had to turn a knob which appeared 
in an apperture in the Answer Recorder. While the knob was being turned, 
the kymograph pen attached to his recorder vibrated. At other times, the pen 
was still, drawing a straight line »O the kymograph. Thus, by measuring the 
length of the line against the 5 second marks, it was possible to get a 
measure item time. However, this item time still included irrelevant 
components, such as writing the solution, preparing to turn the knob for the 
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next answer space etc. 
. 
While individual testing overcomes the many problems of group 
presentation and recording, it does not necessarily remove all of the 
difficulties. While the testor may be able to adjust the recorded times for 
some of the interstitial overt acts, it is not possible to correct for 
covert effects, such as knowing when the subject has actually begun his 
attempts at finding a solution. The Nufferno Test procedures require 
surreptitious timing in an attempt to overcome some of these distorting 
features. The present author, having used these tests in a clinical setting, 
is well aware of their timing limitations. Although the stopwatch is 
concealed, the testor has to record times on a duplicate answer sheet which 
of necessity, has to remain in the subjects view. Hence, the testee can 
become aware of the fact that each time a solution is written, the testor 
records some numbers on another sheet of paper. Inaccuracies also arise 
when the solutions are presented at a rate which the testor can't handle. 
Brierley (1°969) has also reported similar experiences. He notes that in 
addition to subjects becoming aware that they are being timed, it is sometim3s 
difficult to define precisely when the answer is written. He states 
"It is not uncommon for a single letter answer to be begun then left whilst 
the answer is re-checked before it is finally completed. Similarly a 
subject will often spend an appreciable period following the recording of an 
answer still checking that item before passing on to the next". (p. 159). 
Manual and electrical stopwatches, and more recently, millisecond 
timers are used in individual testing situations. Even under these circumstances, 
some researchers time blocks of items or individual as well as blocks of items 
(Peak and Boring 192¢). Such techniques however introduce certain problems 
which may or may not be of any consequence. Some of these problems have been 
highlighted in the previous paragraphs, A further difficulty is the possible 
differential effect of obvious vs. surreptitious timing, or what Ferneaux 
(1955) has called 'stressed' and 'unstressed'-speed, respectively. As these 
procedures have a differential effect on performance (Furneaux (1955), it is 
necessary to treat the different studies separately : one cannot presume that 
'natural speed' has been measured if the fact of timing is obvious. 
In recent years a number of investigators have used complicated 
techniques in order to get away from some of the more obvious defects described 
in the previous paragraphs. Brierley (1969) constructed a special apparatus 
so that very little time would intervene between successive items. By housing 
the timing apparatus in a separate room, by arranging for the timing to 
begin only when the test item was presented, and by enabling the answer to 
be recorded when an electrical switch was depressed, the time added to 
problem solving time by the apparatus was trivialized. While such 
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of course remove those components of time added by interstitial 
activities in the subject. This problem remains however in the present 
study as well as in other studies. 
The present writer has employed a computer based control of item- 
presentation and timing to circumvent the problems of apparatus time. 
While the apparatus will be described in a subsequent chapter, it is 
worth noting at this point that timing was initiated only when the test 
item was exposed and terminated when the subject depressed a response 
button mechanically linked to a microswitch. Inter-item times were of 
short duration (about 0.5 sec: ) and constant for all subjects. One major 
limitation of this approach, which only became apparent after this study was 
completed should also be noted here, The short delay between responding 
to one item and being confronted with the next means that the item is 
present even though the ibject may not be ready -or willing to begin 
working on it. This therefore introduces a potential interstitial time - 
one cannot know when the subject actually began working on the item. 
All that is recorded Is response latency. Such a problem could be partly 
solved by interspersing a message which in effect tells the subject to 
press an 'Item Presentation Button' when he is ready for the next problem. 
This would not be necessary if the research was concerned with forced 
presentation or massed practice, although even here it would be difficult 
to record the time when the subject began working on the problem. 
A variety of other procedures is available for the presentation of test 
material. These take the form of self-contained devices or else apparatus 
linked to computers (see papers in Elithorn and Jones 1973; Gathercole 1968; 
Gedye 1966; Miller 1968). However, none of these procedures is specifically 
designed for gathering accurate solution times. 
Figure 4 is an attempt to schematize some of the foregoing discussion:., 
The dashed line at the top represents the hypothesized periods of mental 
activity concerned with solving the problem. The 'true' problem solving time 
is the sum of components V, W, X and Y. 'a' marks the onset of the process, 
the the point at which a solution is available. The second line represents 
Apparatus Time. From the point of view of the procedure, the problem 
could have been presented anywhere between 'A' and 'B'. Also, the end of 
timing could take place anywhere between-'C' andA'D', depending on what is 
required of the subject once he has a solution to offer. - 
For example, 
if one of a set of keys has to be pushed to record a multiple choice answer, 
some of the time between 'C' and 'D', will be taken up in locating the 
correct key. 
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While the discussion to this point may imply an unrealistic demand 
for precision, it can be argued that until such time as the measurement 
problems are removed, research must be of limited value and any theory 
based on it inappropriately speculative. It is the impression of this 
writer that insufficient attention has been paid to the measurement problem 
and to an analysis of what is supposed to be measured. Yet many scientific 
advances are contingent on technical developments and until such time as 
the measurement problems are overcome, theoretical speculations can be 
trivial. Unfortunately, the research and theory on mental speed has failed 
to take such considerations into account. 
The rush into speculation is nowhere stronger than in the factorial 
analyses of 'speed tests'. Writers have ignored the quality of their data 
and have proceeded to erect elaborate structures on data which are 
unworthy of such efforts. The problem is that if mental speed is to be 
investigated using factorial techniques, then the method of investigation is 
predetermined by the method of analysis. Proper scientific research 
requires the opposite. Factorial procedures need large amounts of data. 
The most economical way to gathdr such data is by group testing large numbers 
of subjects. Yet, as has been demonstrated in this chapter, group testing 
cannot, by its very nature, provide the quality of data necessary for the 
proper investigation of mental speed. This was apparent well before 
factor analysis achieved its popularity as a data analysis technique in the 
1930's. It was made explicit by McFarland in his 1927 review and emphasised 
by Peak and Boring in their 1926 study. 
If there is some substance to the multicomponent conception of speed, it 
. is necessary to 
isolate the speed components for proper measurement. 
However,. because of our current technical limitations, the basic unit of 
analysis must be the single item time. Such times are subject to 
distortions, but at least they are minimal. These times should be measured 
in individual rather than in group test situations as the latter make it 
almost impossible to cope with distorting factors. 
As noted earlier, Furneaux (1961) asserted that item times (response-rates) 
were' "simple and unambiguous"' and that they could not easily be redefined 
in terms of simpler determinants. From the foregoing discussion, it is 
suggested that his assertions are unfounded. Theoretically and practically 
'speed' measurement presents a number of important difficulties which are 
only partly overcome by timing individual items during individual testing. 
The further assertion that response rates cannot be defined in terms of 
simpler determinants is also questionable. There is sufficient evidence 
that response times are significantly influenced by contextual factors. 
Furneaux's difficulty scaling is based directly on measured response times. 
While difficulty may be independent of the sample, it cannot, be.. independent 
of measured times. Hence, it 
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cannot be independent of context. Whether or not this is an important 
restriction on Furneaux's solution of the difficulty problem is a task 
for further research, which, in addition to examining contextual factors, 
will also need to examine the role of instructions and other factors on 
performance. What evidence there is suggests that on this issue, 
Furneaux was over-optimistic. 
3. The Role of Instructions. 
There is very little research in psychology on the effects of 
instructions on behaviour during testing and the ways in which such 
instructions and their various nuances interact with other factors to 
produce differential outcomes. Researchers may fail to publish 
instructions or when reported, no evidence is given that subjects have 
responded to the instructions in a way which is consistant with the 
researcher's intentions. Attention has already been drawn to some of the 
ways in which the conduct of a study may contradict standardized 
instructions, either obviously or indirectly. 
The way in which instructions are given, and the ways in which they 
can then be interpreted are obviously important in research on speed. 
Cattell (1971) has emphasised how certain "speed" factors will emerge only 
when "speed" is ewphasised in the instructions. Eysenck (1967a) has 
pointed out the need to pay careful attention to structuring the test 
situation if the effects of N are to be manifest. Instructions are 
undoubtedly important here. Hence, in the design of research on speed, 
it is important to ensure that the instructions do not contain ambiguities 
and that research procedures do not contradict the researcher's intentions. 
4. Concluding Remarks. 
The problems inherent in measuring 'speed' are highly likely to 
introduce unwanted variance into solution time data. While random 
variance is usually coped with in the error term of analysis procedures, 
there is no way of knowing how much of the variance is systematic, either 
within subjects or across subjects. There would seem to be little doubt 
that "apparatus variance" is important in speed measurement. What remains 
unresolved is the question of apparatus X subject interaction and the 
extent to which it affects research on speed. 
The measurement problem in speed research also includes the type of 
material or the task which subjects confront. As will be seen a wide variety 
of tasks has been used in research on speed. These range from "Making X's", 
through letter cancellation and adding numbers to low 'difficulty' test 
items, and to items from standard intelligence tests, as well as reaction 
times. The limitations of these tads will be considered during the discussion 
of research on speed in the following chapters. 
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V. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF SPEED 
1. Simple and Choice Reaction Times and Intelligence. 
(a). Introduction: 
The study of reaction time, and the use of reaction time procedures 
have always been part of experimental psychology, and the study of the 
relationship between reaction times (as indices of speed) and intelligence 
is almost as old as experimental psychology itself. 
Reaction time procedures entered experimental psychology following 
the work of astronomers and physiological psychologists, on the 'personal 
equation'. As Boring (1957) records, the timing of various mental processes 
and the subtractive procedure were predominant activities in Wundt's 
laboratories in the 1880's. Reaction time experiments in which there is 
more than one signal and response were introduced by Donders in 1868 
(Woodworth and Schlosberg 1955). In his classification, Donders 
distinguished three main procedures. The a procedure involved only the 
single stimulus and response, the standard RT procedure. Procedure b 
required one of n responses to one of n stimuli, a procedure commonly 
known as the CRT method. The c reaction involved a single response to 
one of n stimuli. 
Much is now known about the factors affecting RT and CRT (Johnson 1923; 
Teichner 1954; Woodworth and Schlosberg 1955; Smith 1968). Both RT and CRT 
have always been the)subject of theories aimed at explaining the underlying 
determinants of each and there are many attempts to account for the time 
difference between RT and CRT (Smith 1968). Neither of these topics will be 
considered in detail here except insofar as they are related to attempts to 
link RT and CRT with intelligence. 
The association between studies of reaction times and intelligence 
stems in part from the common source of a concern with individual 
differences (Freeman 1939; Boring 1957) as well as attempts to measure such 
differences. Galton used a reaction time device to obtain data for his 
investigations of individual differences in mental ability. Galton's 
influence extended to James Cattell and the latter initiated an extensive 
programme of testing in the United States. By the last decade of the 
19th century, and extending into the early part of the 20th century, many 
psychologists and others had devised batteries of tests which frequently 
incorporated reaction time procedures. The outcomes of many of the studies 
were reviewed by Spearman (1904b), with an essentially negative conclusion; 
no relationship was found between reaction time, as well as other measures, 
and intelligence. As Spearman put it 
"The Intellectual Order harmonizes badly with 
Reaction-times" 
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TABLE 3. Some procedural differences in the 
measurement of reaction time, both simple and 
choice. 
i. Short, long, variable inter-stimulus intervals. 
ii. Pre-stimulus warning, present or absent. 
iii. Auditory, visual, tactile modality. 
iv. Lift, press, or other response (e. g. voice switch). 
v. 'Jump' response to precede responses in iv. 
vi. Right, left, preferred, non-preferred limb. 
vii. Number of practice trials, experimental trials. 
viii. Index: mean, mode of reaction times to all or 
a sub-set of trials. 
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Whipple (1904) dismissed much of the early work as being "anthropometric" 
(as distinct from the scientific or "laboratory") studies not worthy of 
attention. He concluded "that the reaction-test is quite without 
significance as a measure of mental ability (save insofar as a small mean 
variation might indicate a certain steadiness in the control and directing of 
attention)". 
The results of these early studies led to the gradual demise of the 
early tests as measures of intelligence and the loss of interest was further 
reinforced by the advent of the Binet test with its items that appeared to 
sample the higher mental processes with greater success. As McFarland (1928) 
points out, after 1900 "one finds a tendency which departs from the sensory 
reaction time towards the emphasis on speed in relation to mental ability". 
A further consequence of these early studies was the pervasive acceptance 
of the conclusion that reaction time is essentially unrelated to intelligence. 
This early response was subsequently reinforced by later studies, using the 
newer'i-erion of intelligence, which also tended to report overall trivial 
relationships. However, a closer examination of the literature reveals a 
number of studies which produce low but significant correlations between reaction 
time and intelligence. Before considering these, it is useful to examine the 
characteristics of the operations for measuring both reaction time and 
intelligence. 
b. The measurement of reaction time. 
The use of the term 'reaction time' to mean the time that has elapsed between 
the presentation of a stimulus and the completion of some reaction has had the 
unfortunate consequence of leading psychologists to assume an operational 
equivalence in the procedures used. As Yates (1961) has pointed out however, this 
assumption masks a wide range different procedures for arriving at reaction 
times. The extent of this diversity is illustrated in Tab], q 3 adapted from 
Yates (1961). This Table is not exhaustive, nor does it list the variations in 
the way in which the stimuli are presented. For example, stimulus lights can 
vary in their intensity, the visual angle they subtend, their configuration, and 
so on. 
The equivalence of the, various procedural permutations is of course an 
empirical question and there is now a substantial amount of data on some of the 
variables which can differ from one study to the next (Woodworth and 
Schlosberg 1955; Thompson 1973). Procedural differences also abound in studies 
which measure choice times (Smith 1968). 
Some of the difficulties produced by procedural variations between 
experiments have been described by (soldfart1D (1941). In his study Goldfarb 
found correlations between simple, 1 of 2 and 1 of 5 choices ranging between 
0.813 tc 0.945 for men and from 0.894 to 0.967 for women (with age partialled out) 
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In his review of five studies in which simple and choice times were 
correlated-(17 correlations) Goldfarb found a.: range 
(uncorrected) to vary between 0.27and 0.64, with a mean correlation of 0.44. 
Goldforb attributes these differences to differences in-the procedures 
employed in the other studies. Whereas his subjects, all reacted with the 
preferred hand, subjects in the other studies were required not only to 
discriminate between stimuli, but also to use the non-preferred hand for 
some of their reactions. 
Given the variety of procedural possibilities, it would be inappropriate 
to conclude anything about reaction time as a generic concept without first 
conducting appropriate studies to show that such a concept is meaningful. 
For the present, it would seem to be more appropriate to focus on the 
specifics, such as procedures and subjects, in drawing conclusions. It is 
only when the procedural permutations have been exhausted that general 
statements about reaction times will be appropriate. This view is supported 
by some of the studies discussed later, 
c. Reaction time and intelligence 
Any attempt to examine the relationship between reaction time and 
intelligence is further complicated by the operational criterion of intelligence, 
Before the advent of intelligence tests as we know them today, the criterion 
of intelligence was either teacher judgment or some derivation of rank order 
according to classroom performance (which must in any case have had an 
influence on teacher's judgments). There was no real attempt to 
differentiate between speed, power or level. Once the judgment criterion was 
replaced by the more objective test criterion, some classification of tests 
was made, the usual division being between 'speed' and 'level' or 'powers 
tests (Goodenough 1935; Lemmon 1927; Farnsworth et al.:: 1927; Goldfarb 1941). 
However, this distinction is not the only one that can complicate an 
assessment of the relationship between reaction time and intelligence. Some 
tests use a set of homogeneous items to produce a single measure of 
intelligence (e. g Ravens Matrices). Others summate a variety of scores from 
tests sampling different abilities to produce the I. Q (e. g the Wechsler Full 
Scale I. Q). Still other indices of intelligence are used. Clement (1962) 
for example used the WAIS Vocabulary sub-test as his measure of I. Q. Not all 
these tests are interchangeable as I. Q assures. This is illustrated in 
Wechsler Sub-test scores. These sub-tests show a stable differential change 
with age, the Information sub-test being the least affected and Digit 
Symbol being most affected by aging (Botivinick 1973). 
Scores on intelligence tests are derived from group and individual tests. 
Some of these scores are based on timed and others on untimed performance. 
When these basic procedural variations are them combined with the variations 
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possible in measuring reation-time, the establishment of meaningful 
generalisations is a difficult task. These difficulties are further 
complicated by subject variables, as will be illustrated later. 
d. Empirical findings using simple and choice time procedures. 
No attempt will be made here to provide a detailed review of studies of 
simple reaction time and intelligence. There is no doubt that a substantial 
number of studies have found only minor relationships (Lemmon 1927; Beck 1932; 
Clement 1962; Farnsworth et al. 1927, and many others). There have been 
reviews of this relationship which have also indicated that it is of a low 
order (Farnsworth et al. 1927; Goldfarb 1941; Hohle 1967 among others). 
However, there have also been other studies which have found correlations 
varying in magnitude as a function of the type of test, the sex and the age 
of subjects (Gaodenough 1935; Goldfarb 1941; Peak and Boring 1926). 
Goodenough (1935), somewhat inappropriately, used a cross-sectional 
design in her study of the development of what she called "the reactive process" 
She used children aged between 3-l and 111 years as subjects. The reaction 
time measure was a press reaction to the onset of a buzzer. Depending on 
the age of the child, it was given one of several tests selected from the 
Minnesota Pre-school Scale, the Merrill-Palmer Scale, the Arthur Performance 
Scale or the Stanford-Binet. All children were tested individually. Goodenough 
also divided her tests into those in which speed was or was not presumed 
to be an important factor in performance. 
Correlations between 'levels tests and reaction time varied substantially, 
from -0.64 (7 boys, l(* - ll3years) to +0.57 (12 girls aged 53years). The 
majority of the coefficients were low, and given the small numbers, within 
chance variations from zero. Goodenough also found that 20 of the 30 
coefficients were positive, and this led her to suggest that a more extensive 
study would "probably vreveal a very low positive relationship between 
reaction-speed and scores on intelligence tests that do not involve speed". 
In examining the correlations between reaction times and scores on tests 
in which speed was considered to be an important 'actor, a different pattern 
was found. In this instance the coefficients were all positive and ranged 
from +0.04 (20 boys aged 81) to +0.58 (17 boys, 71 years old). Goodenough 
suggested that the reason for some of the lower correlations appearing in 
this set could be attributed to the low reliability of one of the tests. 
Hence, she anticipated a more general and substantial relationship with 
increased numbers of subjects and more adequate measures. 
In the Peak and Boring (1926) study five university students were tested 
individually on the Army Alpha and the Otis Self-Administered Tests of 
Mental Ability. Subjects were instructed to be as quick and as accurate 
as possible and to indicate abandonments. Individual item times were 
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observed and speed scores generated for each subject. All subjects were also 
given a simple reaction time task in which they had to react to the 
appearance of a 'b vk dot in a circular hole in a screen. Subjects used a 
press response vvit1 the preferred hand and were given 110 trials. The 
average reaction time was computed from the fast hundred trials. Peak and 
Boring (1926) found substantial correlations between reaction time and 
performance on the I. Q tests, 0.70 for the Alpha and 0.90 with the Otis. 
Although very cautious about the significance of their findings, due to the 
small number of subjects, they nevertheless were "... inclined .. to conclude 
that reaction time is a very important factor in intelligence as the tests 
test it, both because-of the relation of these reaction times to the 
important speed-factor as analysed-out of performance in the tests, and also 
because of their direct relation to the intelligence scores". 
Although a number of researchers have subsequently attempted to repeat 
the Peak and Boring findings, their success has been limited and none of 
the correlations reached the same magnitude (Goodenough 1935; Farnsworth et al, 
1927; Lemmon 1928). It should be noted however, that none of these studies 
used the same procedures as Peak and Boring, and they should not be accepted 
as appropriate tests of the Peak and Boring conclusions. 
Goldfarb (1941), in his review of studies correlating reaction time and 
intelligence found that the 17 correlations ranged between -0.32 and +0.39, 
with a mean of 0. The majority of these studies were carried out on 
college students who Goldfarb presumed to be aged between 18 and 25 years. 
The purpose of Goldfarb's study was to examine the relationship between 
reaction time and intelligence in older subjects. His study, reported in 
a monograph, is too extensive to present in any detail here. However, he 
found statistipally significant correlations between simple and choice reaction 
times (1 of 2,1 of 5) for his male subjects but not for females. For his 
group of 108 males (age range 18 to 65 years), the correlations varied from 
-. 131 to -. 471. (The data are scored so that a positive correlation would 
indicate that the slower the reaction, the higher the test score). There 
are several sampling constraints in Goldfarb's study, such as the above 
average narrow range of ability in his male subjects and an inadequate 
sampling of female subjects at different ages. While such factors restrict 
the generalizability of his findings, his study does show that it is Possible 
to observe significant correlations between intelligence and reaction time, 
particularly choice times. Although his correlations are low, this may have 
been a consequence partly of the gross intelligence measures used and the 
restricted range of scores for subjects on these tests. 
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Since the publication of Goldfarb's (1941) study, reaction time has 
continued to be an important variable in investigations of aging (4hlford 1959; 
Talland 1965; Birren 1964; Botwinick 1967; 1973). As Talland (1965) pointed out, 
"No matter how the task is defined, latency tends to increase with age". 
Reaction time, according to Botwinick (1973) is a "prototype of the slowing" , 
, Increased latency is observed in both simple and disjunctive measures and tends 
to be' independent of mod4lity and type of response required. 
Birren (1964) in his review of the relationship between reaction time and age, 
noted that speed of reaction increases to its peak at 18 years, remains steady 
up to age 40, after which there is a gradual slowing of reaction. A number of 
experiments suggest that the main factor involved is not what he calls 
Movement Time, the interval needed for free muscular movement but rather the 
time from the appearance of a signal to the initiation of the movement. 
Movement times tend to change only slightly with age. By far the largest portion 
of the time increase is due to the reaction portion of the sequence. Birren's 
(1964) statements have been supported by Botwinick (1973) in his more recent 
review. 
The increase in reaction time is, according to Botwinick (1973) partially 
controlled by the preparatory interval (PI) used in the reaction experiment. 
The PI, it is suggested, affects the state of the responder by influencing set and 
response preparation, with the effect on men being different to the effect on 
women (Botwinick 1973). With increasing age, men appear to lose their ability 
to maintain the set necessary for a rapid response and they also appear to 
need more time to recover from the effects of incorrect expectations. They 
also appear to need more time to prepare themselves so that they experience 
difficulty when responses have to be produced in quick succession. Practice 
reduces these effects (Botwinick 1973). 
Research on choice reactions reveals that older people become disproportionately 
slower than younger people as the number of choices increases. This seems, 
according to Botwinick (1973), to be a function of how much time is allowed 
for the choice, If the amount of time for choice decreases, the 
disproportionality between old and young diminishes substantially. Some of these 
relationships are modified, as would be expected, by the effects of disease and 
organic involution (Birren 1964). 
Several studies of elderly subjects have produced correlations, usually of a 
low order, between various measures of reaction time and a variety of cognitive 
tests (Birren et al. 1963; Clement 1962) although in the Birren et al. C1962) 
investigation, more substantial correlations have been found (ranging between 
0.50 and 0.60). Clarke (1960) also reported that following an oblique rotation 
of the factors produced in his study, the second factor to emerge was an 
"unambiguous general ability factor"3 choice reaction time had a loading of the 
same magnitude as the spatial and reasoning tests from Thurstone's Primary 
Mental Abilities battery, the respective loadings being . 51, -. 51 and -. 51. 
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(e) Concluding remarks on reaction time studies 
Experimental psychologists are concerned with producing laws which 
will cover relationships between variables. One of the characteristics of 
such laws would be that they are not context bound or bound by the methods 
that are used to seek these lawful relationships. Yet the 
overwhelming conclusion from this review of studies of reaction time and 
intelligence is that we have not yet come to terms with "methods variance". 
Substantial relationships have been reported between reaction times and 
intelligence. Yet-these have been nullified by further studies, so that the 
main conclusion appears to be that there is no general conclusion. What 
this review of research suggests is that sex differences, age differences, 
test differences and criterion differences can exert an effect on outcome. 
There has been a tendency to regard all procedures for measuring reaction 
time as functionally equivalent. There has been as well a tendency to regard 
people, irrespective of age, sex or intelligence as equivalent. At the present 
time, such assumptions are inappropriate and unwarranted. If generalisations 
are to emerge, they will only do so once it is appreciated that methods 
variance appears to exert a substantial influence. It is only when this is 
taken into account that theory variance will become manifest. 
2. Reaction Time and Personality 
The research literature on reaction time has in general tended to ignore 
the role of personality variables. Studies may redord sex, age, modality 
and stithvlus differences but little attention has been explicitly directed 
at the role of personality. For example, various reviews of reaction time, 
both simple and choice, do not concern themselves with the effects of 
individual differences in personality characteristics (Woodworth and 
Schlosberg 1955; Teichner 1954). Of the studies which examine reaction time 
in relation to 'personality', the majority have been concerned with some 
other problem and the personality/reaction-time relationship has been 
incidental (e. g Wenar 1954; Earber and Spence 1956; Stabler and Dyal 1963; 
Nash 1966). 
The personality measure most commonly encountered is Taylor's (1953) 
Manifest Anxiety Scale (TMAS), used as a measure of 'drive' or motivation 
in studies concerned with testing predictions from Hull's (1943) learning 
postulates. One of the first studies to use reaction times and the TMAS in 
this context was carried out by Wenar(1954)- 
Wenar (1954) considered anxiety to correspond to what Hull (1943) called 
"irrelevant drive". He also used stimulus intensity as an index of 
"relevant" drive, basing his formulation on the established finding that 
in reaction time studies, increasing the intensity of the stimulus tends to 
lead to decreased reaction times (Woodworth and Schlosberg 1955). In his 
study, Wenar assumed that with other factors held constant, speed of 
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reaction (1/RT) would be a positive function of the variations in motiyation 
associated with variations in level-of manifest anxiety and stimulus intensity. 
The reaction times of his subjects (84 undergraduates of unspecified sex) were 
measured by a key press response to a buzzer and to weak and strong shock. 
These stimuli constituted the stimulus intensity gradiant and subjects with 
scores below the 20th and above the 
80th percentiles (low and high TMAS), the 
anxiety gradient. Wenar's results indicated that both an increase in 
anxiety and an increase in stimulus intensity were effective in increasing 
the speed of reaction during the initial training trials. However, the 
overall findings showed that reaction time differences between high and low 
anxious subjects were unaffected by changes in stimulus intensity. 
This particular experiment, while indicating that high and low TMAS subjects 
appear to differ in speed measured by simple reaction times, also set in 
progress a number of other studies which, if nothing else, have added to the 
perplexity of the various researchers who have ventured into this field. 
Their confusion has not been helped by the methodological failings of 
Wenar's study which they have failed to take into account (e. g Faber and 
Spence 1956; Yates 1961) and which were pointed out by the author. As he says 
"Since there is evidence indicating that reaction 
time is slower in the case of shock than in the 
case of auditory stimuli, the issue of how much 
the increase in speed of reaction in the present 
study was due to the increased intensity of the 
stimulus and how much it was due to differences 
in modalities is confounded..... 
Since 64 of the 84 Ss had been in an experiment 
in which they were shocked, and since most of 
them expressed concern that they would be shocked 
again, the entire population might be described as 
"shock sensitive". " 
Grice (1955) using the 'Air Force Discrimination Reaction Time Test' 
on 30 high and 30 low TMAS basic trainee airmen found that the low-anxiety 
group was superior in performance on the discrimination reaction time task. 
However, when intellectual differences were partialled out, the superiority 
of the low anxious group became statistically insignificant. 
In their review of the literature on the relationship between manifest 
anxiety and simple and'choice reaction times, Farber and Spence (1956) noted 
that findings varied according to the type of reaction studied. One study 
(Wenar 1954) found a positive relationship between simple reaction time and 
*The present author has been unable to secure a copy of the 
report describing this apparatus (Melton 1947). Details were 
not provided by Grice (1955). 
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manifest anxiety whereas others, using choice reaction time as the 
criterion, found either negative or no relationships. These findings 
suggested that there may be an interaction between anxiety and task complexity. 
Further evidence, referred to by Farber and Spence, suggested that stress 
factors may also interact with anxiety. Examples of such factors would 
include the use or threat of shock, and the intensity of the response signal 
used in reaction time studies. 
The interrelationships among all these variables are further complicated 
by the manner in which TMAS is conceptualised. Two views have been noted. 
The first regards people with high TMAS scores as chronicallyt. anxious and 
thus they have high drive levels consistently. The alternative view, called 
the "reactive hypothesis" (Farber and Spence 1956), suggests that high 
TMAS scorers have a predisposition to become anxious under stress conditions. 
As these authord also point out)the picture is even further complicated by 
the manner in which manifest anxiety as a type of drive may combine with 
other drive variables. The research of Farber and Spence (1956) and others 
constitute attempts to sort out the various interrelationships and it is 
in this context that the association between reaction times and anxiety have 
been investigated. 
In their first study, Farber and Spence (1956) usedboth simple and 
choice reactions to visual stimuli, varied the intensity of the stimulus and 
used threat of shock as a stressor. The subjects were 40 male and 40 female 
college students, equally divided into high and low TMAS scoffers. 
The data were analysed by means of variance analysis and the main effects 
were consistent with findings from previous reaction time studies. Men were 
faster than women, there were quicker reactions to the more intense stimulus, 
choice times (1 of 2) were slower than simple reaction times and both simple 
and choice times improved with practice. The p values for all of these findings 
were less than . 001. No main 
affect 
was found for manifest anxiety or 
induced stress. Of the interactions found to be important, only one was 
of theoretical significance, mainly because it was not anticipated. This was 
the interaction between stress, task complexity and sex. It was found that 
men reacted more like women when under stress when the simple-choice time 
differences were examined. Ferber and Spence (1956), in their attempts to 
understand the lack of a significant effect for anxidty, were unable to find 
any strong reason, although a number of possibilities were examined. 
In their second study, reported in the same paper, they examined the 
possible role of manifest anxiety and stimulus intensity as determirnts of 
simple reaction time. The subjects were again 40 male and 40 female students 
whose scores on the TMAS covered the full range. Again, the results relating 
to the TMAS were negative, and their overall conclusions were expressed 
as follows - 
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"The results offered no convincing evidence that 
variations in amount of anxiety affected RT in 
any manner, either as a main effect, or as a 
function of stress, task complexity, stimulus intensity, 
or generalisation. The effect of experizpentally induced 
stress was also unclear". 
In an attempt to clarify some of the inconsistencies found in the 
literature on the relationship between manifest anxiety and reaction 
time, Kamin and Clark (1957) tested 67 normal adult males (basic trainees 
in the Canadian Air Force) aged 17 to 28, using an auditory RT measure. 
Subjects were given either non-shock blocks of trials, or trials in which 
they were shocked if response latency fell below a given criterion. 
Unfortunately, this study also failed to clarify the problem of inconsistent 
findings. If anything, it complicated the picture even more. Ksmin and 
Clark found that the higher the TMAS score the slower was the simple 
reaction time (r= -0.44, p less than . 01). A weaker relationship 
(r= -0.24, p less than . 05) was found between the TMAS and the stress reaction 
time. However, it was found that the higher the TMAS score, the greater was 
the speed increase when subjects moved from unstressed simple reactions to 
the stressed reaction. These authors conclude that they were unable to 
account for the differences between their data and those of Fcrber and 
Spence (1956). 
Stabler and Dyal (1963), taking account of Grice's (1955) findings on 
the importance of intelligence, carried out a study in which they also 
attempted to account for reaction time differences as a function of intelligence 
rather than of motivational factors. Their subjects, male 
prisoners, were divided into four groups of high and low intelligence/high 
and low TMAS combinations. They used visual stimuli in a choice reaction 
task of (1 of 3) to test their hypothesis. Intelligence was measured using 
the Otis tests. It was found that speed (1/reaction time) was greater for the 
low anxiety group on the early trials, and that as task difficulty apparently 
diminished with repeated practice, the performance of the high anxiety 
subjects improved more than that of the low anxiety subjects. The high I. Q. 
groups were also faster than'the low I. Q. groups. The ages of these 
subjects were not given, nor was-the possible effect of age examined in this 
study. 
In the study of Nash et al. (1966) 36 female introductory psychology 
students (17.5 to 24 years), mean age 19.5 years, were placed in low, medium 
or high anxiety groups based on their scores on the TMAS. The subjects were 
then randomly divided into stress and no-stress groups, and also into 
groups tested by one of two experimenters. The stress condition consisted of 
an individually determined uncomfortable electric shock administered on 5 
of the 10 reaction time trials. A simple lift reaction to light onset was 
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used. Apart from a difference between the experimenters, the only othet 
difference found to be significant was that between stressed and non- 
stressed conditions. None of the interactions were significant. Under the 
stress conditions, simple reaction time was found to be slower than under 
the no-stress condition. Manifest anxiety appeared to have no significance 
in this group. The authors of this study attributed the slower reaction 
of their stressed subjects to the distracting effects of shock. 
Costello (1968) examined the relationship between manifest anxiety, 
stimulus intensity and threatened (but not administered) shock on simple 
reaction time to a visual stimulus. Two groups of subjects, one high, the 
other low scorers on the TMAS were obtained from a university population. 
There were 30 subjects in each group, and they were randomly divided into 
shock-threat and no-shock-threat sub-groups. 
Costello found that high anxious subjects had slower reaction times 
than did low anxious subjects. These findings were consistent with those 
of K&win and Clark (1957) but whereas these authors had found a significant 
interaction between threat of shock and TMAS score, no such interaction 
was found by Costello. 
More recently, Ferguson (1971) has found no relationship between TMAS 
and reaction to visual stimulus. Ske used 189 male and female university 
titer 
students as subjects but did not examine aria data for sex differences. 
Apart from TMAS, other motivational and personality factors have been 
studied in relation to reaction times. Church and Camp (1965) tested 40 
students on visual reaction time in order to investigate the effects of 
knowledge of results. All subjects were tested over a period of five days. 
It was round that reactions were faster if knowledge of results was 
provided, However, there was no evidence of a lasting effect of this 
information. It appeared to be effective only during the periods in which 
it was given. 
In view of the vast amount of research generated by Eysenck's 
personality theory, it is somewhat surprising to encounter a paucity of 
research relating simple and choice reactions to these dimensions. Hence, 
a crucial question is whether or not the various studies using the T14AS 
are of any relevance? ° Yates (1961,1973) appears to suggest that they are, 
Eysenck (1973b) writing in the same volume, questions the use of TNN, AS 
scores-as measures of neuroticism and the confused results of the various 
studies reviewed above would suggest that Eysenck's position is the 
correct one. Both statements will be discussed below. 
Yates (1961,1973) has based his assertions on the performance of 
neurotic subjects on various motor tasks.. The following "relatively well 
supported empirical statements" (Yates 1973) provide the basis for a set 
of postulates, to be described shortly. 
4: { 
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"l. Efficiency of performance on a psychomotor 
task is a function of drive interacting w1ith 
task complexity. High drive facilitates performance 
when the task is of low complexity, but interfere s 
with performance when the task is of high complexity. 
Drive is here defined as lability of the autonomic 
nervous system; complexity is defined in terms of 
the number of competing responses available, with 
the correct response being low in the response 
heirarchy. n 
Although the formality of this statement appears to give it some 
precision, the operational definition of complexity may well present 
problems. For example, failure to support this statement experimentally 
could always be attributed post hoc to the task not being of sufficient 
complexity. 
112. Neurotics' are characterized by high drive (autonomic lability) 
such that a stimulus that would be neutral for a non-neurotic 
person will trigger off a strong autonomic response in the 
neurotic person". 
*Footnote in Yates (1973) "Actually, the reference here ib to 
neuroticism, considered as an inherited predisposition, whereas 
neurosis refers to the actual state of breakdown, resulting 
from the interaction of neuroticism with stress" 
These statements are important because they appear to suggest that data 
from studies with neurotics are pertinent to a discussion of neuroticism. 
As will be seen shortly, much of Yates' (1961; 1973) discussion of the 
role of neuroticism is based on studies of normal subjects who vary in 
TMAS Scores. The link between TNAS scores and neuroticism is based on 
Yates' (1973) supposition that n1AS is in fact a measure of neuroticism, 
a point of view specifically rejected by Eysenck (1973b). 
"3. Persons high in neuroticism will perform better than 
persons in low neuroticism where the task does not 
involve competing responses; the contrary will be true 
where competing responses are involved". 
These postulates, according to Yates (1973) lead to certaih predictions, 
which he asserts, receive empirical support. 
"(a). Neurotics will show psychomotor disorganisation 
compared with normal subjects on complex but not 
simple tasks......... " 
tt(b). An increase in the strength of the stimulus will lead 
to an increased amplitutde and speed in normal subjects.... 'i 
"t(c) An increase in induced anxiety in normals (usually by means 
of some4stressful situation) will facilitate amplitude and 
speedlsimple responses....... " 
8z 
"(d). Whereas increasing stimulus strength, inducing 
anxiety or stress in normals appears on the 
whole to facilitate response amplitude and speed 
in normals where the response required is simple 
in nature, it is predicted from the theory that 
the same factors would disrupt performance where 
the response required had to be selected from a 
range of possible choices or where the response 
itself is of a complex nature...... " 
These predictions are substantially the same as those presented by 
Yates in his earlier (1961) review of the same topic. It is therefore 
surprising that the more recent statement has not incorporated the various 
qualifications which he presented in the earlier paper. Insofar as the 
research on reaction time is concerned, these postulates do not rec4ve 
unambiguous support as the review in this thesis has indicated. These 
studies on the relationship between, TMAS, stress, stimulus intensity and 
simple and choice reaction times show confusing and at times conflicting 
results. At least in relation to reaction times, the roles of age, sex, 
practice and intelligence need to be clarified, as do such concepts as 
complexity and stimulus intensity, before predictions can be adequately 
stated and tested. 
It is possible that another of the major difficulties with this research 
has been an inadequate understanding of what is being measured by the TMAS. 
This question has recently been discussed by Eysenck. According to 
Eysenck (1973b) many "investigations have shown that this scale correlates 
in the neighbourhood of 0.6 to 0.7 with neuroticism, and 0.3 to 0.4 with 
introversion... " The TMAS, will thus pick out subjects who may be introverted 
or neurotic (non-clinical) or both. It is however unlikely that this 
confusion is the sole cause of the discordant outcomes in reaction time 
studies. 
The task of deriving testable predictions on the basis of the theory of 
introversion - extraversion is also complex, according to Yates (1973). 
While there appears to be sufficient evidence that the type of response 
for introverts will be different from that of extraverts ("provided that 
the experimental conditions are appropriate" - Yates 1973), other factors 
are involved. A task such as tapping, while apparently simple, turns 
out on fine grain analysis to be made up of a number of components, each 
of which would need to be covered in a prediction exercise. Simply 
measuring overall tapping rate could obscure the outcome or lead to negative 
results without actually affecting the theory. Further, contrasting 
introverts with extraverts may lead to confused data if the groups 
differed in neuroticism, particularly if neuroticism can influence 
performance. These, and other considerations have led Yates to conclude that 
it - 
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".... is unfortunately true that detailed theoretical 
analysis and empirical investigations in relation to 
psychomotor performance have not yet been carried out 
so that a more comprehensive model of individual 
differences in psychomotor performance as related to 
personality factors may be constructed". 
There have been a few studies which have investigated the relationship 
between E and N and reaction times. 
Mangan and Farmer (1967) sought to relate Eysenck's theory to Russian 
research on psychological functioning. In this particular study, reaction 
times were measured in response to the onset and offset of visual stimuli 
of different intensities. Twenty male undergraduates, aged between 18 and 
24 years were used as subjects. Unfortunately, the raw data were not 
analysed in relation to E and N. Instead, the authors' used a complex ratio 
measure which was then correlated with E and N scores from the MPI (Eysenck 195 
a scale on which E and N are in fact negatively correlated, albeit slightly. 
(Eysenck and Eysenck 1969; Brody 1972). However, they found that extraverts 
reacted near maximally at lower stimulus intensities whereas introverts did not. 
It is difficult to know what to make of the Mangan and Farmer conclusions-as 
they found that E correlated 0.55 with stimulus onset, N correlated 0.47 with 
stimulus offset. Although both correlations were statistically significant 
(p less than 0.05), the latter correlation was not discussed. 
In the study by Cramer (1972) no differences in response speeds were found 
for different groups of extreme scorers on the EPI. However, the many 
methodological inadequacies of this study detract from its relevance to the 
present discussion. 
Hendrickson (1972), as part of her investigation reports that simple 
auditory reaction time correlated negatively with N at high but not at 
moderate intensities. 
In Thompson's (1973) study, in which he also used simple auditory 
reaction times measured in 103 male subjects, some relationships emerged as 
statistically significant. He found some differences between introverts and 
extraverts in relation to the effects of the intensity of the warning signals 
used, the effect being more marked for the former group. N showed no 
relationship with reaction time. 
The paucity of research on the influence of E and N on reaction times, 
the methodological inadequacies-of some of the Studies, and the many 
parameters which could be varied in reaction time research as well as the 
different components in the actual psychomotor task make it difficult to 
formulate any general statement. It is likely that individual differences are 
related to personality attributes but the necessary systematic research has 
yet to be undertaken. 
w.. 
84 
3. Choice Reaction Time and Information Measures 
Although there have been many studies of CRT, the investigation 
carried out by Roth (1964) appears to be the only one in which a 
transformation of the reaction time measures has been correlated with 
intelligence. In the studies cited earlier, mean reaction time, 
averaged over the time to respond to each set of alternatives, was the 
measure generally correlated with intelligence. With the advent of a 
set of transformations derived from Information Theory (Hick 1952; 
Hyman 1953) whereby the number of alternatives within a set can be 
expressed in terms of 'bits' of information, it became possible to 
relate increased choice times to amount of information by means of 
a linear function commonly known as Hick's Law (Smith 1968). 
Before 1950, although there were relatively few CRT experiments 
(Laming 1968), most of the factors affecting CRT were known. In 1873, 
Exner demonstrated the importance of the 'preparatory set' and in 1885 
Merkel showed that reaction times increased as the number of alternatives 
increased to ten. Age and sex differences have been observed and various 
factors influencing CRT have been identified (Woodworth and Schlosberg 1955). 
The difference in mean reaction time between RT and CRT (the 
disjunctive reaction) has always been the subject of some form of 
theorizing (Smith 1968), but the major impetus to research on CRT itself 
was the publication of a series of papers which attempted to cast CRT into 
the framework of information theory (Hick 1950; Hick 1952; Hyman 1953). 
Since then, the literature on CRT has expanded rapidly and its growth 
continues (Smith 1968). It is not proposed to discuss in any detail 
the many theories and empirical findings as these are beyond the scope 
of the present study. The present chapter will focus only on those 
theories and findings which have a direct bearing on certain aspects of 
the information theory interpretation of CRT, one of many possible 
interpretations, 
The characteristic CRT experiment. involves at. least three basic 
features. Firstly, through instructions given at the : outset,. the subject 
knows the alternative stimuli, responses and, the"associations 
(mapping-Smith 1968) between them. Secondly,, the task is structured so that 
the error rates are low, usually, of, the: order of 1% to 10%. Thirdly, 
no cpmparison between the stimuli is required. Finally, the major 
dependent variable is latency. Discussion in this section will be 
concerned with studies in which there. is. a 1: 1 mapping of stimulus and 
response. That is, where each signal requires a different response. 
In 1885 Merkel found that'-reaction time increased as the number of 
alternative signals was increased: from'1-to 10 (Woodworth and Schlosberg 
1955) and this finding has-been repeated by many investigators (Smith 1968; 
Laming 1968). In the 1: 1'mapping`task, ýthe mean CRT has been found, -to increase 
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linearly with base 2 log of the number of alternative stimuli, This 
between 
relationship/uncertainty and CRT holds when uncertainty is manipulated 
by varying the number of alternatives (Hick 1952) or by varying either 
the probabilities of occurrence of the individual stimuli or their 
sequential dependence Hyman(L953)- 
The results of many studies which have investigated the amount of 
information transmitted and its relationship to CRT can be summarised 
by the equation 
CRT=a+bH 
(Smith 1968) 
In this equation Ht is the information measure, b is identified with 
processing rate and a with simple reaction time. Similar equations 
describing the same relationship have been presented by Bricker (1955), 
Schmidtke (1961) and others and it is this equation that is generally- 
described as "Hick's Law" (Mowbray 1960). 
Studies have been devised to test the immutability of Hick's Law. 
Mowbray and Rhoades (1959), Mowbray (1960) and Schmidtke(1961) have 
examined the effects of practice on CRT. 
Mowbray (1960) for example suggested that the law holds only in 
circumstances in which the subjects are unpracticed and when the task 
requires the exercise of unnatural or uhfamiliar skills. In addition, 
he noted that many of the studies have only used a small number of subjects. 
In his study, 75 males and 75 females aged 17 to 48 years were required 
to make a verbal response to numbers displayed on read-out (Nixie) neon 
tubes. Each subject was given only 1 task, to respond to 1/2,1/4,1/6, 
1/8,1/10 alternatives. Reaction times were aAalysed only to the number 8, 
which was common to all the tasks. The study was designed so that all the 
subjects had the same number of opportunities to react to the '8'. When 
this was done, the slope of the function was found to be 0. Mowbray, -(1960) 
concluded that CRT's to practiced responses are constant. 
This conclusion was recently questioned by Burns and Moskowitz (1972) 
who pointed out that subjects in a 10 choice task would have five times 
the amount of practice as subjects in the two choice situation. "Since the 
critical constraint is not that each numeral appears an. aqual_. numberwof times 
but that each condition occur tin equal number of times, the procedure (used 
by Mowbray 1960)" is faulty" (Burns and Moskowitz 1972). To overcome 
this problem, Burns and Moskowitz tested 20 subjects (3 females and 17 
males) aged 16 to 49 years, giving an equal number of trials per presentation. 
They used 1,2,4,8,16 and 32 alternatives, the task being similar (naming) 
to that of Mowbray (1960). It was found that response latency increased as 
a function of the number of alternatives. 
There is however evidence that the a and b constants change with 
not in original 
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extended practice aid that given as many as 36 alternatives, the slope 
is curvelinear at the end of a practice section, once the number of 
alternatives increases beyond 12 (Schmidtke 1961). 
The generality of Hick's Law has been challenged in another way. 
A number of researchers have suggested that the observed relationships 
are a function of stimulus-response compatibility (Leonard 1959; 
Broadbent and Gregory 1965; Fitts and Deininger 1954; Fitts and Se 
e a 
er 1953; 
Fitts and Switzer 1962). For example, Leonard (1959) found that by using a 
vibratory stimulus applied independently to each of eight fingers, there 
was a difference between simple and two choice times but no significant 
difference between 2,4 or 8 choice times. 
The studies just considered are but a few of many which have 
investigated relationships between CRT and the number of alternatives in 
CRT experiments. The review by Smith (1968) has looked at the 
conclusions of most of the studies published up until 1967 and a number 
of subsequent studies examined by the present writer (e. g Pachella and 
Fisher 1969; Hyman andUmittä . 1969; Kornblum 1967,1969; g, 1968; Burns 
and Mo, ekowitz 1972) do not appear to modify these conclusions. The 
major disagreements appear rather to be concerned with theoretical issues 
such as the validity of the information theory and othdr approaches. 
As not all studies have been framed within an information theory 
approach, Smith's (1968) review has cast the empirical findings in 
terms of the relationship between CRT and the number of perceptually 
distinct choices (s). On the basis of published data, Smith states - 
"We may take as a tentative generalisation that 
CRT increases as the number of perceptually 
different choices (s) increases". 
the number _of stimuli. in any CRT set is finite. Hence, the faster 
times to elements of a set could be attributed to an increase in the 
frequency or probability of particular stimuli, of their associated 
responses or both. 
The evidence as assessed by Smith indicates that the more probable 
stimuli are responded to more rapidly and that this effect is 
independent of any response effects. 
It has also been reliably demonstrated that reaction times to 
immediately repeated stimuli in a choice situation are generally faster. 
The evidence suggests that this effect is mainly a consequence of 
response repetition, although some effect can be attributed to the 
repetition of the stimuli as well. These findings are of importance in 
the design of choice experiments because they indicate a need to keep 
V 
stimulus sequences constant across subjects in procedures which employ 
1: 1 mapping. The evidence on stimulus discriminability also carries 
important implications for research using CRT tasks. It has been shown 
that decreasing the disciminability of the stimuli, given S is held constant, 
leads to an increase in response times. Heace, it is important to ensure that 
in CRT studies not concerned with stimulus discrimination, all the stimuli 
are easily discriminated. 
In 1: 1 mapping tasks, the stimulus-response compatibility is particularly 
important as it can have a major impact on the b slope coefficient. Smith (1968) 
says "There seems to be no doubt that in such tasks, the slope of the function 
is inversely related to the degree of compatibility.... But it is still a 
moot point whether this slope can be reduced to zero, that is, whether CRT 
is independent of S under conditions of great compatibility". The available 
"evidence for obtaining no relationship between CRT and S in a highly 
compatible task is extremely weak" (Smith 1968). The effects of practice 
can also reduce the b slope coefficient, although the evidence available to 
Smith (1968) was obtained from studies using very few subjects. However, 
Schmidtke's (1961) results were not considered in Smith's review, and these 
findings supported those obtained in the two studies reviewed. 
RQ. wa4; on 
4. Information Theory Interpretations of Choice ''" Time 
It is perhaps no great surprise that the empirical relationships' 
demonstrated in CRT studies have led to the development of a number of theories 
and mathematical models which attempt to account for these relationships. All 
of the current theories have a common underlying logic which is similar to the 
logic of the earliest attempt at theorizing, contained in the work of Donders 
(Smith 1968). This common element is the subtraction method which in effect 
assumes that CRT is a complex process, the components of which can be 
separated conceptually and experimentally. In its present form, an important 
issue is whether the execution of the component stages such as stimulus 
categorization and response selection is "best approximated by a serial 
riodel or a parallel one" (Smith 1968). 
The various current theories of CRT have been reviewed by Smith (1968). 
As he points out, the scope of contemporary theories is limited in that they 
attempt to account for only part of the total CRT sequence. This sequence 
consists of four elements, conceptualized as follows: 
1. Some pre-processing of the stimulus occurs in 
which the stimulus is given a central nervous system - representation. 
2. This central representation is then compared with some already stored central representation of the alternatives and as a consequence of this comparison, the stimulus becomes categorized. 
Ö 
3. For this categorization, the appropriate response is selected. 
4. The execution of the response is then programmed. 
These, or similar processes, intervene between the stimulus onset and the 
emission of the response. Contemporary theories have in general not attempted to 
account for the fourth component and the majority, according to Smith (1968) have 
been mainly concerned with categorization, the second element of the sequence. 
Even though some models focus on a narrow aspect of CRT, there is still no 
generally accepted theory to account for this limited aspect. As Smith(1968) 
stresses, there are two fundamental issues which are still unresolved. The first 
is whether the central representation involved in stimulus categorization is best 
conceived of as "templates or lists of critical features" (Smith 1968). Secondly, 
it is still not possible to decide "whether stimulus categorization consists 
of a matching between a stimulus representation and stored templates of the 
possible stimuli or of a feature-testing process based on a consideration of 
what features the stimulus representation contains"(Smith 1968). 
On the basis of these as yet unresolved theoretical problems, it would SRem 
to be inappropriate to designate any theory of CRT as having the status of 
a well-supported theory. And even if the aforementioned difficulties could be 
resolved, there still remains the point that as yet theories have not attempted 
to account for the full set of processes thought to intervene between stimulus 
and response. As Welford (1968) has commented "Each has its advantages and 
difficulties, and it seems likely that there is no one model which applies in 
all circumstances. 
Possibly the most influential of the CRT models has been that cast within the 
framework of communication theory, sometimes known as an 'Information Theory 
model'. This model has both its advocates (Hyman and Umiltä 1964)and its critics 
(Kornblum 1967,1969; Laming 1968). While one of the original proponents of the 
information model(Hyman and U ilta 1969) has suggested that a rejection of the 
information hypothesis would have been premature on the basis of the then curretkt 
evidence, there were compelling grounds for at least a substantial revision of 
the earlier ideas. Some of the reasons are considered next. 
Kornblum (1967,1969)has presented a strong case in which he has demonstrated 
that the overall reaction time which is linearly related to the information 
measure is an artifact of the balance between stimuli which are. alternations and 
repetitions in the stimulus sequence. The basic data show that the reaction time for 
a repeated event is greater than that for a non-repeated(alternative)event. 
The overall mean reaction time 8T is the mean for the repetition R Trand 
that for alternations RTa each weighted by the probability of occurrence of 
each pr and pa. That is 
89 
RT = Pr RTr + Pa RTa 
{Kornblum 1967) 
and given Konmblum then goes on to argue that given RT >RT 
a fixed number of alternatives, the "observed net increase in RT may simply 
be attributable to the shifts in the proportion of slower and faster responses 
u 
in the overall RT distribution. 
In a later study byK4rnblum (1969), designed to test his views, 
he was able to demonstrate that the information (H) " is confounded with the 
probability of nonrepetition of the stimuli in most of the experimental 
conditions whose results have been taken as evidence of the linear relationship 
between choice RT and H". When these variables are unconfounded, in the experimental 
situation, the ensuing results lead to a rejection of the information hypothesis. 
Laming (1968) has put forward arguments, on both theoretical and 
practidal grounds, rejecting an information theory interpretation of choice 
reaction times. He points out that what had previously been termed the 
"Information Theory Model" is more appropriately called a 'Communication Theory, 
Model. Its major theoretical weakness is the limited correspondence between 
the experimental situation ahd the ideal communication system. 
In such a system, the source selects a particular message from a set 
of alternatives and this message is then transformed by a transmitter. The 
transformed message, the signal, is sent through a channel to the receiver. 
The receiver transforms the message into its original format, but may not-be 
able to do so accurately because noise has been added to the message between 
transmission and reception. The parallel with the reaction time experiment 
identifies the stimulus with the source, and the transmitter, chann&l, noise source 
and receiver with the human subject. In order to maximize transmission rate, the 
encoded signal must be transformed to match the statistical properties of the 
original. In the reaction time experiment, the transmitter is the stimulus source 
and its functioning is fixed and not capable of the flexibility needed to 
approximate the statistical structure of the signal sequence which is an 
essential element of Shannon's original formulation (Laming 1968). 
Further ramifications of Shannons theorem also fail to be met in 
the commfinication theory analogy adopted by psychologists. Laming and Cronbach(1955)) 
criticises the simple way in which the information measure (bits) of entropy 
has been applied. Thus, in the original statement, the measure applied only to 
'1'ideal channels in which messages are infinitely longs' (Laming 1968). In the 
choice reaction experiment signals are of necessity very short, so that-the 
analogy does not fit the specification in this instance as well. As a further 
illustration of the lack of fit between the psychological and the original model, 
Laming (1968) cites data from various stän es of variations in the transmission 
rate of signals which only show a trivial/inadequate correspondence to the 
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performance of the ideal system. As specified in the original model, the 
ideal communication system is capable of extended delays in responding, 
and indeed, such delays are considered to be an advantage in that a 
greater number of coding systems becomes available. Evidence from human 
subjects indicates however that they make progressively more errors as the 
delay is increased (Laming 1968). Perhaps the most telling point is that 
"at a theoretical level, the analogy with a communications system has not 
been wholehearted:. : rather, certain convenient aspects only of the analogy 
have been selected" (Laming 1968, p2). 
The original studies of Hick (1952) and Hyman (1953) stimulated a great 
deal of research on reaction times in the context of the communication and 
other models. These studies were reviewed by Welford (1960,1968), Laming 
(1968) and Smith (1968). These reviews examined both the mathematical 
statements such as Hick's Law and other models not specifically cast in the 
framework of communication theory. From the point of view of the present 
study, only certain aspects are considered to be important and these are 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Possibly the most important issue concerns the relationship between 
reaction time and entropy. The equation 
t=a-b Pi log Pi 
has been viewed as the fundamental choice reaction time equation (a and b 
are constants, P1is the probability of signal i being presented). The 
entropy of the i'th signal is - log Pi, so that, according to Laming (1968), 
"the mean reaction time to signal i should be 
t! =a - blogPt' 
(p. 10) 
There is some evidence that this relationship holds when the meanmreaction 
time is averaged over all of the signals in the series, but not when the 
mean time to any component signal is computed. However, in a series of 
investigations conducted by Laming, it was found that in certain 
circumstances, the series mean reaction} times did not conform to the 
requirements of the fundamental equation. Further experiments, apart from 
those cited by Laming (1968) also demonstrate that choice reaction times, 
and hence the functions which they generate, change with practice (Schmidtke 1961), 
so that reaction times are more than a simple consequence of the 
probabilities of the signals. Another factor which influences reaction times 
is the discriminability of the signal, and this is not taken into account 
in the fundamental equation. 
Studies which have investigated the channel capacity of human subjects, 
together with a further series of studies on the compatability of 
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stimulus and response, also produce data which do not conform to the 
requirements of communication theory. For example, the model requires that 
the channel capacity in a true communication system is limited. Data on 
human subjects suggest that the channel has infinite capacity, or as Laming 
(1968) puts it, "that there is no channel at all', (p. 14). 
iaming's (1968) final comments, following his detailed analysis, are 
worthy of quote. 
"The theoretical anomlies and empirical weaknesses 
of the Communication Model are now seen to be such 
that the Mathematical Theory of Communication cannot 
provide any basis for a theory of choice reaction 
times". (p. 16). 
5. Roth's Experiment 
The experiment described by Roth (1964) was an attempt to integrate 
an information-theory analysis of CRT within the more general compass of 
psychology, particularly, the study of intelligence. Drawing on the work 
of Hick (1952), Hyman (1953) and on the review by Schmidtke (1961), Roth 
examined the relationship between CRT, a test of general intelligence 
(the Amthauer Test) and a test which he describes as a 'pure test of speed' 
(the Pauli Test). As the present study was partly designed to replicate 
Roth's findings, his study will be considered in some detail. 
The basic apparatus consisted of a stimulus generator and timing device. 
The stimulus generator was designed so that it would illuminate 1 light, 
1 of 2,1 of 4 or 1 ofi 8 lights. Associated with each light was a push 
button which was used by the subject to record his response. The latency of 
reaction, which was the interval between light and response, was recorded 
on the timer. The lights and response buttons were arranged so as to be 
equidistant from a point on which the subject rested his finger. The sub ject, 18 
task was to react as quickly as possible to the onset of the light. For 
the simple reaction time trials, all except one light and response button 
were covered. For the 1 of 2, only the two lights and response keys were 
uncovered, and so on. The subject was thus aware of the task, namely to 
react to the light which was on, the light being one of 1,2,4 or 8 alternatives, 
equivalent to 0,1,2 and 3 bits. Each subject was given 8 blocks of 20 reactions 
per block. Within each block, the number of alternatives was held constant. 
The inter-stimulus interval varied between 3.5 and 9.5 seconds. Order of 
presentation of the blocks was randomly varied but within each block, the 
interstimulus intervals remained the same for all subjects. Each block was 
preceded by an auditory warning signal and the experiment was carried out 
in a soundproof room so that subjects were isolated from any cues which might 
arise from the apparatus. 
Roth tested a total of 85 subjects, 29 of whom were students 
(8 females), 18 school children (7 females) and 11 youths in a penal 
institution. The average age of these groups is presented in Table 4, 
together with the main findings of his study. 
Certain features of these data are noteworthy. Firstly, Roth does 
not separate the data for males and females, despite the well 
established findings of sex differences in CRT (Woodworth and 
Schlosberg 1955). As they note, age for age, males are faster than 
females. Sedondly, Roth does not report the standard deviation of the 
ages of his subjects. There is evidence that CRT decreases with age 
until age 20 years. It then tends to remain fairly stable until the 
mid-50's, after which CRT then shows a gradual increase (Woodworth and 
Schlosberg 1955). ' The implications of age-related trends in CRT will 
be discussed shortly. 
As anticipated from the research of Hick (1952), Hyman (1953) and others, 
Roth found a linear correlation of 0.99 between mean reaction time 
to each set of alternatives and number of bits of information. He computed 
the slope of the individual regression lines and intercepts on the 
ordinates for all subjects and reported finding strong inter-individual 
differences in these measures. 
The correlations among his various measures are presented inTable.. 4.. 
On the basis of these data, Roth concluded that whereas there was no 
relationship between IQ and simple reaction time, "the speed of information 
processing correlates significantly with IQ". Although Roth had 
hypothesised no relationship between slope and simple reaction time, this 
hypothesis was contradicted by the data. No attempt was made to explain 
this result,. The measure of speed, the Pauli Test, showed no. sigpificant 
correlation with slope. 
Some doubt on the meaning of Roth's results arises because of his 
inclusion of the group with a low mean IQ. Given that some individuals of 
low IQ may have neurological or other disabilities, it is possible that 
their reactions on CRT might have been impaired. The effect of this would 
be to artificially extend the range of reaction times, thereby increasing 
the likelihood of an increased correlation. Secondly, using both sexes as 
subjects might well have had a similar effect. Given the known sex 
differences in CRT, Roth should have presented evidence that for his 
sample, such differences were of no consequence. 
*Birren (1964) states that simple times decrease up to 18 years 
and then remain stable until 40 years, after which they increase. 
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TABLE 4. Data from Roth's (1964) study. 
Mean 
Subjects N Age IQ Mean IQ s. d. 
Students 29 21 108 8.9 
(8 Female) 
School 
Children 18 18 104 7.1 
(7 Female) 
'Borstal' 11 21 85 7.3 
IQ and Simple Reaction 
Time 
IQ and. Slope 
Slope and Pauli 
Slope and Simple R. T. 
IQ and Pauli 
Slope and Pauli 








t d. f. p 
- 56 - 
3.15 56 < 0.01 
0.96 33 NS 
3.34 56 <0.01 
(not reported) 
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A further limitation of Roth's data is his failure to partial out the 
effects of age. The relationship between age and CRT has already been noted, 
and given the ages of the subjects, Roth's CRT data may have been prone to 
age effects. That is, the correlation between slope and IQ may have been 
due to correlation between slope and age. In part, the strength of this 
limitation is also a function of the correlation between age and IQ. Although 
IQ's are supposed to be independent of age in the population, they need not 
be so in a sample. In effect slope and IQ may be correlated simply because 
eeýrel. tiaA 
both correlate with age. Al b., although in general the time and agetmay be 
zero for this age range, it need not be so in a given sample. While these 
criticisms are speculative, they nevertheless point to serious limitations 
which should have been evaluated before the results of the study were used 
in support of his hypotheses. 
Eysenck (1967a) has accepted Roth's findings without questioning the 
methodological adequacy of this study. He then uses these results to support 
his more general position, viz. that reaction time experiments can produce 
data consistent with a theory of intelligence based on mental speed. 
In proffering this interpretation, Eysenck does not take account of two 
further points which can invalidate his argument. Firstly, he fails to 
mention Roth's finding of a non-significant correlation between slope and a 
measure of 'speed'. Secondly, he has not questioned the interpretation which 
indentifies the slope measure with speed of information processing. 
The Krapelin-Pauli measure of 'speed' indexes the rate at which a subject 
completes a series of additions. It is not a speed measure in the sense 
that Furneaux defines speed, not is itlsimilar to other measures of speed 
(for example a letter-cancellation task). In fact, Roth's data suggest that 
the Pauli-test may well involve pcesses similar to those tapped by his 
measure of IQ. As can be seen from the data in Table 4 the Pauli and 
Amthauer tests produced a correlation coefficient of 0.54. Attempts to make 
sense of Roth's data are hampered by the lack of Pauli test data for one of 
his groups, and by the lack of a clear conception of what is being measured 
by the Pauli test. It is doubtful that, it is the, pure measure of speed as 
claimed by Roth. One author (identified as P. G in Eysenck et a1.1972, p. 373), 
describes the Pauli Test as providing "information about psychological capability 
(concentration, quality of performance etc. ) and dynamics of performance 
(time taken, amount done, fatigue etc. )", 
It is worth recalling at this point that correlations of a similar 
magnitude between choice reaction times and intelligence were reported by 
Goldfarb(1941). Given the near perfect correlation between choice times and 
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the bit transformation reported in Roth's study, it is perhaps no 
great surprise that he found a significant correlation between slope 
(a function of the choice times) and intelligence. 
Two fundamental questions arise out of the-foregoing. The first is the 
empirical status of Roth's finding of a low but statistically significant 
correlation between slope and IQ. The second is the credibility of an 
Information Theory interpretation of this finding. 
In the view of the present author, Roth's study is methodologically 
unacceptable for reasons already given. It is possible that his results 
are forced by the methodological failings of his experiment, so that any 
attempt to invent them with psychological meaning is at best premature. 
However, if his finding can be shown to hold in an independent study, then 
at least an important empirical relationship will receive additional support. 
The theoretical problem then becomes one of accounting for why the slope 
transformation of CRT data produces a correlation with intelligence. The 
first priority however is to produce the evidence that such a relationship 
holds. Thus one of the aims of this study is to test if such a relationship 
can be found. 
The attempt to interpret Roth's finding in Information Theory terms 
appears at this point in time to be unwarranted. To do so requires a 
detailed evaluation of the status of Information Theory in relation to CRT. 
Some of the critical aspects of this analogy have been considered in this 
chapter, and the overall conclusion is that the analogy is trivial. Like any 
attempt to extend Roth's findings, the Information Theory interpretation is 
premature if not inappropriate and misleading. 
6. Speed and Intelligence 
(a). Introduction 
This review of empirical studies on the role of speed in mental 
ability will take as its starting point the conclusions of McFarland's 
(1928) review. Although a number of reviews have been published since 1928, 
(Himmelweit 1946; Tate 19k8; Jones 1959; Vernon_1961 ; Brierley 1960,1969; 
Russell 1968), none has been , as 
detailed,. or_as methodologically incisive 
as that of McFarland. For the most part, these later reviews accept the 
original author's conclusions without any serious attempt to discover if 
the conclusions are acceptable, given the methods used. On the basis of 
the present author's examination of the later studies, this failing of 
subsequent reviewers is serious, for in many cases, as will be recorded in 
subsequent paragraphs, the most appropriate conclusion would seem to be that 
no conclusion is possible due to the variety of methodological inadequacies 
which have characterised these studies. 
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The studies to be considered in this section will be divided 
into the following categdries - 
(a) Non-factor analytic group-test research 
(b) factor-analytic studies 
(c) studies employing individual item times 
(d) studies relating speed to personality variables 
The early investi&ations of the relationship between reaction time 
and intelligence were gradually supplemented by studies of the relationship 
between measures of rate and judgments of ability. The study by Burt(1909) 
in which he correlated card sorting and alphabet sorting speeds and 
headmasterst judgments of intelligence exemplifies the type of research 
carried out. This, like related studies was subsequently criticiiad on 
various grounds, particularly because of the criterion of intelligence 
used (McFarland 1928). 
In 1916, an important conceptual complication was introduced by 
McCall when he raised the question of the relationship between $speed tests', 
'power tests' and intelligence. As his criterion of intelligence, McCall 
employed teachers' ratings, school marks and composite test scores. The 
speed tests included cancellation tests, addition and the power tests, 
vocabulary, sentence completion and other indices. This study is 
historically important mainly because it was probably the first to 
introduce the speed--/power distinction (McFarland 1928). 
With the advent of group tests of intelligence, and particularly 
the widespread use of such tests during the First World War (Boring 1957), 
psychologists and testees alike became concerned with the effects of 
time limits. (May 1921 - see McFarland 1928; Ruch and Koerth 1923). 
To examine the consequences of time limits, the general procedure 
adopted was to administer the test in the prescribed time and then to 
allow extra time for those testees who needed it. Although such studies 
usually found substantial correlations between the limited and unlimited 
time scores, they tended to be methodologically inadequate. Hunsicker(1925) 
for example pointed out that because of the, -wide range in the abilities 
of the testees, a single test such as Army Alpha was a speed test for the 
more intelligent of the'subjects and a power test for those who were 
less able. The Ruch and Koerth (1923) investigation wa'criticised on 
different grounds (Highsmith 1924) although they also found substantial 
correlations between limited and unlimited time administrations. 
By 1925, research had become more sophisticated and a more 
differentiated conceptual scheme had emerged. Hunsicker (1925) commented on 
the need to control for accuracy, and she introduced individual item-times. 
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Although she strongly criticised group testing, her own study employed 
small groups. Also in 1925, Thorndike introduced a scheme whereby 
intelligence was conceptualised in terms of level or power, range 
and speed. By 1925 as well, the role of persistence had. been proposed 
(McFarland 1928) and Spearman's questioning of the existence of a 
speed factor had entered the literature. Spearman's work will also be 
considered in a later section of this chapter. 
It is against this background that McFarland (1928) was able to 
conclude that, rising the method of individual timing and by using data 
from studies that "have conformed to scientific testing procedure", 
".... the evidence, although contradictory, decidedly 
tends to favour the existence of a positive relationship 
between rate and ability in mental tests". (McFarland 1928) 
What remained unclear, according to McFarland (1928) was the 
amount and nature of the relationship, two issues which needed to be 
resolved by further research. 
Whereas the majority of studies before 1930 used group- 
test procedures without recourse to factor analysis to analyse the data, 
after 1930, most of the studies relied on factor analysis. The major 
exception was the series bf studies which examined individual item times. 
b. Studies using group-testing (non-factor-analytic) 
Baxter (1941) using a number of standard intelligence tests 
(Otis Self-Administering Test, Revised Army Alpha) as well as a number 
of outside criteria (examination grades), examined the inter-relationships 
between speed, power and level among 100 University undergraduates. 
In his first study, Baxter asked subjects to work as quickly and 
as accurately as possible while being individually tested on the Otis. 
He recorded the time to complete the test (speed), the number of items 
correct in unlimited time (level) and the number of items -eompleted in 
20. minutes (power). These procedures were later adaptedl to a group 
presentation of a parallel form of: the Otis and the inter-relationships 
re-examined under these conditions: ' 
Baxter found that speed and level varied independently and that all 
the power score variance could be accounted for by speed and level, 
the contribution of speed being somewhat greater. It was also found that 
the inter-relationships varied as a function of the test of intelligence 
used and that group testing led to a reduction in the strength of the 
relationships. 
Jones'(1959) review was concerned specifically with speed changes 
in relation to age. It is an important assessment of the problem in 
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that it highlights certain variables that may differentially affect 
performance. From the studies considered, it was apparent that time 
limits can reduce the scores of elderly subjects but that after about 
60 years, there is a suggestion that such differences are no longer 
substantial. However, the extent of any difference is a partial function 
of the nature of the test. Another important influence in the relationships 
between speed and aging is the complexity of the task. While these general 
conclusions are important because they direct us to variables to be controlled, 
none of the studies mentioned in Jones'(1959) review used individual item 
times. Rather, they employed indices of speed based on "number of items 
attempted' (Jones 1953). 
Knapp (1960) tested two groups of 100 subjects each on what he described 
as 'speed' and 'power' versions of the Cattell Culture Free Intelligence 
Test. The imposition of time limits was used to define the speed version 
of this test. Power and speed tests were given in a counter-balanced order 
in a group-testing situation, the one condition immediately following the 
next. Subjects in one of the groups were applicants for Visa's to enter the 
U. S. A and testing was part of the procedure to which these people were 
subjected. The only result of importance was the finding that the order of 
speed-power test administration was important. Initial testing on a speed 
test seemingly placed all subjects at a disadvantage relative to their 
performance in a power-first administration. 
c. Factor-analytic studies of speed. 
Factor-analysis has had a profound influence on our conceptions of human 
ability. As Horn (1972) points out, its history "is very closely tied to the 
history of our ideas about human abilities". Speed factors have been 
readily identified in factorial studies. 
In 1963, French and his co-workers assembled a kit of reference tests, 
containing 24 primary factors which had emerged in over 120 studies of 
ability. These factors have been repeatedly observed and thus have the 
status of well-replicated dimensions. Spced factor3 of various types were 
identified. These are listed below 
"Established"Primary Factors (French et al. 1963) 
Speed of Closure: Ability to integrate disarranged visual patterns. 
Spatial Planning: Ability to quickly survey a complex spatial field 
and for example, trace a pathway through it, (eg 
Maze Tracing Speed). 
Perceptual Speed: Speed in identifying pattern in visual material. 
Number Facility: ' Speed and accuracy in numerical tasks, 
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The French et al. (1963) list, according to Horn (1972) isd. somewhat 
conservative. For example, it does not include "Speed of Reaction" 
which has emerged in a number of studies (Horn 1972), nor does it include 
as a potential source of factors those which could be detected in 
individually administered tests. All the factors listed by French et al., 
(1963) are derived from group tests. 
There have been many large scale studies that have isolated speed factors 
of one type or another. Kelley (1928) studied the inter-correlations 
of batteries of tests given to groups of pupils at different ages and 
found speed factors at each age. Thurstone's studies of the primary 
mental abilities (Thurstone 1938; Thurstone and Thurstone 1941; 
T. G. Thurstone 1941) at different ages have yielded factors such as 'p - 
Perceptual Speed' for some but not all age groups. T. G. Thurstone (1941) 
reported that in the study of 710 8th grade children, ten factors were 
extracted by means of the centroid procedures and after rotation, only 
six factors were clearly identified. Factor P, found in studies of both 
College students and high school children did not emerge in the data for 
the young children. However, the N (Number) factor, described as "the 
ability to do numerical calculations rapidly and accurately" was found in 
the youngest group. 
The United States Employment Service his produced a series of aptitude 
tests (General Aptitude Test Battery) based on extensive studies of large 
numbers of subjects who were applying for jobs of different types. Among 
their stable and consistent factors are included Motor, Perceptual and 
Clerical Speed (Vernon 1961). Percepti2al and Psychomotor Speed have also 
been identified in the various studies carried out by Guilford and his 
colleagues using Air Force trainees as subjects (e. g Guilford 1940). 
A speed factor has also been found in the Spearman-Holginger Unitary Traits 
Studies. Holzinger and Swineford (1939) for example repeated the earlier 
investigations which had identified a group factor of speed in four 
tests (additions, coding, counting dots, and distinguishing between straight 
and curved capital letters). They tested 7th and 8th grade children of 
both sexes in two schools (301 subjects) using group tests. The data for the 
two schools were analysed ,_....; using the bifactor method and the 
solutions were examined for sex differences. Their speed tests "designed 
to measure mental or perceptual speed" revealed some significant sex 
differences, the girls being quicker than the boys. 
The investigation carried out by Davidson and Carroll (1945) was an 
attempt to establish the linear independence of speed and level scores and to 
examine their relationship with time-limit measures. Level was taken to 
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TABLE 5. Factors from Davidson and Carroll (1945) 
Factor Nature 
A Speed of computation 
B Level of reasoning 
C Speed of reasoning 
D Uninterpretable 
E 
F General speed factor 
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mean the amount the subject knows and speed the rate at which he works. 
Speed scores were the times taken by subjects to attempt every test item 
once. Level scores were the number of correct answers when subjects were 
allowed to take as much time as'they wanted. Time limit scores were the 
number of correct answers in a prescribed time. 
These authors used a variety of tests including the Revised Alpha 
Examination (Form 5) and the Minnesota Speed of Reading Test for College 
Students. These tests were administered to a group of 91 subjects 
(12 men, 79 women), all psychology undergraduates. Timing was carried out 
using a large clock with a sweep-second hand placed in front of the group. 
Time limit testing was followed by the students being instructed to work 
rapidly to the end of the test. They were then required to note the time 
taken on their answer sheets. The subjects were also allowed to correct 
their previous answers using a red pencil. 
The skewed time scores were transformed to near normality by a 
reciprocal transformation, and the data were factor analysed by the centroid (SatT,. lo% 5) 
method and then rotated to simple structure. Six factors were extractedLand 
in addition the relationship between speed, level and time limits was studied 
by examining certain bultiple correlations. 
On the basis of the multiple correlations between Speed-Level and Time 
Limit measures, it was found that for some tests, speed made little 
contribution, for others that level was unimportant and for a third set both 
made equivalent contributions, indicating the factorial complexity of time- 
limit scores. are. 
The unrotated loadings of the second factor le particularly interesting 
taey 
in that it appear to define a bi-polar factor which differentiates speed 
and level measures. 
Myers (1952) applied different forms of a non-verbal reasoning test to 
600 recruits in their first term at College. Each of the forms was differently 
speeded by varying the number of problems to be\ione in each part of the tests 
12 minutes being allowed for each part. A total of 19 differeht scores was 
obtained for each form of test, including number correct, number wrong, 
number skipped and number attempted, the latter being measured by, the 
last item attempted. (Lord(1956) found that this last measure was particularly 
prone to 'dishonesty' in the testees). 
Each of the three forms of the test was analysed separately and each 
produced two orthogonal factors which Myers described as the tendency to 
answer correctly and the tendency to respond quickly. The former factor was 
found to be somewhat more valid for predicting course grades. 
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Howie (1956) used 13 tests (from which he generated an additional 
9 measures) in his study of speed and accuracy in 158 12-year old boys. 
He does not describe his procedures in detail. The purpose of the study 
was to examine the relationship between speed and accuracy when ability 
was held constant. A centroid analysis was used and three different 
orthogonal rotations undertaken, mainly because the first two could not 
resolve certain anomalies in the solution. tv, tdf 
The first factor appeared to be a mixture of 'g' and - which could 
not be partitioned. The second appeared as a general speed factor not 
restricted to simple or routine tasks. All the accuracy scores loaded 
negatively on this factor and no other accuracy factor appeared. Howie 
states_that for his data, with ability held constant, "faster workers will 
make more errors, slower workers will make fewer errors". The third 
factor appeared to be one of verbal ability and the fourth was uninterpretable. 
Lord (1956) studied a group of 649 entrants to an American naval college. 
The ages of this group were not reported and it has to be presumed that 
they were highly selected. These subjects were given seven tests of verbal, 
spatial and arithmetic ability. The entire battery, together with other 
data, contained a mixture of tests varying in their degrees of 'speededness' 
as well as 'level' tests "involving virtually no speed". Also included 
in the battery were six reference tests. All test data, as well as 
information on school grades (a total bf 36 variables) were factor-analysed 
using Lawley's Maximum Lilr-lihood procedure. 
In addition to the standard scoring procedures, a 'last-item-attempted' 
score for one of the speeded tests in each area was computed. Lord found 
that subjects who completed the speeded tests in fact skipped items or else 
answered at random. Although the per cent of examinees who finished was 
low (2% to 11%), he does not state how these data were treated in the 
computation of scores. 
After extracting 10 factors (of which 9 could be interpreted), further 
analysis was abandoned because of the statistical non-significance of the 
residuals. The factors were then rotated "with the help of a matrix rotator" 
to ppoduce meaningful oblique. axes. In addition to the anticipated verbal, 
spatial and mathematical reasoning factors, four speed factors were found 
(verbal, number, perceptual and spatial speed), These factors were inter- 
correlated "demonstrating the existence of a general speed factor at 
second-order level". With one exception, which Lord regarded as minor, all 
correlations between course grades and the four speed factors were positive 
but low. 
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Lord's study is in many ways typical of factorial research which 
gives little attention to the quality of data subjected to factor 
analysis. Attention has already been drawn to the limitations of four 
of his variables and other aspects of his study are questionable. 
For example, he asserts that the course grades were "virtually unspeeded", 
his reason being that "almost every student finished". Such statements 
ignore the speed stress which is inherent in the examination situations 
that are used to generate the data. 
Porebski (195+, 1960), in a series of investigations, challenged 
Spearman's (1927) view that it is "unnecessary to distinguish between 
speed and quality of thinking on the assumption that these two 
characteristics correlate almost perfectly". In his view, Spearman (1927) 
used an inappropriate procedure when simple tests were scored first on 
speed and secondly on accuracy without time limit. As Porebski (195+) 
put it: "It can be doubted whether an accuracy score on a simple test is 
adequate to measure the quality of thinking". To test his views that 
speed and power are distinct factors of ability and that they are 
fundamental (in the sense that they over-ride abilities such as verbal, 
spatial and numerical), Porebski constructed six speed and three power 
tests. Each test series was sub-divided into verbal, spatial and numerical 
tasks. The speed tests had to be complete. d within a specified time in the 
test room whereas the power tests were taken home and the subjects allowed 
up to two weeks to solve the problems. Whereas the speed tests allowed for 
a wide range of scores, the power tests were graded into three levels of 
solution, correct, partially correct and wrong. These tests were given to 
50 subjects, the scores correlated and factor analysed. A centroid method 
was used and the loadings rotated. The orthogonal solution produced 
factors which were described as 'g' speed and 'G' power and specific 
factors of speed. 
Porebskils 1954 paper, and a subsequent study (Porebski 1960) have been 
subjected to detailed critical analyses by Vincent (1955; 1960) who put forward 
a number of reasons for disregarding Porebski's conclusions. The limitations 
he identified include inappropriately chosen tests and the fact that, 
with only nine tests given to such'a small, group; "it would not be possible 
to extract more than two factors". Vincent(I. 960) also advanced the view 
that the 'power' factor could have arisen from a variety of other 
determinants; auch as-persistence. Porebski has made no systematic attempt 
to refute this or some of the other criticisms. 
Finally, the method of administration of the power tests, 
while certainly not subject to the criticism of being time-limited, 
nevertheless does raise other questions which add to the limitations of 
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this study. For instance, we are not informed how Porebski insured 
that the power tests were solved by the same subjects who solved the 
speed tests. While Porebski has repeated his tests a number of times 
(Porebski 1954,1960) the same limitations would seem to hold for these 
repiLtitions. 
Mangan's (1959) factorial study was an attempt to answer a number of 
questions on the relationship between speed, power and various 
temperamental attributes. 
Specifically, he was concerned to see if it was possible to identify 
speed, level, persistence, accuracy and carefulness factors under what he 
termed "ordinary experimental conditions". He meant by the latter, group 
tests to groups of 30 or so school children (sex unspecified) aged 13 to 
14 years in a London Comprehensive School. In addition, Mangan sought 
to discover whether speed or level was the more appropriate measure of the 
general factor, and to determine the relative contributions of speed, 
persistence, level, accuracy and carefulness to the power test variance. 
A total of 200 subjects was.. tested over a period of eight weeks, with 
test sessions lasting up to 60 minutes. The battery consisted of 32 tests 
which yielded 38 measures. Thurstone's centroid method was used to factaHze the 
battery and the factors rotated to produce an orthogonal solution with the 
sole constraintbeing the retention of as large a 'g' factor as was possible. 
Included in the large battery of tests were scales aimed at measuring 
"clerical, perceptual and motor speed and fluency", as well as tests of 
verbal and motor tempo. Tempo was defined as "the natural rate or rhythm, 
or basal speed". Although Mangan concedes that timing of individual items 
on the speed and tempo tests "was considered desirable", he used only 
gross rate measures. It is also worth noting that on 14 of the tests, 
the subjects were required to record their own times to completion, a 
41 procedure not conducive to accurate timing. 
Seven factors accounting for 40% of the variance were extracted. 








a general power factor 
mainly on power tests 
perceptual, verbal and non-verbal and 
clerical speed on easy material. 
bipolar factor contrasting motor speed, writing 
and tempo, with accuracy. 
mental and problem arithmetic 
difficult to identify 
of doubtful significance 
In discussing his results, Mangan notes that he had some difficulty 
in deciding whether or not the general factor was 'g' or a '&+y. ed, ' 
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FIGURE 5. Mangan's (1959) schematisation of his findings. 
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thertimed power tests on this factor, they were also the more lengthy. 
Two of the timed power tests did nevertheless have higher loadings 
(. 551 . 
48) than other timed tests,. Speed, as measured by Mangan appeared tD 
be of "minor importance at a difficult cognitive level", although 
here it must be recalled that 'speed' was defined by rate measures. 
Mangan had schematized his findings as shown in Fig-5. 
According to his view, the content factors cannot be measured in 
isolation from what he has called the two work attitude factors of speed- 
accuracy and persistence. Thus, for difficult material persistence enters 
into performance but is absent particularly when the tests are highly 
speeded. Speed-accuracy on the other hand enters into performance only 
when easy or unskilled tasks ate presented. If power tests are given 
with unlimited time, the outcome, according to Mangan, will depend on 
the temperamental attribute of persistence. If highly speeded tests are 
used, speed-accuracy will intervene. When there is no time limit , the 
work-attitude of the subject will change from speed-accuracy to 
persistence as the test material moves from easy to difficult tasks. 
Mangan also emphasised that the other speed factors were relatively distinct 
from speed-accuracy. 
Mangan's conclusions, while seemingly sensible, are too firmly presented, 
given the narrow age range of his subjects, the fact that possible sex 
differences were not taken into account and given the crudity and 
possible inaccuracy in some of his measures. There is, for example, some 
evidence that factor structure will vary as a function of the sex of 
subjects (Cooley and Lohnes 1968) in a group not much older than those 
tested by Mangan, in a similar setting and when tested in groups. 
Clarke and King (1960) administered a battery of three motor and three 
perceptual. speed tests to a group of subjects who were available to a 
Highway Traffic Safety Committee. 106 of these. subjects were being re- 
examined because of "excessive violations", the other 93 being routine 
license applicants. Subjects ranged in age from 18 to 77 years and 
were all males. The group was also heterogenous with respect to years of 
education (3 to 21 years). --, 
The WAIS vocabulary test was also given to these subjects. 
The intercorrelations were factor analyzed using the principal axes method. 
The three main factors were rotated to orthogonal simple structure but the 
third factor was not interpretable following rotation. 
The rotated factors were designated perceptual and motor speed. 
Using age, education and vocabulary as reference variables, Clarke and King 
suggest that slowness in selecting an appropriate response, the perceptual 
component, was inversely related to "verbal ability" while slowness in 
making a response, the motor component was positively associated with 
increasing age. 
1O7 
The same analysis procedure was used with education partialled out 
of the correlation matrix to ensure that the observed structure was not 
attributable to the educational heterogeneity of the group. Only minor 
alterations in the loadings were observed. 
Chown's (1961) factor ahalytic study of "the rigidities" and their relationship 
with age has yielded data on the 'speed factor'. She used 16 tests of rigidity 
and two measures of intelligence (20 minute Matrices and the Mill Hill) 
and the battery was administered to 200 men ranging in age from 20 to 
82 years. Principal component analyses on the data for the full groups 
were followed by similar analyses on the data for theee sub-groups 
(Young, middle-aged and old men). Chown carried out graphical rotations 
to remove two factors, those of non-verbal intelligence and age, from all 
the factor analyses. Hotelling's principal component method was used. 
The measures of speed in Chown's study were derived from a nunber of the 
tests and varied somewhat in their nature. For example, speed of forward 
writing was one index of speed, counting letters (e. 9. fourth letter after C) 
another. She found, on examining the inter-relationships among the 
factors, that the most marked changes with age were those associated with 
speed. As she states "the speed tests formed their own unique factor in 
the young group, maintained this to a lesser extent in the middle group, 
and were loaded most highly on the Non-Verbal Intelligence factor in the 
old group. Thus among old people, but not among the young, these speed- 
tests became a measure of intellectual capability and of the extent of the 
preservation of this function". The extent to which these findings are a 
function of the timed administration of the Matrices is not known. Chown 
was investigating this Possibility when her paper was published. 
In the late 1950's, Flanagan and his colleagues (Flanagan et al. 1964) 
initiated a massive study of adolescent 'talent'. Its purpose was to gather 
material on abilities and motives to be used in career guidance. 'Project 
Talent' as it was called, was based on a multifactor conception of human 
talent, 'general intelligence' being regarded as too oversimplified a concept 
for such a purpose. A large battery, comprised of 60 different ability and 
38 motive scales was devised and administered over two days to about 440,000 
students in the 9th to 12th grades. The group testing was carried out in 
1,353 public, private and parochial schools in all parts of the U. S. A. A 
stratified random sampling procedure was used to select schools and the sample 
was made up of about 5% of high schools in the U, S. A. Since the publication 
of the initial report of the project (Flanagan et al. 1964), further analyses 
of the data have appeared (Lohnes 1966; Cooley and Lohnes 1968) and there are 
plans to follow the subjects into the 1980's. { 
Some of the tests given are presented in Table 6, together with 
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TABLE 6. Project Talent tests. 
Time* Test Content 
90 Information General information 
9 Arithmetic computation Speed and accuracy of 
basic skills 
11 Abstract reasoning Non-verbal reasoning 
3 Clerical checking Speed, accuracy. Verbal 
content 
3 Table inspection Speed, accuracy. Numerical 
material 
3 Object inspection Speed and accuracy in 
detecting differences 
in objects 
3 Preferences** Speed of decision making 
52 English Test of English usage 
4 Visualization(2-D) Spatial orientation of 
two dimensional shapes 
3 Disguised words Deciphering of codes 
* Minutes 
* The Preferences Test is an experimental version of a test 
requiring the testee to select which of a pair of adjectives 
best describes a friend. 
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TABLE 7. Project Talent Ability Factors (Lohnes 1966) 
Factor Name Percent Variance 
Verbal Knowledges (sic) 18.7 
Grade 7.8 
English Language 6.6 
Sex 5.7 
Visual Reasoning 5.3 
Mathematics 4.1 
Perceptual Speed and Accuracy 3.6 
Screenings 3.3 





*These factors are components of the test which 
sampled a range of areas of specific knowledge 
on the Information Test. 
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the time limits employed for each and a brief description of the test 
materials. 
A few of these tests were designed so that nobody would finish and 
another few were less 'speeded'. Most of the tests were designed to have 
as generous time limits as were possible in the two-day test sessions. 
All tests were group administered. 
Although the data were gathered for all Subjects, most of the analyses 
were carried out on specially selected representative sub-groups. These 
subgroups did however contain substantial numbers of subjects (7,000 to 
16,000 in some analyses). 
Lohnes (1966) has described the outcomes of a series of principal 
component analyses of the data. The varimax rotation prodedure was awed to 
produce orthogonal solutions. This approach was adopted so as to accord. 
with the basic multifactor theoretical conception of the study.. The original 
60 ability scores were reduced to 13 uncorrelated factors accounting for 64.6 
of the variance. As can be seen from TQblýl 7 two of the factors (sex and 
school grade) which emerged were not part of the test battery. 
The outcome of the factorial study on 17,000 subjects is presented in 
Table 7, together with the percentage of variance accounted for by each 
factor. 
Three of the factors, Visual Reasoning, Perceptual Speed and Accuracy 
and Memory, were considered to be "differential aptitude factors". Lohnes 
(1966) defines an aptitude in terms of a performance set that facilitates 
speed and precision of responses, "to a specific, unique class of 
relatively simple tasks" (pp. 4-1 to 4-2). 
Perceptual Speed and Accuracy (PSA) was loaded by four "highly speeded 
tests" (Clerical Checking, Table Inspection, Object Inspection and 
Arithmetic Computation). While the loadings of these tests were somewhat low, 
'Lohnes (1966) attributed this to low reliabilities "brought about by 
widespread discrepancies in the timing of the tests in different schools" 
(p4-9). Apart from Arithmetic Computation, considered by Lohnes (1966) to 
be a complex test, all these tests showed low intercorrelations with the 
other tests in the battery. 
Separate analysis of the data were undertaken for the two sexes and the 
different grades. In the analyses contrasting males and females PSA emerged 
with a different structure in the two groups, with the sex differences being 
most extreme in the 12th grade. Males overall were found to be superior on 
the preferences Test whereas females excelled on Arithmetical Computation, 
Table Reading, Clerical Inspection and Object Inspection. 
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Two studies quoted by Cooley and Lohnes (1968) also reveal some 
important findings on PSA. Both these studies were carried out on Project 
Talent testees but were issued as internal reports to the project. In the 
first of these, Shaycroft retested 7,500 subjects in the 12th grade who 
were first seen as 9th grade students. It was found that the basic ability 
structure remained stable. However, PSA emerged with "very low" stability 
coefficients,. 33 for males and . 
41 for females. Cooley and Lohnes (1968), 
in commenting on these coefficients assert that these findings are 
attributable to "anomalies in Lebest administration". It should be noted that 
a similar reason was given to account for the low re4iabilities when these 
tests were first administered (Lohnes 1966). 
The second study, carried out by Schoenfeldt, consisted of an analysis 
of the heritability of the various TALENT factors. The original sample 
contained over 2,000 same sex twins, By means of a specially developed 
questionnaire, Schonfeldt isolated 150 male and 187 female monozygotic pairs 
and 53 male. and 103 female dizygotic pairs; sex differences in heritability 
were found in some of the factors. Of particular importance in the present 
context was the failure to find a statistically significant heritability 
coefficient for the male students whereas an h. 
2 
of 0.59 was found for the 
females. 
d. Conclusions from factor-analytic studies. 
The problems which have served to focus factor analytic studies have 
been sufficiently explicit. They include the questions of the presence of a 
speed factor at general, or group level, the relationship between such factors 
and factors of power oz' 'g', whether or not such factors are a function of 
difficulty level of the test material, their relationship with accuracy, 
persistence and so on. 
Any attempt to draw together the findings of factor analytic studies of 
speed is hanpered by a number of methodological shortcomings. Basic to the 
difficulties is the quality of the data, a point which has already been 
considered in some detail. Further complications are introduced by the 
specific procedures used to analyse the data, which is in turn related to 
theoretical pre-conceptions and the type of rotation employed. At a higher 
level are found the problems of factor interpretation which further 
confound the task of making sense of the studies. Also, as has emerged in 
the preceding review, the strength and patterning of the relationships 
appears to be a function of age and sex. There have been no systematic 
investigations of the role of intelligence, education and social class of 
subjects. Finally, what is meant by 'speed' in some factorial studies does 
not coincide with other definitions of speed. 
Taking an overview, it is also somewhat disconcerting to find an absence 
of systematic replications. The overtiding impression is that most studies 
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are of the "one-off" type, Porebski (1954; 1960) being possibly the only 
exception. 
Vernon's (1961) conclusion seems to be the most appropriate at this 
point. After reviewing the various studies of speed in the factor-analytic 
literature, he reaches the inevitable conclusion that only when further 
research has been conducted will it be possible to make a proper assessment 
of speed and its relationship with other human abilities. There does 
however appear to be sufficient evidence that a variety of tests show low 
but consistent inter-correlations. These are predominantly of the repetitive 
item type and are of low conventional difficulty, termed cognitive speed tests 
by Cattell (1971). There is also some evidence of sex differences on these 
tests in terms of 'level' and possibly in terms of pattern as well. How this 
speed factor relates to intelligence within sexes and between ages at varying 
levels of ability is at best uncertain. 
7. Studies of Speed Using Item Times: 
The studies most pertinent to this thesis are those in which individual items 
have been timed. While such studies can be divided into those using group - 
as opposed to individual - test procedures, both types will be considered 
in this section. 
In 1925, Hunsicker conducted what was probably the first study which used 
individual item times in investigating 'rate and ability'. In fact she 
employed a variety of procedures to gather her data, including group-testing 
However, because of the problems associated with group tests, Hunsicker 
discarded these data and used only what she called "individual-test" data. 
These data were actually obtained from groups of 4 to 7 subjects tested 
together. Hunsicker timed both individual items and blocks of items. In all, 
368 subjects were tested on items of varying difficulty. To control for 
accuracy, only correct items were used. Subjects were of both sexes and ranged 
from school children to college students. All subjects were given arithmetic 
items and sentence completion tasks. 
On averaging the correlations between rate and level across age groups, 
the values ranged between 0.39 to 0.61. Hunsicker concluded 
"These values leave ho escape from the 
conclusion that for the groups studied 
under the conditions of this experiment 
there is a consistent and fair positive 
relationship between rate and ability'. 
Hunsicker suggested that had there been a wider range of ability in 
her groups, the correlations would have been more substantial. Correlations 
between rate measures ranged from 0.57 to 0.81, and those for level measures 
between 0.55-to 0.71. 
3 11 
It is difficult to determine the accuracy of Hunsicker's timing 
procedures and what effects the act of timing would have had on the 
subjects. It is likely that the test situation produced conditions of 
stressed testing. 
The study by Peak and Boring (1926) is in some ways a classic 
investigation of mental speed. Their report presents an important theoretical 
analysis of mental speed (discussed in a previous section), and their study 
was among the first to use individual item times. It's major limitation 
was the use of only five highly selected subjects, (2 males, 3 females), 
who were either advanced undergraduates or psotgraduates in psychology. 
All subjects were given Forms 5 and 6 of the Army Alpha and Forms A 
and B of Otis. Each subject was tested individually and the tests 
administered in the same order. The normal time limit instruction was 
omitted but subjects were instructed to work quickly and accurately and 
to indicate abandonments. Each item was timed by the examiner, apart from 
one sub-test where 5 consecutive solutions were timed. 
To investigate individual differences in speed, only correct solutions 
were examined. Even this index, as the authors note, is not quite adequate 
since "the subjective assurance of the subjects must have varied in the 
different items". On the basis of the data used in this analysis (which 
is too extensive to present here in detail), Peak and Boring observed that 
solution times showed significant individual differences, that appeared to 
be fairly constant. They concluded that speed differences inhere in the 
single item, rather than between items. As they state "the tendency for 
differentiation as to speed appears in the simple intelligent act 
represented by a single item .... 1t There is however a difficulty with this 
conclusion in that they do not clearly state how items were timed. For 
example, if they'simply noted the time at which the solution was recorded, 
then individual item timed will include interstitial times. If the timer 
was reset for every item and timing initiated only when the subject 
initiated the problem solving process, the interstitial tiffs would not be 
included. 
Peak and Boring also gave their subjects a visual-reaction time task 
(simple) and found that the average time for 100 reactions correlated . 70 
with a weighted average item time on the Otis and . 90 on the Alpha tests, 
Further, the scores obtained by the subjects in the standard time allowed 
on these tests both correlated . 90 with the reaction times. 
It should be noted that Peak and Boring were cautious in discussing 
the implications of their findings, firstly because of the small number of 
subjects and also because they only examined the central tendency and not the 
variability of their data. 
11'4 
Sutherland's (1934) report presented a series of studies, the 
details of which are too extensive to describe here. His measures of speed 
varied according to the task given. For example, on a series of performance 
tass, each test was timed, but because Sutherland presumed that such 
times would he too unreliable, each time was converted to a deviation score 
and the median of these was used as the index of speed. For his university 
student samples on these tests, the Spearman-Brown reliabilities were 
much too low to allow serious consideration of the data. The reliability 




In another test series, Sutherland used a timing procedure whereby 3 
large cards with single digit numbers on them were turned every two seconds. 
At certain points in the test, subjects were asked to note the numbers 
on the cards currently displayed. Thus, he could only obtain fairly crude 
rate measures for tasks such as cancellation of letters, adding groups of 
3 digits, simple arithmetical problems, and the like. 
On the basis of his data, Sutherland could find no evidence of a 
speed factor that is general. It is only when problems are of low difficulty 
that "a factor of speed comes into operation.. Sutherland goes on to 
conclude 
"If intelligence is taken as the general factor 'g', then 
no specific factor of speed is involved in solving problems 
whether these are easy or difficult". 
Slater (1938), in his study of speed, used an adaptation of Thorndike's 
CAVJ as well as a number of other tests. His subjects were asked to work at 
their own rates. About 150 subjects aged approximately 14.5 years were 
tested in groups. Equal numbers of males and females were used. A cyclometer 
(described in a previous chapter) was used to indicate the time. Subjects 
were told the; OSe of the machine and were asked to put down the time 
at which they began each question. Further, they were asked to raise their 
hands when a new set of questions required. Thus, despite the 
intention of the author, the emphasis on timing and the visible progress 
of others makes it highly unlikely that Slater was getting measures of 
subjects working at tii? 'own rates. If anything, this study appears similar 
to Furneaux's (1955) stressed speed condition. 
Rate of work measures were computed from the correct solution times to 
control for accuracy. Measures of level were obtained from the number of 
correct solutions on the level test. Slater found that although the 
speed measures correlated among themselves, they did not show any close 
association with the various measures of intelligence, irrespective of whether 
or not these tests were timed. Correlations were found to vary between 0.0 and 0.4 
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depending on which subjects were considered. He also found that 
subjects tended to have consistent work rates irrespective of the type and 
difficulty of the tasks. Thesd rates, according to Slater "could not be 
considere4o depend only on the amount of their general intelligence". 
The procedures of this study make it very unlikely that the time measures 
were accurate. Slater himself recognised this shortcoming. Slaters procedure 
for measuring average speed on each of the tests resulted in a degree of 
data loss that, because of its differential nature, further complicates the 
interpretation of his data. For example, the average rate of work measure 
was computed for only those series in which the subject had "successfully 
answered any considerable number of problems... " Slater did not specify 
what he meant by 'considerable'. 
In a carefully devised study, Tate (1948) examined differences in speed 
of response to items at different levels of difficulty. His immediate concern 
was the extent to which speed of response to mental test items differentiated 
individuals once the effects of accuracy were controlled. He also attempted 
to discover a factor of speed independent of altitude and the function being 
measured. 
Thirty -six high school students aged 188mos. on average (s. d 7.4mos. ) were 
used as subjects. This group, as judged by their mean mental age, were of 
above average ability (mean M. A 218.7mosr, s. d. 16.7mos4 on the S-Form of the 
California Test of Mental Maturity and all were enrolled in classes to 
prepare them for college entrance. Although the group was made up of both 
sexes (14 females, 22 males) only minor sex differences appeared and of these 
only one was statistically significant. All subjects were randomly selected 
but the group did not consitute a representative sample of high school 
children. They were all students in Tate's class who were willing to spend 
three to five hours doing tests. 
Tate used four tests, Arithmetic Reasoning, Number Series, Sentence Completion 
cn 
and Spatial Relatij).. Ea. ch was divided into three non-overlapping levels of 
difficulty and the battery administered during the vacation and at weekends. 
Subjects were instructed to complete items as quickly and as accurately as 
they could, but Tate does not give details of the wording. All items were 
individually timed. (The procedures have been described in an earlier chapter). 
Times were recorded in seconds ,, nd transformed into logs to satisfy the 
distributional assumptions for the analysis of variance used on the data. 
Tate found that when difficulty and accuracy were controlled, there were 
highly significant individual differences in speed. Ccntrolling for accuracy 
differences, it, was found that those subjects who were fast at one level of 
difficulty were also fast at other levels. Also, subjects who were fast in 
one test content area were also fast in the other three. For difficult items, 
using an independent measure of altitude in the same content area, correlations 
between speed and altitude did not differ significantly from zero, indicating 
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that mental speed is independent of altitude. However, in addition to this 
general speed component, the items "were eliciting a special ability in 
speed linked to the fiction. in which it was being measured". Finally, Tate 
concludes "and that there was an independent factor of speed operative 
throughout a wide range of difficulty appeared statistically certain'. 
Although there were some serious methodological limitations, there is 
little doubt that Tate's study was a major advance inýinvestigation of 
mental speed. The restrictions attached to his findings are mainly those of 
generalizability. The narrow age and ability ranges and the above average 
ability of the subjects are some of the features which preclude any wide 
generalization of Tate's conclusions. Other limitations arise due to his 
timing procedure and the failure to counter-balance the order of testing. 
Some further restrictions must also follow from the fact that the person 
who conducted the study was also the class teacher. It would also be 
important to discover if instructions which stressed neither speed nor 
accuracy and a surreptitious timing procedure would lead to the same conclusions. 
The study published by Cane and Horn (1951) was indirectly concerned with 
speed in relation to ability. However, it employed an interesting procedure for 
recording solution times and was well conceived in terms of its design. Cane 
and Horn were mainly concerned with developing a set of parallel tests matched 
for type of question, difficulty and average solution speed. This provided them 
with an opportunity to investigate the relationship between speed and total 
score, and between difficulty and time spent in doing any item. 
Cane and Horn used the shapes Analysis Test made up of six types of question 
about 2- and 3- dimensional shapes. The subjects were 13 -and 14-year old 
children at a Secondary Modern School. There were 60 children in each group, 
with equal numbers of boys and girls. The timing procedure permitted the 
recording of time from item presentation to the time at which the subject 
initiated an action which led to the presentation of the next item. Details 
of the apparatus were described in an earlier chapter. 
The test session lasted an entire day, with three breaks between periods of 
testing. Each subject answered 108 problems and also completed the A. H. 4. The 
authorss were careful tö'design the order of, testing (balanced incomplete blocks) 
to control for order and other effects. Time scores were converted to logs. 
It emerged that the tests given were much too difficult for these groups 
of subjects. The scores (number correct) were generally less than one half the 
maximum score, with many scores of zero and very few near the test ceiling. 
Cane and Horn report that the position of a set of problems did not affect 
the score. Males were significantly better than the females on the total 
score measure and there was also a significant sex x age interaction. 
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BOYS GIRLS 
13 years 1040 786 
14 years 1095 979 
Although the authors describe this interaction as showing that 
girls improve more than boys, it is not a true 'improvement' because 
different age groups were used in this 'cross-sectional' design. In any 
case, given the difficulty of the tests, it is equally likely that the 
age differences in scores interacting with sex of subject is artefactual 
as it seems likely that both groups of boys were at their score celing, 
whereas the data suggest that the scores of girls could still increase on 
these tests. 
Cane and Horn also found that the time spent on a set of questions was 
significantly affected by its position. There was a general practice effect 
on speed, and although boys were slower, there were no age differences. 
The effect of practice was to considerably diminish the time spent on a 
test. However, there was no effect on the score obtained. This tray well 
have been a consequence of the difficulty of the tests. Also, although 
the better subjects (higher total correct) were slower, the relationship 
observed was not linear, as it was found that the very slowest subjects 
also had the poorest scores. 
Unfortunately, the various speed scores in this study were not correlated 
with the scores on the A. H. 4. The Shapes Test showed only a low correlation 
(. 29) with the A. H. 4 but the many zero scores and the few scores in the 
upper score range make it highly likely that this correlation is artificially 
low. 
Cane and Horn present an interesting hypothesis on the basis of their 
data. They suggest that when a difficult test is given with a time limit, 
poorer subjects will cover more of the test and so approach nearer to their 
maximum score than do better subjects, the latter being slower. If the test 
is readministered, all will tend to work faster. But, according to their 
observations, "the increase in the number of questions answered will be of 
greater benefit to the good subjects, who will get more of them right, so 
the good subjects will improve their scores more than do the worse ones% 
Apart from the present investigation, the study by Brierley (1969) is 
the only attempt known to this writer to test Furneaux's approach to 
problem solving. Brierley's study is distinguished by its careful attention 
to methodological and procedural problems. Unfortunately, its length (over 
300 pages excluding tables and appendices) precludes any description of the 
full study. However, as is noted in other sections of this report, he 
encountered a number of difficulties with Furneaux's item scaling procedures. 
This _- led to some limitations being attached to his findings and these 
should be borne in mind when considering his results. 
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There were three main components to Brierley's study. The first was the 
procedure used to record item solution times. His automated testing 
procedure has already been considered. The second was his attempt to employ 
Furneaux's item scaling procedures. This is discussed in greater detail in 
a later section. The third component, concerned with his findings on speed 
and accuracy, is presented here. 
In brief, Brierley found that Furneaux's theory of intellectual speed 
measurement held up to some extent when investigated in normal subjects by 
means of an automated individual test procedure. Clinically diagnosed neurotic 
subject,? displayed problem solving characteristics that were substantially 
the same as those of normal subjects. The normal subjects in this study were 
hospital personnel (administrative staff and nurses aged 15 to 45 years) who 
were predominantly of above average ability. No attempt was made to examine 
the data for normals for differential patterns of performance with regard to 
the sex. of the subjects. 
Brierley also proposed a dimensional system for 'power' measurement based 
on Thurstone's (1938) views. On the basis of his power scores, he was. able to 
show that neurotic subjects were significantly less efficient than normal 
subjects. Further, extraverted neurotics tended to be quicker than introverted 
neurotics and that for a considerable range of item difficulties they were 
less accurate. 
Chown and Davis (1969) selected items from the Nufferno Letter Series 
(level) for their study of the effects of age on speed and level of performance. 
10 subjects aged 45 to 70 years and 12 subjects aged 20 to 35 years were 
given the items. The proportion in each passing an item was used to establish 
item difficulty for a sub-set of the items. From these data, they selected 
10 iteis representing five difficulty levels and these were then arranged 
as two cycles. This modified test was then administered without time limit to 
42 subjects, half of whom were between 20 and 49 years of age, and the other 
half, between 50 and 69 years. The groups were matched on Mill Hill Vocabulary 
scores and the tests were individually administered and timed. Further 
details of timing and other procedures were not given. 
Chown and Davis (1969) found that the two age groups did not differ 
in mean number of items correct. No information on the ratio of errors to 
abandoments is presented. 
Solution times were transformed to log values for the correct solutions. 
Older subjects were found to spend more time on easy items, rather than on 
those that were more difficult. Older subjects also showed greater persistence 
on items which they solved incorrectly. 
A study such as this is difficult to interpret for a number of reasons, 
1, ack of information on timing procedure, and the difficulty scaling being two 
of the major reasons for this. 
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Yates (1963,1966 ) has carried out a series of investigations to 
examine the effects of time limits in test scores. In the 1963 study, 
using the Standard Matrices, he found a group of students who appeared 
to be slow but accurate. This group attempted fewer items than otherb 
subjects, but the majority of those attempted were correct. The 196 
study aimed to repeat this finding. A group of 86 first year engineering 
students were given 30 minutes to complete the test and were then allowed 
a further 15 minutes, not having been told beforehand that extra time 
would be allowed. The Nufferno Level Test GL/26 was then given to the 
group with the 25 minute time limit being made explicit. 
Yates was again able to identify the slow but accurate group. Their 
level scores were the same as those of subjects who worked faster. Yates 
suggested that because his was a pre-selected group, the proportion of 
individuals in the general population with this approach to tests may be 
more extensive. While Yates also commented on the possible personality 
characteristics of such a group, no personality variables were used in 
the study. A similar performance pattern has also been reported by 
Hichens (1968), using Grammar and Intermediate school pupils. The sex 
r4os and ages of these groups were not described. 
While the studies discussed in this section share the procedure of 
individual item timing, methodologically they are not much more adequate 
than the studies previously considered. The findings, taken overall, are 
inconsistent in some respects and consistent in others. Some authors have 
found that speed measures are related to each other, giving an indication 
of a more general speed factor. Tate (1948) also reports finding specific 
sped effects dependent only on the test. Others have found no general 
speed effect. Given that the criterion of speed varies between studies, 
that timing is surreptitious or overt, that instructions vary, and so on, 
it is perhaps not surprising that research produces inconsistent results. 
8. Speed and Personality 
Himmelweit(1946) studied a group of 100 neurotic patients diagnosed as 
either hysteric or dysthymic with a view to determining if they responded 
differentially on speed and accuracy tests. There were equal numbers of men 
and women in each diagnostic group and ranged in age from 18 to 40 years. 
All subjects were given four paper-and-pencil tests and one motor 
manipulation task. For on4alf of eacli_ task they were instructed to respond 
both quickly and accurately and for the other half as quickly as possible. 
All subjects were also given Raven's Matrices and these scores were used 
as the basis for partialling out intelligence differences. 
Himmelweit found a general speed factor as well as a general accuracy 
factor both of which accounted for substantial proportions of the test 
variance (ranging from 24 per cent to 41 per cent). On the paper-and-pencil 
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tests there was no relationship between speed and accuracy but on the 
manipulation task a substantial negative correlation was found. 
Himmelweit- attributed this difference between the two types of test to 
the presence of corrective feedback which was immediately available on 
the manipulation task. 
Contrasting the performance of the hysterics and dysthymics, Himmelwe}i't 
found that the former preferred 'speed', the, latter accuracy. However, 
score differences between the two groups were only'suggestive' in the case 
of speed and very significant-in the case of accuracy. It was also found 
were that 'irrespective of diagnostic groups womenwre quicker and more accurate 
than men. 
Himmelweit was cautious about generalizing her results because of the 
clinical status of her subjects. However, given the age range of her group, 
the conclusions are even more restricted by her failure to partial out 
any age effects in the data. 
Foulds and Caine (1958) administered the Matrices and Porteus N; azes to 
a large group of female patients (aged 20 to 59 years) admitted to a 
psychiatric hospital. They were all told that they could take as long as 
they wished to complete the tests but that they would be timed. The patients 
were later divided into personality groups and although significant 
differences in total time emerged, no attempt was made to partial out the 
effects of age. Details of the timing procedure were not reported and the 
impact of the clinical status of these patients on test performance was 
not examined. 
Eysenck, in a study published in 1959, attempted to test the prediction 
that on a test which required subjects to work for an extended period of 
time"+ extraverts would show a decrement in performance towards the end of 
the test. This prediction was based on the notion that a long test satisfied 
the conditions of a massed practice task which would generate reactive 
inhibition more readily in extraverts than in introverts. The test chosen 
for this study, the Morrisby Compound Series Test, was individually 
administered to two groups of subjects, 19 extraverts (E score greater than 30) 
and 28 introverts (E score less than 17). These subjects were selected from 
an initial group of 137 adult "male and female neurotics". Each item was 
timed separately. 
The two groups did not differ significantly in total correct scores, or 
in the speed with which all items were completed. However, on dividing the 
test into the first 45 and last 15 items, introverts were found to be 
significantly slower on the latter, when correct solution speed was examined. 
. 
Extraverts were also found to abandoxn items more quickly at the end of the 
test . 
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While these results appear to support Eysenck's predictions, the paper 
does not provide details of the ages of the subjects and the sex ratios 
within each group. Neither timing procedures nor instructions are described, 
so that the conclusions from this ttudy are difficult to evaluate. 
Lynn and Gordon (1961) obtained measures of E and N from .a group of 60 
university student. -volunteers 
(the first to volunteer) ranging in age from 
18 to 23 years. These students were given both forms of the Mill Hill 
Vocabulary Scale and the odd-numbered items from the Matrices (Standard). 
They were asked to work primarily for accuracy but to be quick at the same 
time. 
Compared with the general population, this group was found to be more 
introverted and neurotic than the 'general population' and their E and N 
scores correlated -. 32. As a consequence, the main analysis of relationships 
between measures of intelligence and personality was based on partial 
correlations. Neither N nor E had any significant correlation with Matrices 
total score. However time taken to complete the Matrices was positively 
correlated with N and the test for curvelinearity of this relationship just 
reached significance. 
Both E and N were found to correlate positively with the vocabulary score, 
the correlation with E only being statistically significant. None of the 
correlations was greater than 0.36 in absolute value. The sex composition 
of this group was not reported and presumably the data were not examined 
for sex differences. Also, the method of timing and the circumstances of 
testing were not reported. Although these factors detract somewhat from the 
value of this study, it is also likely that any correlations with intelligence 
would have been attenuated, given the narrow ability band of the subjetts. 
Eysenck (1967a)` reports a study by Jensen (1964) which found a significant 
correlation of -0.46 between E. P. I. extraversion scores and time spent on 
the Matrices (Standard). These results indicate that extraverts tend to 
work more quickly and while they are reported to have made more errors, the 
trend did not reach statistical significance. The document reporting this 
study is not generally available and the research cannot therefore be 
properly evaluated. 
Two studies by Farley (1966a, b), using the-same group of subjects, have 
examined relationships between speed measures and personality variables. 
The subjects in both studies were 30 male and female nurses, orderlies 
and other hospital domestic staff and W? niversity students, mean age 29.37 
years 04.11.14 years). 
In, the first study (Farley 1966a) subjects were required to copy simple 
geometric figures and letters on to a specially prepared sheet of paper. 
The total time to complete the task was recorded covertly, the subject 
being given "non-anxiety-evokingt" instructions (not published). Time-measures 
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were converted into logs. Subjects also completed the MPI . (only 
Extraversion scores were used), Taylor's MAS and the Need-Achievement scale 
of the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (Edwards 1959). 
Farley (1966a) found the following product'-moment correlations: 
Log Time with Extraversion -0.42 (p less than . 02) 
Log Time with MAS 0.11 (not significant) 
Log Time with Need-Achievement -0.20 (not significant) 
Visual inspection of the scatter-plots revealed no curvelinear relationships. 
Farley (1966a) concluded that extraversion influences free-response 
speed but that measures of anxiety and Need-Achievement showed no significant 
relationships. The value of this study is limited because of the failure 
to partial out age, to examine the data for sex differences and the small 
nu#iber of subjects. It is also somewhat surprising that no attempt was made 
to examine the relationship with N. These scores were available as is shown 
by the use of N in the Farley (1966b) study carr e out on the same subjects. 
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In the second study, subjects were individually/the Nufferno Speed Test 
under stressed conditions. 
Subjects were di%rided into 3E groups on the basis of low, middle and 
high E scores. They were redivided into similar N groups for a separate 
analysis concerned with the effects of N on speed. Farley (1966b) checked his 
data to find if there were any interactions between E and N and failed to 
find any such effects in the speed scores. 
Using an analysis of variance and Schaffe's test for individual comparisons, 
significant differences were found between extraverts ane ; &mbiverts, extraverts 
and introverts, and ambiverts and introverts vs extraverts. A similar analysis 
for the neuroticism group speed scores showed the mid-N group to be faster 
than the low N group and the low-and high -N groups combined. No other 
differences were significant. There were no significant differences in the 
number of correct solutions in the groups, and age, sex, and Mill Hill 
Vocabulary I. Q's did not show significant differences in the sub-groups. 
Farley (1966b) concluded that extraverts are faster than introverts 
on such measures of speed. The N-sub-group differences were interpreted 
as supporting the "inverted U" hypothesis under stressed testing. As he 
points out, the groups were not extreme scorers on the two dimensions, so 
that the effects of the personality differences are somewhat restricted. 
Some of the methodological problems of this study were similar to those of 
Farley (1966a). 
Ley et al. (1966) investigated too hytotheses, firstly, whether there would 
be a significant departure from learity when the regression of intelligence 
test scores on anxie$y is tested and secondly, whether there wbuld be 
1 
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negative correlations between measures of extraversion and intelligence. 
Both hypotheses emerged from a numbar of reviews on the relationships between 
E, N, anxiety and intelligence. 
The sample tested consisted of 144 volunteers (mean age 46 years, s. d. 13 years) 
who had previously completed the Progressive Matrices and the Mill Hill 
Synonyms Test, Form II Senior. No information is given as to the time interval 
between the administration of these tests and the battery of measures given 
for purposes of this study. The later battery consisted of the MPI, the IPAT 
Anxiety Scale, the TINAS, and the 16 PF (Form C). The only contemporaneous 
measure of intelligence was derived from the 16 P. F. 
Of the nine correlations between N or anxiety and intelligence, seven were 
significant and negative. Only one was significant and positive (Mill Hill 
and the Cattell Anxiety Scale) and one non-significant. The largest correlation 
was . 36 (absolute value). Four of the coefficients were found to be non-linear 
but none showed the hypothesized inverted -II pattern when the data were 
plotted. They also found that all correlations with extraversion, when 
significant, were positive rather than negative. An attempt was also made to 
examine the relationships between 11 or anxiety at different levels of 
intelligence. In these analyses no 'inverted-U ' was found. Although these 
investigators were aware of the possible effects of age on their data, no 
attempt was made to partial out its effects. Sex differences were not commented 
on. 
In an attempt to test a series of hypotheses derived from Eysenck's theory, 
Russell (1968) administered a battery of group and individual tests to 94 male 
and 92 female children aged between 10.5 years and 11 years 10 months. 
In addition to the JEPI and a latter series test, Russell obtained scores 
indexing speed and accuracy on the Gibson Spiral Maze, a letter cancellation 
task, mirror drawing, paper and pencil aiming and pursuit aiming. Russell's 
procedure for timing individual items on the letter series during group 
administration has already been described. 
On the basis of his analysis, Russell reported that speed of performance 
was general across both motor and cognitive tasks. Accuracy was much less 
general. Speed and accuracy were negatively related for motor tasks but 
positively related on the letter series in wales but not in females. 
For the female subjects, speed of problem solving was significantly related 
to E, with extraverts being faster. However the correlation between speed of 
problem solving and E diminished . as the length of the task increased. For 
males, E was unrelated to speed or accuracy. A sex difference was also found 
for some of the correlations with N. For females, the higher their N scores, 
the faster they tended to be. 
Russell was unable to find any meaningful linear relationships between 
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FIGURE 5a. Extroversion and search time on the blaze Test. (Digits show number of 
decision changes made by each subject. ) 
Taken from Jones and Wineman (1973) 
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however, on some () of the tasks N showed a significant curvelinear 
relationship with high and low N scores being faster than the mid N group. 
In general, Russell asserted that in his data he was unable to find support 
for the hypothesis that extraverts work quickly, sacrificing accuracy, and that 
introverts tend to be slow and accurate. In fact, he noted a tendency for 
effects to operate in the opposite direction for the majority of Motor Tasks. 
Although Russell's study produced findings unanticipated by Eysenck's theory, 
it was probably an inappropriate test of the various predictions. The male 
subjects were higher on N than would be expected on the basis of the 
standardization data and WheremE and N correlated -. 15 for males, the 
correlation for females was -0.314, a relationship not found in the normative 
sample. Plots of E and N also revealed curvelinear relationships in the data. 
Russell was aware of these problems and attempted to cope with them 
statistically. Also Russell did not take into account the fact that the Nufferno 
Latter Series Test might have been too difficult for his subjects. This test 
is not normally administered to children as young as this, and given that they 
were of average intelligence, the Letter Series must have been particularly 
difficult. As Furneaux (1955) points out in the test manual - "The criterion 
situation can be taken to be Grammar School examinations of about G. C. E (Ordinary) 
standard. The test has, however, been used successfully with intelligent children 
down to about 11 years" (p L/11). If anything, Russell's subjects were slightly 
below average in intelligence (female mean 98, s. d 14.8; male mean 95, s. dl3.4).. 
Jones and Wineman (1973) used an on-line computer presentation of the 
Perceptual Mazes Test in a study of the relationship 
between extraversion, speed and accuracy. Difficulty thresholds were determined 
for each subject and they were then given speed-stressed and accuracy stressed 
instructions. The on-line task presentation enabled them to record the 
different amounts of time spent by subjects on different parts of the pattern. 
Thus their records enabled them to measure the amount of time spent on planning 
a route through the maze as well as other decision times and decision changes. 
Their study, based on the data for a group of 26 "relatively homogeneous" 
young adults showed a relationship between extroversion and speed preference. 
As extroversion score increased, there was a greater tendency towards faster 
responding and an increase in careless errors. No formal statistical analyses 
were reported in this study, but the trend is readily apparent in the 
accompanying diagram (Fig-5a). 
The studies presented in this section have examined a variety of relationships 
between speed and personality on measures of intelligence or on narrow ability 
tests. Most of thejstudies cited have used the Eysenckian and on occasion, 
the Cattellian dimensions. There is also a large number of studies which have 
looked at the relationship between 'anxiety' and performance on tests. 
Various questionnaires have been devised to measure 'anxiety'. The Taylor 
Scale (TMAS) was discussed in an earlier section. Mandler and Sarason (1952) 
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have developed the Test Anxiety questionnaire as a measure of the anxiety 
experienced by adults in test-taking situations. Similar questionnaires 
have been devised for adolescents and children (Mandler and Cowan 1958; 
Sarason et al. 1960). The test devised by Alpert and Haber (1960) unlike 
its predecessors, attempts to identify testees whose anxiety in test 
situations either facilitatesor disrupts performance. 
Speilberger et al. (19ii) distinguish between 'state' and 'trait' 
anxiety, the former being a transitory phenomenon, the latter equivalent to 
an enduring personality bait. They have developed a scale that aims to 
measure both aspects in test situations (The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory). 
None of these measures has been fully explored in relation to E and N 
although, as noted earlier, the TMAS appears to be a measure of both 
(Eysenck 1973b). Fleishman and Ellison (1969) for example, have found a 
correlation of 0.77 between the TMAS and the M. P. I. -N scale. 
Gaudry and Spielberger (1971) in their review of anxiety and 
educational achievement note that despite the different measures used 
for anxiety and intelligence, a low negative correlation is consistently 
found. 
In a recent review, Entwistle (1972) has examined the relationship 
between personality (measured on the Eysenck and Cattell Scales) and 
attainment. His assessment suggested that an age effect may be important in 
that academic success at primary school is linked to stable extroversion 
whereas success at university tends to be associated with introversion. 
He does however caution that this apparently simple pattern may be 
complicated by a variety of interactions depending on intelligence level, 
type of institution and subject being studied. 
A similar inversion emerges in with N, although for this dimension 
the strength and pattern fof relationship is somewhat different. At younger 
ages, N tends to show low negative correlations with achievement but at 
older ages the correlation tends to be low anc/ositive. Exceptions have 
been found, and again other factors may be responsible for the observed 
pattern. 
Naylor (1972) has also recently reviewed the research literature on 
the relationship between personality and educational achievement. He concludes 
that "general assertions concerning the relation between personality and 
academic achievement are unlikely to have general validity" (p-71). Sex 
differences in patterns of relationship as well as variation associated 
with school settings, teaching procedures and other factors are among 
the variables that lead to the uncertainty. 
Anthony (1973) has attempted to account for the inversion of the . 
1.2 
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relationship between E and IQ from pre-to post-puberty by proposing a 
differential developmental course for each variable. He states that E 
increases to a peak at 13 to 14 years and then begins to decline. General 
ability however increases until the twenties. Cn the assumption that 
individuals who are advanced :. (or behind) on-ore aspQct are similarly 
advanced (or behind) on the other, the inversion can be explained. 
Unfortunately, while this is an attractive explanation, its validity is cast 
into doubt by it being an attempt to base notions of development on 
predominantly cross-sectional data (Schaie 1970). ldhile there is some 
evidence that the EN and L have decreasing reliabilities as retest interval 
increases (S. B. G. Eysenck and HI. J. Eysenck 197 ), there has been no extended 
attempt to follow the developmental sequence of these dimensions using an 
appropriate design. As Schaig (1970) emphasises, it ".. has been known for 
some time that data on age-related phenomena will differ markedly depending 
upon whether it has been collected by means of cross-sectional or 
longitudinal research strategies". 
In a recent study of over 2,000 children aged between 9 and 13 years 
(Whites, Negroes and Vexicans), Jensen (1973) found that the E, N and L Scales 
of the Junior Eysenck Personality Inventory showed 
low but significant and systematic correlations with achievement. Extraversion 
also correlated positively with three measures of IQ (Lorge -Thorndike Verbal 
and Non-verbal. IQ and Matrices IQ). However, this was found predominantly 
in the 6th grade group, the highest value being . 37 and the pattern across 
ethnic groups was not consistent. Even fewer of the correlations with 
N and L were significant and the same inconsistent pattern was shown. 
E, N and L made negligible independent contributions to achievement, but 
when combined in a multiple regression equation they accounted for a small 
share of the achievement variance. No attempt was made to examine 
relationships separately by sex. 
C ticn are diverse in terms of the subjects The studies reviewed in this se# 
tested, the measures used to quantify personality and intelligence, the sex and 01 
age of the subjects, and in terms of the quality of the research. There seems 
to be little doubt that personality factors correlate with test porfor r_ce 
and that 24 and N have differential relationshifs with test scores, although 
the correlations are lcw and not always consistent, either from study to 
study or with the predictions based on Eysenck's theory. 
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9. Continuance, Accuracy and Test Performance 
Unlike speed, the two other major components of Furneaux's model, 
continuance and accuracy, are not examined in detail in Furneaux's 
publications. Their role in his model and their interaction with speed 
will be discussed in Section B. The present chapter will focus on theory 
and research concerned with continuance and accuracy. 
Furneaux (1961) proposes an individual difference dimension which 
is the tendency not to abandon attempts to find a solution to test 
problems. In empirical work, this disposition is indexed by the time 
elapsing between the presentation of an item and the recording of a 
"give up" response. This time interval is termed abandonment time 
and for any given individual there is presumed to be a distribution of 
such times for a set of items. 
The disposition not to abandon items is termed "continuance", a term 
which he considers to be somewhat more general than the common term for. ' 
this disposition, persistence. Continuance, as indexed by abandonment 
times, is considered by Furneaux to be partly determined by persistence, 
but ..... 
"the decision to abandon an item may sometimes be 
made on grounds which involve an intelligent 
assessment of the effects on score of attempting 
a lot of items rather than persisting with a few". (Furneaux 1961). 
The concept "continuance" has not been generally adopted in the 
psychological literature. In fact, the term persistence has been 
retained and appears to be used in a somewhat confusing manner. In 
its original form, persistence is a dispositional term, and refers to a 
personality trait. In the general literature (e. g. Feather 1962), 
"persistence" is also used to refer to the amount of time an individual 
actually worked on a difficult or insoluble task, or the number of attempts 
to solve the problem. For reasons which will become apparent, it is worth 
drawing a distinction between dispositional persistence and behavioural 
persistence. The latter is indexed directly by the time or number of 
trials to abandonment, whereas the former is inferred from abandonments. 
"Continuance" as used by Furneaux differs somewhat from both these 
conceptions. As will be seen, it is possibly the most appropriate term 
to use. Unfortunately, Furneaux never elaborated his views on the nature 
and determinants of continuance. 
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"Persistence" has been the subject of a number of major reviews 
(Ryans 1939, ]arsenck 1960 b, Feather 1962). 
In his review, Eysenck (1960 b) focussed on the evidence for 
"dispositional persistence" or persistence as a personality trait. 
On the basis of his assessment he concluded that persistence is a trait 
that is of a "relatively unitary nature", but that in addition, there 
are sub-groups of activities which cluster together to form more specific 
types of persistence, physical and ideational persistence being the 
two most important of these. As a trait it tends according to the 
evidence presented by Eysenck, to show slight correlations with intelligence, 
but "more impressive ones with 'w' or lack of neuroticism, and with 
introversion". (p. 80). 
Eysenck (1957) accounts for the differences in persistence between 
introverts and extraverts on the basis of differences in inhibitory 
potential. The extravert is assumed to generate excitatory potential 
slowly and at a weak level. Inhibitory potential is generated strongly 
and rapidly, but then dissipates slowly. The converse applies to 
introverts. It is proposed that on tasks requiring sustained or 
strenuous effort, the tendency of the extravert to generate strong 
inhibitory potential would lead to a lesser persistence relative to 
introverts (see Eysenck 1947; 1967 b). 
Subsequent to Fysenck's (1960 b) review, little research appears to 
have been conducted on trait persistence, apart from the work of Thomas et al. 
(1968) on temperamental characteristics in infants and young children. 
These authors, in the context of a longitudinal study of individuality 
in children, have identified persistence as one of nine temperamental 
characteristics. They define persistence in terms of continuation of 
behaviour despite obstacles and on the basis of their data, suggest 
that persistence (as well as the other traits), can be identified in 
early infancy and has a degree of stability over time. 
Feather's (1962) review, while accepting the evidence for trait 
persistence, is primarily concerned to develop an approach in which trait 
persistence is regarded as one of several determinants of behavioural 
persistence. His review is confined to a somewhat narrow definition of 
persistent behaviour. It focusses on the paradigm in which the individual 
is confronted by a very difficult or insoluble task and where no 
restrictions are placed on the amount of time or the number of attempts 
allowed. This definition does not take into account "easy" tasks of long 
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duration, and "time allowed" is defined solely in the experimenter's terms: 
it does not take account of subject's perceptions of the amount of time. 
For example, subjects may abandon tasks for such trivial reasons as test 
sessions which extend into dinner breaks. 
Studies of persistence, according to Feather (1962) cluster into 
three fairly distinct classes: 
i. Those in which persistence is considered primarily as 
an enduring and pervasive personality trait which leads 
to predictable behaviour. Situational factors are 
given only minimal weight. 
ii. Studies concerned with resistance to extinction in 
which persistence is indirectly implicated. Such 
studies, according to Feather, rarely consider persistence 
as an individual characteristic. 
iii. Studies in which persistence is treated as a 
motivational phenomenon. In this group, the weight 
given to personality and situational factors can vary, 
but both are taken into account. 
A study carried out by Feather and summarised in his 1962 paper, 
provides evidence for the inadequacy of a predominantly trait approach to 
behavioural persistence. This study will be described shortly. Feather's 
assessment of the research which conceptualises persistence solely in 
terms of resistance to extinction also draws attention to the inadequacies 
of such a view. Such studies emphasise the situational factors in persistence 
with little attempt to take into account personality variables. As he notes, 
they do not account for the variations between individuals in the same task 
environment.. Studies have found that if subjects develop a high level of 
expectation of reward during the acquisition trials they tend to show low 
persistence when placed on an extinction schedule. Conversely, low 
expectation of reinforcement will tend to be associated with high levels of 
persistence. However, the generality of these observations is restricted by 
other factors. Feather (1962) points out that in partial reinforcement 
studies, an important element is the subject's perception of the control 
he has in the task situation: persistence is lowered when the subject sees 
the presentation of reward as outside of his control but is raised when 
the subject regards the reinforcement as dependent on his skill. 
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The series of studies which adopt, implicitly or explicitly, an 
interactional approach have served to underline the complexities involved. 
The basic model for such studies is concerned with the total motivation of 
the subject to perform the task in competition with the total motivation 
to perform an alternative. This model is somewhat limited in that the usual 
paradigm is concerned with two alternatives whereas in practice there may 
well be a fluid heirarchy of alternatives. The total motivation in any 
one direction is construed in terms of a number of sub-components each of 
which has to be determined for prediction purposes. It is then assumed that 
these components combine additively or multiplicatively together with any 
disposition in the individual to produce the individual variations in 
persistent behaviour on the specific task. The model is further complicated 
by the introduction, for each of the motivational components, three 
additional factors, motive strength, level of expectation and the magnitude 
of the incentive value (Feather 1962): A final element introduced by 
Feather relates to certain characteristics in the task situation, namely 
the extent to which the subject sees the outcome as being dependent on 
his own skill. 
Feather's (1962) review of studies of persistence, and his own 
investigations were undertaken in the framework of Atkinson's theory of 
achievement motivation. These studies were aimed at testing a somewhat 
complicated set of predictions about persistence under different levels of 
achievement motivation, motivation to avoid failure, expectations as to 
task difficulty, and actual task difficulty (soluble and insoluble). 
Projective measures were used to define need achievement, and the 
Mandler-Sarason Test Anxiety Questionnaire to provide a measure of anxiety. 
It was then assumed that subjects with high projective test scores and low 
anxiety scores, for example, were individuals in whom the motive to succeed 
was greater than the motive to avoid failure. Four tasks, two of which were 
insoluble, were given to sub-groups of psychology undergraduates who 
showed varying patterns of scores on the two measures. Expectancy of success/failur 
was manipulated by giving subjects fictitious norms for each of the tasks. 
Persistence was measured by recording the amount of time or the number of 
trials on the insoluble tasks. Although not all predictions were supported, 
it was possible to show fairly strongly for example, that subjects in whom 
it is assumed that the hypothesised motive to achieve success is stronger 
than the motive to avoid failure persist longer at the initial achievement 
task when it is presented to them as easy rather than as very difficult. By 
contrast, subjects in whom it is assumed that the motive to avoid failure is 
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stronger than the motive to achieve success do just the reverse and, 
according to Feather's data, persist longer when the task is presented as 
very difficult rather than as easy. 
The results of Feather's studies have a number of important implications. 
Only those of immediate concern are considered here. 
Although Feather made no attempt to measure trait persistence in his 
subjects it seems improbable that such a measure would by-itself be 
sufficient to generate the diverse predictions that could be deduced 
from the Atkinson model. If nothing else, this study strongly suggests 
that there is no one-to-one correspondence between the "trait" and the 
performance: it would appear that behavioural persistence is at least t-a 
function of expectancy of success, and possibly many other influences as well. 
It also seems fairly obvious, to the present writer at least, that 
Eysenck's theory of personality does not provide an adequate basis for 
predictions of the type tested by Feather. 
Brody(1972) has also used Feather's study to clearly demonstrate that 
Cattell's approach, which attempts to unite source traits and situational 
variables, also cannot cope with the outcomes of the Feather experiment 
(see p. 22 to 25). 
Finally, the results of Feather's study suggest that Furneaux was 
right to use the term continuance rather than persistence, a conceptual 
distinction which White (1973b) unfortunately has not retained. However, 
Furneaux's treatment of the topic of continuance does not readily lend 
itself to further characterization. 
Since Feather's review, a number of studies directly or indirectly 
concerned with persistence have been published. These studies appear to 
have introduced a proliferation of motives and inconsistent findings 
related to behavioural persistence. 
Di Ciaula et al, (1968) found some evidence in support of an intermittent 
reinforcement interpretation of temporal persistence in undergraduate 
psychology students on a set of anagrams. However, they were unable to 
account for the "somewhat surprising" finding that subjects who were 
given fictitious norms for the problems persisted longer than subjects who 
had had practice sessions on similar tasks prior to the persistence measures 
being taken. They also found no relationship between achievement motivation 
and persistence. 
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Stuempfig and Maehr (1970) divided their 84 sixteen-to eighteen-year 
old subjects into those whose conceptual development could be characterised 
as concrete and those who had developed to an abstract level. "Concrete" 
subjects persisted more (in terms of number of completed tasks) when given 
personal as opposed to impersonal feedback. The type of feedback had no 
effect on the "abstraot" subjects. Clarke 
(1972) found that in his group of 
40 twelfth grade students randomly assigned to feedback or no feedback 
groups, those who received feedback persisted more than those who were 
not given feedback. Those of his subjects who were high on achievement 
motivation but low on "affiliation motivation" persisted longer than other 
subjects. The least persistent were those who were high on achievement 
motivation but low on affiliation motivation. 
Chaikin (1971) studied the effects of increasing success, decreasing 
success, constant success and constant failure in 30 male and 30 female 
undergraduates. Each subject was randomly assigned to one of the four 
groups and required to work on problem solving tasks. The group that was 
constantly successful showed a sharp drop in their desire to continue over 
time: the group tested under increasing success conditions shored the 
greatest persistence. The remaining groups showed intermediate levels of 
persistence. 
" The study by Shepel and James (1973) examined the effects of several 
variables on both temporal persistence and number of trials before 
---abandonment. Their study included measures of "locus of control" and 
assessments of the extent to which performance on the tasks depends on 
the exercise of skill. Some tasks are heavily dependent on skill, others 
entirely on chance and yet others intermediate. The "locus of control" 
variable was introduced following the suggestion of Throop and MacDonald (1971), 
that individuals vary in the extent to which they believe life events to 
be beyond their control. "Locus of control" is proposed as a personality 
dimension. Subjects in the Shepel and James (1973) study were also given 
tasks under 100% and33 % reinforcement. The criterion measures were based 
on their persistence scores on an insoluble task. For their 96 student 
subjects (males) they found for example that for both measures (time and 
trials) under skill conditions there was a reversal of the partial reinforcement 
effect (i. e. less resistance to extinction) whereas under chance conditions, 
the partial reinforcement effect occurred. It was also observed that both 
internal and external locus of control subjects showed their maximum 
persistence when the locus of control and the task situation were congruent. 
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However, possibly the most significant finding in this study was a 
second order interaction for the temporal but not for the trials to 
extinction data. This finding 
(and others) is used by the authors to 
suggest that the earlier studies of persistence need to be "interpreted 
more cautiously. " 
One recent study (Gupta, 1973) using the MPI to obtain measures 
of introversion and extraversion, in addition to showing the importance 
of "motivation" in task persistence also indicated the differential 
effects of high and low motivation on introverts but not extraverts. 
Gupta measured temporal persistence on an arithmetic task in 40 applicants 
to a college and compared their performance with that of 40 students already 
accepted. He found that introverted applicants showed increased 
persistence scores on repeated testing: the already accepted introverts 
showed no such changes. 
Studies of behavioural persistence in children have served to further 
complicate the discussion of it's determinants. 
Barton and Barnard (1972) studied 40 children (4th graders) with 
high verbal and low spatial abilities and 40 with low verbal and high 
spatial abilities (measured on Thurstone's Primary Mental Abilities Test) 
under conditions of social reinforcement and no social reinforcement. The 
persistence measures were time spent on two tasks. Under conditions of 
social reinforcement, the high verbal-low spatial subjects persisted longer 
on the tasks than did children with the opposite ability pattern. This 
latter group of high spatial-low verbal ability also spent less time on 
the persistence tasks when socially reinforced than they did when no 
reinforcement was given. 
Means et al. (1973) have found that middle class children persisted 
longer than lower socio-economic groups on a "very difficult jigsaw puzzle". 
They also found that subjects receiving no social reinforcement persisted 
longer than children who were either positively or negatively reinforced. 
The 90 children in this study had been randomly allocated to reinforcement 
conditions. 
0 Need achievement"has also been studied in children. Ollendick (1974) 
found that children high in"need achievement 
persisted longer than did those 
who obtained low scores on the achievement measure. A correlation of 0.49 
was found between need achievement and time on the insoluble task. 
"Mastery motivation" was recently added to the list of motives implicated 
in persistence (Harter 1975). This form of motivation is regarded as the 
motivation which derives from the desire to solve a problem simply for the 
sake of discovering the solution. Harter (1975) included an insoluble 
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problem in her study of 4 and 10-year old children, and also obtained measures 
of need for approval. She found that mastery motivation was particularly 
important, especially for the older boys, whereas need for approval was 
important for the girls but not for the boys. The younger children 
appeared not to be influenced by approval and 
they exhibited a special 
form of mastery motivation which was primarily concerned with the repetition 
of interesting stimulus events. 
The concept of "accuracy" within Furneaux's model has a specific 
connotation, best illustrated by his hypothesised "problem-solving mechanism". 
Furneaux postulates several components to this mechanism including 
a set of possible solutions to a given problem, the solutions being 
generated internally. With a possible solution available, it is transferred 
to a "comparator", a device which serves several functions. The possible 
solution is examined by the comparator and if found to be acceptable, a signal 
is issued which eventually leads to the individual making the overt 
behavioural response. If the comparator rejects the solution, it then 
re-instigates a search for a different solution and the cycle is repeated 
until continuance is exhausted or a satisfactory solution is found. The 
comparator is given certain characteristics in the mechanism, one of which 
is analogous to "bandwidth" in electrical and mechanical filters. 
Individual variations in bandwidth account for individual differences in 
error-proneness in the sense that broad bandwidth comparators are more 
prone to accept "nearly correct" solutions than are those of very narrow 
bandwidth. 
The errors that Furneaux is concerned with are not so much those 
that arise due to lack of knowledge but rather those that arise from 
the "carelessness" or low standards of the system. Furneaux's mechanism 
(which incidentally includes a "persistence" device) is, apart from the 
language, very similar in conception to contemporaneous as well as more 
recent mechanisms. For example the TOTE (Test-Operate-Test-Exit) model 
of Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960) has a "Test" component which not 
only detects the unsolved nature of the problem, but also checks if the 
solution returned by the "operator" is acceptable. This problem solver also 
has a "stop order" system, equivalent in many respects to Furneaux's 
continuance mechanism which prevents the system from going into an 
infinite loop. The Newell and Simon (1972) "Information Processing 
System", described earlier (IV i) also has many similar features (see 
Fig. 3). The nature of the accuracy checking mechanisms postulated by 
these various writers can ultimately only be inferred from studies of 
behaviour. The empirical task is one of delineating the sources of error. 
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Although there have been a number of speculations concerning the 
sources of error in cognitive tests, Payne 
(1973) points out that 
little is known about the causes of error or the nature of the checking 
process in solution verification. A number of researchers have resorted 
to the use of introspective accounts as well as the use of direct reporting 
by subjects of their ongoing thoughts during problem solving (e. g. Newell 
and Simon (1972). Errors can obviously arise in a variety of ways, the 
number depending on how finely one discriminates the component processes 
involved in problem solving. Payne (1973) suggests that the sources of 
error can include an inaccurate perception of the data of the task, 
a misinterpretation of the task instructions, and the complexity of the- 
problem. Other factors, such as the method of presentation, could also be 
implicated. These sources are likely to be influenced by the implicit or 
explicit "costs and payoffs" inherent in the testing situation (Edwards 
1961) as well as by what are regarded as the more orectic determinants, 
such as impulsiveness and the like. 
Much of the research on error appears within two as yet unconnected 
areas of research. The first is in the area of comparatively simple classes 
of responses, such as accuracy on vigilance tasks and in reaction time, the 
second in the area of "cognitive style". 
Broadbent (1971) has assembled much of the evidence in support of, or 
contrary to, the various theories devised to encompass performance on 
vigilance and reaction time tasks. Although a variety of theories have 
been proposed to account for. the phenomenon of vigilance, and while these 
have focussed on performance decrement rather than on success, it is recognised 
that no single theory has been satisfactory. The theories have included 
arousal, expectancy as well as inhibition as major mechanisms framed within 
information, signal detection and decision theory contexts. Theories 
concerned with reaction times have attempted to encompass error as well as 
correct performance. They have been at least as unsuccessful as theories 
of vigilance in accounting for performance (Broadbent 1971) although one 
important finding of relevance to the present discussion has emerged. 
Broadbent (1971) notes that the speed and accuracy of decision, as seen 
in reaction time tasks, are influenced by what he calls "the general 
characteristics of the process" (p. 323). The quality of the performance 
depends to some extent on the criteria which are imposed on the decision. 
If, for example, the subject operates with criteria that require lower 
levels of evidence, faster levels of performance will arise at the cost of 
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accuracy. As Broadbent 
(1971) states: 
"Both speed and accuracy will be sensitive to 
general changes of criterion placement". 
Factor analytic studies of cognitive tests have yielded factors 
identified as accuracy components. (e. g. Howie (1956) and Mangan (1959) 
described earlier). Both Howie and Mangan reported bipolar factors which 
contrasted speed with accuracy on tasks of low conventional difficulty. 
A perceptual speed and accuracy factor was also found in the more recent 
study reported by Lohnes (1966). Vernon (1961), in his book on the 
structure of human abilities concluded that speed-accuracy shows a 
"..... fair degree of generality ... when the material is easy and 
time restricted. " (p. 152). 
One trait, impulsiveness, appears to be directly relevant to accuracy. 
Impulsiveness is an important component of extraversion (E-senck 1975) 
and there is some evidence that extraverts make more errors on the 
Nufferno speed and level tests,. for example, than do introverts (Payne 1973). 
There has been a substantial amount of research in recent. years on 
the behavioural dimension in children termed "reflection-impulsivity". 
Although it is not certain that the impulsivity component of extraversion 
is in any way related to the impulsivity dimension proposed by Kagan 
and his colleagues (e. g. Kagan and Kogan 1970), there are sufficient 
similarities to warrant a brief examination of the reflection-impulsivity 
literature in the context of a discussion of accuracy and its possible 
personality accompaniments. or example, Kagan and Kogan (1970) state that: 
"The reflection-impulsivity dimension is concerned with 
the degree to which the subject reflects on the validity of 
his solution hypothesis in problems. that contain 
response uncertainty. " 
In a recent paper, Kagan and Messer (1975) note that both latency and 
number of errors on the Matching Familiar Figures Test (MFF) are used to 
classify children as reflective or impulsive. This procedure was introduced 
so that they could differentiate between children whose fast response times 
were associated with many errors and those whose fast response times were 
associated with errorless performance. 
The paper by Kagan and Messer (1975) was issued in response to a 
critical analysis of the MFF as a measure of reflection-impulsivity by Block 
et al. (1974) who concluded that the MFF is an inadequate procedure for 
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measuring this dimension. The attempt by Kagan and Messer (1975) to 
counter these criticisms was rejected by Block et al. (1975), who persist 
in their view that time is unimportant as far as personality implications 
are concerned. Instead, they assert that the major differences arise in 
association with accuracy-inaccuracy, that "Accurates" are : 
"ego-resilient individuals well stocked with assimilative 
structures but able also to accommodate to the previously 
unexperienced: the Inaccurates we see as comparatively 
brittle individuals, more rigid, less resourceful and 
therefore more susceptible to anxiety. " 
A major limitation of many of the studies examining differences 
between reflective and impulsive children has been their failure to 
control for IQ, either statistically or by matching (Block et al. 1975). 
However, a study by Achenbach and Weisz (1975) suggests that IQ may not 
be the most important variable. They found that when Mental Ages as an 
index of developmental. level, was partialled out of their data, there 
was virtually no evidence for the existence of an independent trait of 
reflection - impulsivity as a component of "cognitive style". If their 
conclusions are also found to apply to older children, then, obviously, 
the vast amount of research on this trait will have to be re-evaluated. 
As these authors used the KRISP (Wright 1971) and only one item of the 
LTF, further study is needed to assess the generality of their findings 
across tests as well. 
On the basis. of the preceeding paragraphs, it can be seen that 
Furneaux's choice of the term continuance, rather than persistence, was 
justifiable although it is doubted that he could have foreseen the 
complexity with which it is now endowed. There appears to be little 
doubt that behavioural persistence is complexly determined: what it's 
precise determinants are remains to be specified. In a sense, much the 
same could be said about accuracy. Although Furneaux appeared to refer 
to some central mechanism for error checking, such a mechanism is at present 
inaccessible. At the behavioural level accuracy could be a function of 
several factors, at least some of which may be personality linked. 
e 
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10. Concluding Remarks: Speed, Continuance and Accuracy 
The concepts "speed", "accuracy" and "continuance" 
appear to be uncomplicated. On a closer examination of their 
theoretical characterisation and their transformations into 
operational variables the simplicity disappears. The complexities 
which emerge are confounded further by the attempt to integrate 
them within a personality theory. It is unfortunate that no 
attempts have been made by psychologists to clarify the basic 
concepts involved: even Furneaux's "logical atomisation" of 
his primary concepts appears to be insufficient, One of the 
problems appears to be what Harre and Secord (1972, p. 36) call 
"the conceptual leap from the theory to the operation ..... 
over-emphasizing empiricism at the expense of conceptualization .. 'ýý 
To the present writer at least, this would appear to be one of 
the major problems which emerged from a closer inspection of 
the research literature. This is particularly the case with 
the study of speed and one of the many ramifications of this 
is the ensuing empirical confusion. 
While it may still be difficult to isolate strong empirical 
conclusions from the foregoing research, there is little doubt that 
the' methodological and technical gains have been substantial. Unless 
they are of immediate interest, age effects must be partialled out 
of the data. Even when IQs are used, their correlation with age 
needs to be examined in the specific sample. The fact that 
IQ's are "age , 
corrected" does not mean that they won't show 
correlations with age in a given sample. There is now sufficient 
evidence of sex differences in a variety of psychological 
characteristics and sex effects need tb be properly controlled. 
It has also been suggested that neither group testing not crude 
timing procedures yield data that are likely to be of sufficient 
accuracy and careful atterition. has to be given to these procedures 
in research. Instructions have to be clearly stated and caution 
exercised that instructions, setting and aims do not produce 
conflicting reactions either within subjects (such as stating that 
there is no need to rush yet using overt timing procedures) or 
between subjects, such as might arise when subjects are free to 
choose which part of the instructions they will relate to their 
own performance. 
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No study is likely yet to satisfy all the requirements of a 
methodologically ideal investigation and the present study is no 
exception. The author has attempted to take account of what guidance 
there is in the literature but deficiencies remain. It is hoped 
that these will be explicit in the presentation which follows. 
The preceding reviews of the literature identify many theoretical 
and technical problems. Those selected for the present investigation are 
specified later as the hypotheses which have determined the research 
to be described in subsequent chapters. They are based directly on the 
theory proposed by Eysenck and with some exceptions, attempt to 
replicate research findings reported in a number of studies. 
In examining personality performance relationships, a: _ important 
decision that needs to be taken at the outset is whether or not speed is 
to be emphasised in both instructions and, indirectly, in the way in 
which the experiment is conducted, Almost all. of the research considered 
in the review has been concerned with stressed speed. That is, even when 
instructions have given subjects specific options, the use of group 
testing and overt timing Must have had the effect of stressing speed. 
Hence a major research question is how personality and performance 
are related when neither the instructions nor the other procedures give 
I 
the impression that speedy responses are required. The present study was 
designed in part to examine this question. 
141 
SECTION B. 
The preceeding chapters have been concerned with introducing this study, 
and providing it with a general framework. This framework is composed of 
several elements, encompassing the limitations of conventional tests, some 
of their central problems and some of the more recent approaches to the 
fundamental problems of intelligence measurement, particularly the problem 
of difficulty. Subsequent chapters examined certain theoretical approaches 
and the empirical studies specifically concerned with speed and its 
relationship with intelligence and personality. 
Section B of this thesis is concerned with more specific aspects, 
particularly the work of Ferneaux and its incorporation into the broader 
context of Eysenck's model of personality and the theory which relates 
personality to teigt performance. 
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VI. FURNEAUX'S ANALYSIS OF A FORMALIZED PROBLEM SOLVER. 
1. The Conceptual Model: 
As indicated in the preceeding chapters, the work of Furneaux is 
central to Eysenck's (1967a, 1973a) approach to the measurement of 
intelligence. However, his work is also important because it appears to 
overcome the psychometric problem of item difficulty scaling. This latter 
aspect is the immediate concern of the next chapters. 
Butcher's (1968) remark about the 'decided obscurity' of Furneaux's 
analysis applies td two sections of his work, the analysis of problem 
solving and the design of difficulty scales. The feature of his presentation 
which hampers ready translation is the mixture of abbreviations and logical 
and mathematical notation. To try and overcome some of the problems which 
this form of presentation entails, a procedure has been adopted of presenting 
all notation on the left-hand side of the page, except in those instances 
where it is essential to use it in the text. Reference to the notation is 
indicated by It * ". 
Furneaux's approach is guided by two main principles. Firstly, 
the human problem-solver must be conceptualized as a "black-box", 
the input - output characteristics of which are to be specified 
by unambiguously defined observations. Secondly, in the initial 
stages, the aim should be to devdop an oversimplified model which has 
only those characteristics specifically assigned to it. 
Thus, the human problem solver, is, in the first instance 
PB regarded simply as a problem-solving box * whose mechanism is 
unspecified. The nature of this box is such however, that when 
is oe a problem is supplied as input * an "essay" * or solution is 
produced on the output side which is the attempt at solution. The 
te problem solving process requires time which can be measured * and 
the solution offered can be evaluated as to whether or not it is 
Ors Ow correct * or incorrect *. The elapsed time can then be defined as 
tr, tw time to correct solution * or incorrect solution * depending on the 
nature of the solution. 
The model next goes on to assume the repeated input of the same 
pI, aPB problem * to a particular problem box *. The output sequence is 
qr conceptualised as being unpredictable with some proportion correct 
qw and the remainder incorrect *. It is further assumed that even 
for the correct responses alone, the solution times vary between 
Rt and(Rt+Htr) specifiable limits *. These solution times in effect define a 
tr; Vtr distribution with its own mean *, variance * and range. A similar 
+ distribution can be defined 
for the incorrect solutions 
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tw; Vtw; (Rw 
Htw). 
For each individual problem box subjected to the repeated 
input of the same problem, the resulting distribution parameters 
are, as a set, symbolized by 'M'. There will be one M set 
pa Mtr specific 
to the correct solutions * and another to the incorrect 
pa Mtw solutions 
*. 
Furneaux contends that the investigation of the problem- 
solving characteristics of a particular problem-box must begin 
with the collection of the "M-statistics" based on the repeated 
input of the particular problem. Similar data can then be 
b PB, c PB --- obtained for other problem-boxes 
* based on the input of the same 
etc. 
problem. With these statistics determined, it then becomes 
possible to make comparisons among the various problem boxes. 
Which particular statistic is used as the basis for comparison, 
is, in. the: iabbence of the requisite information, irrelevant. That 
is, no single statistic is inherently preferable to any other. 
Nor should one be used to substitute for any other in the absence 
of evidence that they are all highly intercorrelated. It would 
also be meaningless to, say, compare correct solution times from 
one problem box with the incorrect solution times of another. 
Ferneaux also points out that it would be unwise to derive "some 
score which was a more or less undefined function of a lumping 
together of several of the statistics and-then to imagine that it 
could have more than an accidental significance". 
The selection of problemsto be included in any test, is, as 
Furneaux points out, a function of the purpose 
(theoretical or 
applied) of the test. Further, there is no inherent reason why 
one set derived from traditional scale construction procedures should 
be better than a different set chosen on the basis of M statistics, 
However, the task of selection requires that there be some acceptable 
means of classifying problems. It is at this point that the 
notions of 'difficulty' and 'type' have to be introduced. 
Some of the limitations of the traditional concept of 
difficulty have already been discussed and after considering 
these, Furneaux reaches the conclusion that we have to accept 
that "problems can only be classified in terms of the differences 
in response characteristics which they evoke". Given that there 
is no reason as yet for selecting among the various M statistics, 
scaling procedures could be carried out using any of the 
M statistics considered relevant. There is no one statistic that 
is the best measure of difficulty and there is also no single 
meaning for difficulty. Furneaux's view of difficulty is therefore 
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very similar to modern conceptions of reliability and validity, 
namely, the recognition that these are all generic concepts 
(Stanley 1971; Cronbach 1971). 
The purpose of scaling, as Furneaux points out, is to enable 
some form of classification, and this consideration must always 
be taken into account in any scaling exercise. In view of their 
being no a priori basis for selecting any of the M-statistics, at 
this stage of the analysis it is necessary to define a separate 
scale for each. Collectively, such- scales are called 
"D-scales". Specifically, a scale which is confined to mean 
correct solution times for the problem is signified as a Dtr 
scale; the scale associated with proportion correct would be 
identified as a Dqr scale, and so on. 
The task of item scaling is illustrated by Furneaux with 
reference to scales associated with correct solution times. If 
we are given the scale positions of two items, p and q, and we know 
beforehand the mean correct solution time to problem p for a 
particular problem-box, then we should be able to predict with fair 
accuracy the mean correct solution time for problem q. 
Symbolically, the requirement is stated as 
qtr -=f (gDtr9*Kt) ----- 1. 
-. f (D, K) tr -----2" 
where: q Btr is the scale position of item q 
a Ktr is an individual constant assigned to 
individual'a'and is based on his mean time to 
correct solution for problem p. 
Equation 2 is the general form of 1. 
From the point of view of the model and its application, it 
is necessary that the form of equation 2 is constant across individual 
whereas the value of Ktr can vary from one person to the next. 
Once a suitable form for equation 1 and the scale positions of p 
and q have been found, then, according to Furneaux, it becomes 
possible to compare various 'problem boxes' in terms of their 
mean correct solution times to some problem. What is reauired 
from each is the value of K instead of all values of mean solution 
time for all possible problems. 
While it would be desirable to have a common form to f(D, K)tr 
for all possible types of problem so that each could be allocated 
a position on a single D-scale, data from correlational studies 
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of conventional tests suggests that this is unlikely. The data 
which indicate that this may not be possible are derived from 
the many factor-analytic studies (Vernon 1961) which reveal group 
factors in human abilities. Furneaux anticipates that sets of 
problems with a common form of f (D, K) tr may be found, which he 
calls "types" which in turn may or may not correspond to group 
factors. At this stage of model development, the type-structure 
is not known. It is also possible that not all D-scales will be 
generalisable across all problem-boxes. It is necessary to 
contemplate the possibility that ntr scales would vary say, 
between schizophrenic and non-schizophrenic groups, or that 
different personalities might produce differences in the scales. 
The major advantage of the procedure suggested by the model is, 
according to Furneaux, that problems of standardisation are 
avoided. They are replaced by the problem of determining the 
scale position of the items, but this task can be accomplished by 
the procedures he details for D-scale construction which will be 
described in the next chapter. 
Up to this point, the model is unencumbered by the human 
characteristic generally known as 'persistence'. Human problem 
solvers give up their attepmts at solution if an answer is not 
forthcoming and go on to the next problem. Furneaux is careful to 
emphasise that persistence is not necessarily the sole determinant 
of abandonment. Newell and Simon (1972) have for example suggested 
that subjects may decide to abandon an item because their list of 
potential solutions has been tried and exhausted. The decision to 
abandon an item may also be based on the test-takers conclusion, 
that rather than waste too much time on one item, he will have a 
better chance of a higher score if he tackles all the items. 
C Furneaux therefore choses "continuance" * instead of persistence 
as it has no "aetiological presuppositions". 
ST Continuance is added to the model by installing a time-switch 
PS and the new device given the name, of a problem solver *. 
The normal state of the time switch is "off" but it is activated 
is immediately a problem is input. After a period of time * when 
continuance is exhausted the switch reverts to its normal state. 
The coupling between problem box and time sw*h is such that the 
switch only becomes activated on the input of a problem and the 
problem solving process is only initiated with the switch 'on'. 
The problem solving process is automatically terminated when the 
time switch reverts to "off" when continuance is exhausted. A 
further feature of the time switch is that it has no means of 
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distinguishing between different types of input. When continuance 
is exhausted before a solution is available, the output from 
Os the problem solver 
takes the form of a It -- 1' * on the answer 
sheet. However, when an answer is output, it has the effect of 
switching off the timing mechanism. 
As with solution times, the abandonment times have a 
tsý Vts, St and distribution with a mean *, variance * and range *. The sequence 
(St + Hts) of abandonment times cannot be predicted. The set of statistics 
associated with the distribution of abandonment times generated 
by the uncoupled time switch is symbolised by Mts. 
The coupled mechanism, on the input of a problem, initiates 
a "search" for a solution. This search is terminated by the 
production of an essay or when continuance is exhausted. 
Special consideration needs to be given to the distributions 
of solution and abandonment times. It will be recalled that for 
the uncoupled problem box, on repeated input of a particular 
problem, a solution is always offered. This solution, the essay, 
can be either correct or incorrect. Associated with each essay 
is a response time. The distribution of response times can be 
divided into the distributions for correct and incorrect times. 
A distribution is also associated with the abandonment times when 
the time switch is uncoupled. Once the coupling takes place, the 
distributions of essay times and abandonment times become altered. 
If an essay arises from the coupled device, before continuance is 
exhausted, the abandonment time distribution in effect loses one 
time value which it would not have done had the time switch not 
been coupled. Hence the distribution of abandonment times becomes 
Mts modied 
In a similar way, if an abandonment occurs before an essay 
arises, the distribution of essay times loses a value that $4 
would not have been lost had the problem box not been coupled to 
a time switch. It is therefore also necessary to distinguish a 
Mte modified distribution * of essay times. The ". " notation is 
used by Furneaux to indicate the modified M statistics. 
Individual statistics that are changed are also indicated by the 
Vte, Vts, .. etc. 
"" ný * 
The introduction of continuance into the model considerably 
complicates the attempt to develop difficulty scales and the 
practical determination of the M statistics. To simplify the 
analysis, Furneaux assumed that all types of D scales are identical. 
This assumption was later subjected to experimental examination. 
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Fig. 6. has been taken from Furneaux (1961) 
and will be used to illustrate the complications 
which arise when continuance is introduced. 
Increments on the abscissa represent increments in difficulty 
(D). Increments on the ordinate represent increments in time. 
Line A is the lower bound of the range of solution times at increasing' 
D values, line B, the upper bound for the uncoupled problem box. 
Lines C and D are the respective lower and upper bounds for the 
range of continuance times produced by the uncoupled time switch. 
Although the Figure assumes they are unrelated to D, the basic 
conclusions would not be altered if their slope varied (provided { 
of course they did not coincide or go below A and B). } 
The pairs of lines intersect at the points indicated by the 
vertical lines X, Y and Z. 
From this diagram, it will be apparent that at all D values 
c Dte below X, * an essay will always arise. 
Performance is not 
interfered with even though the time switch is coupled. At all 
c Dts D values above Z, * no essays will appear 
because the problem 
solver will always be switched off by the time switch. All 
responses at this point and beyond will be true abandonments. 
In the region X to Y, two types of response will appear. 
These will be either essays or abandonments. Which will arise 
depends on the interaction between D and the problem solver. The 
number of essays having values near to line B will be reduced. 
This will occur because on a proportion of occasions, the time 
switch will switch off the action of the problem box, before an 
essay can be generated. However, all times near to line A will 
still emerge. 
In the region Y to Z, a somewhat different set of consequences 
result. Any essays whose times are greater than maximum continuance 
(defined by line D), and which might otherwise have arisen, will 
not appear because of the operation of the time switch. Those 
that do so, succeed in emerging because they are close to line A, 
and it is this group that will predominate. 
Thus, the effect of the time switch at D values beyond X is to 
change the distribution of essay times. The closer to Z, the more 
the distribution changes. 
Furneaux refers to problems with D values lying between X and Z 
la as ambiguous-inputs * for the particular problem solver. Strictly, 
as he points out, it is not the inputs that are ambiguous, rather 
the statistics generated by their outputs are ambiguous. Those 
inputs which do not generate ambiguous outputs are known as 
IU unambiguous inputs *. 
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The region of ambiguous inputs is bounded by critical 
D-values. The lower bound marks the transition from 
c Dte unambiguous to ambiguous region for essays * and the upper bound, 
c Dts the transition 
to "unambiguous abandonments". * Below the lower 
bound, the M-statistics for essays are unaffected; above the 
upper bound, the M-statistics for abandonments are unaffected. 
Within the bounds there is a reciprocal loss of data from either 
essays to abandonments or abandonments to essays. 
The human problem solver, following Furneaux's arguments, 
cannot be partitioned into a problem box and a time switch. 
Because of this, there may well be a wide range of D-values within 
which it is not possible to compare individuals. The location 
of the critical D-values is said to vary between individuals, so 
that a given D-value may constitute an ambiguous input for one 
problem solver and an unambiguous input for another. In the case 
of the former, the M-statistics will be distorted whereas this 
will not be so in the latter case. This would apply particularly 
in the case of tests made up of heterogeneous items. 
On the basis of these considerations, Ferneaux reaches a 
conclusion of major practical import, that tests intended for 
use with heterogeneous groups will have to be comprised of "easy" 
items if any of the statistics associated with essays are to be 
computed. The only alternative which he considers to be viable 
is to raise the mean abandonment time to such a level that the 
interaction between abandonment and difficulty no longer operates 
within the range of difficulty required. In terms of Fig. 6, 
this would mean a vertical shift of the lines C and D upwards. 
In practice, this would be accomplished, to some extent at least, 
by inducing a high motivation not to abandon items, and by 
discouraging attempts through individual testing, to move on to 
other items on the test sheet. 
While the preceding paragraphs have related to the general 
concept of essays, a similar analysis could be made for either 
of the components of essays, namely, correct and incorrect 
solutions. In these cases, further discriminations need to be 
made and some new assumptions introduced. 
It is possible that the f (D, K) which characterises correct 
response times will not be the same function which is generated 
when considering incorrect response times. It is also possible 
1; ) U 
that the respective M-statistics will have differing values 
when computed. Further, an unambiguous input which would be 
Ia (tr) associated with a correct response * in one case may be 
Ia (ta) associated with an incorrect response 
in another *. Finally, 
there may be different critical D-values associated with 
c Dtr; c Dtw correct 
* and incorrect * solution times. 
Following a procedure similar to that presented when 
considering essays, some potentially correct response times will 
be lost due to the operation of the time switch, and will be 
replaced by abandonment times. With a knowledge of the form of 
f (D, K)tr and the M-statistics associated with correct solutions 
and abandonments, it is possible to compute the proportion of 
potentially correct responses that can arise at any specified 
difficulty value. This proportion will be unity for all 
difficulty values less than or equal to the critical D-value and 
zero at all D-values greater than or equal to the critical 
D-value for abandonments. The curve showing the approximate 
form of this relationship is presented in Fig. 7, as curve B, 
and is called the completion characteristic. It's abcissa 
represents increments of D; the ordinate represents the 
Psr proportion of correct responses, * that. ärise out of those-' 
potentially possible. 
While it might be thought possible to compute this proportion 
out of the ratio of correct to abandoned 'responses at successive 
D-values, Furneaux points out that this would be inappropriate. 
This is so because any abandoned item might well have been a 
wrong solution had the time switch not intervened. 
It should be noted that the completion curve is, in effect 
the curve which represents the responses observed through the 
operation of the problem solver. It does not represent his 
'ideal' response characteristics because of the confounding 
effects of the time switch. That is, some correct responses will 
be lost because the time switch (continuance) intervenes before 
the response emerges. 
It is however possible to generate the hypothetical curve of 
performance of the problem box (i, e. problem solver without time 
switch) in terms of the proportion of correct responses generated 
without the encumberance of the time switch, at each D-value. 
qr The curve relating this proportion * to difficulty is presented 
as curve A in Fig. 7. This curve is known as the accuracy 
curve. 
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At any given value of D, the probability that a correct 
Psqr response will occur * is a product of two separate probabilities, 
Fsr and qr. At this D value, this probability is a constant Kqr 
If the value of this constant is only moderately correlated 
with speed and continuance in a group of problem solvers, than, 
as Furneaux notes, for different problem. solvers, the curves A 
and B can differ in both their "relative and actual positions 
to a very considerable degree". 
The position of these curves for a particular individual and set of 
items determines to a great extent his performance on the test. For the set 
of items covering range P in Fig-7. the main determinant of success is 
accuracy. This individual is low in accuracy, as illustrated by the rapid 
fall off in proportion correct for small increments of difficulty, whereas, 
his completion -a function of "speed" and "continuance" - is much higher. 
However, the absence of overlap between curves A and B indicates that for 
test P, completion does not enter into his performance. On a test covering 
the range of Q, which is positioned in such a way that accuracy does not 
enter into performance, all the responses would be incorrect. 
Underlying this analysis is Furneaux's fundamental point that at any 
given value of D, responses to a test can vary as a function of the accuracy 
and completion characteristics of the problem solver. What may appear to 
the outside observer as a standard input is received in a way which varies 
according to the characteristics of the problem solver. One cannot assume 
identical "internal processes" being elicited by the standard input. For 
example, the "same mental test, if designed and scored in the conventional 
manner" will measure varying combinations of speed, accuracy and continuance 
when given to different testees. The crucial point is the presence in 
the test of an item with a D-value which initiates the operation of 
continuance. In so far as these critical D-values differ for different 
problem solvers, the scores which they produce will be differentially 
determined. 
Furneaux goes on to make a further fundamental point about the notion 
of the "speed free" test. One cannot assume that a test set without time 
limit is "speed free". As he says, 
"In any test which includes problems having D-values which 
for a particular subject, are greater than c Dtr, score is 
determined in part by the completion characteristic, which 
is itself, in part, a function of speed (Ktr)-'+. 
How does this analysis apply to the commonly encountered approach to 
testing, the approach which provides the foundation for theories of 
intelligence and other abilities? 
Wý, 
In the simplest case, consider a test made up of "easy" items, that is 
items with low D-values which do not produce incorrect solutions for the 
group of testees. Such items will not involve continuance and under time 
limit conditions, the only factor influencing score will be speed. (At 
this point, we can disregard other psychological complications, such as 
test anxiety). If the testees have then to go on to a set of items of 
increased difficulty, a different set of factors comes into operation. 
The set of moderately difficult items is such that most members of the group 
produce some incorrect solutions but none of the items are so difficult as 
to lead testees to abandon them. In this compound test, set with a time 
limit, the slowest members will be working on the easy items whereas a 
faster group will have completed the easy items. In this latter group, 
members will have been working on the more difficult items and their scores 
will be partly a function of their speed, and partly a function of their 
tendency to be inaccurate. 
If this test is further compounded by the introduction of very difficult 
items, then, for the fastest subjects, scores will vary as a function of 
individual continuance. 
The already apparent complexity is further complicated by such factors 
as the degree of homogeneity in the group being tested. For a group with 
homogeneous abilities, a test could be tapping mainly speed, mainly accuracy 
or mainly continuance, depending on items difficulty. For heterogeneous 
groups, there will no longer be a preponderance. The factors determining 
score could be speed alone in some subjects and various combinations of 
determinants in others. 
Although Furneaux's analysis has been restricted to a simple conception 
of the problem solver, it will be appreciated that it's implications are of 
major significance. These implications not only extend into the use of test 
scores for developing our understanding of intelligence. Taken seriously, 
they are of relevance to the study of different groups (for example those 
with and without a recognised psychiatric disorder), the same group at 
different ages or in different settings, and so on. Furneaux himself 
suggests how his analysis may be relevant to the study of the development 
of ability. Thus a test at age 5 may, because it is "difficult" elicit one 
set of determinants. Reapplied 5 years later when there has been some 
development of intellectual abilities, the test may elicit a different set 
of score determinants. Until such time as it is demonstrated that the same 
determinants are operating in the same way and to the same extent at the 
two ages, it will be difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions about 
performance at these two ages. 
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From the point of view of initiating research into human intellectual 
function, Furneaux's analysis appears to set a more appropriate basis for 
such work. He has, in effect, defined some of the conditions necessary 
for the 'proper study' of speed, accuracy and continuance. To get any of 
the statistics associated with correct solution times, it is necessary to 
use data from items which have D values below the critical difficulty for 
the subjects. To examine the continuance characteristics, data should be 
used only if they are derived from items with D values above the critical 
level for continuance. 
A further contribution of Furneaux's analysis is it's relevance for 
applied testing. At the very least, it suggests that test scores may not 
simply be a function of the abilities sampled by the test content. While 
applied psychologists do not in general have an oversimplified view of the 
determinants of test scores, the range of influences they consider is 
somewhat narrow even if relevant. A review of research on cognitive 
abnormalities by Payne (1961) provides one illustration of the relevance 
of Furneaux's analysis to the assessment of cognitive functions in 
psychiatric patients. 
Despite these important implications, the impact of Furneaux's logical 
analysis is dependant to a large extent on the outcome of research which 
aims to test the viability of his views. In the next chapter, Furneaux's 
own empirical work is considered in some detail as it represents the first 
test of model. 
2. Empirical Findings: 
The present chapter will focus on the procedures and findings reported 
by Furneaux (1961). To avoid confusion, the detailed procedures for deriving 
D-scales are described in a later chapter. 
As presented by Furneaux, the D-scale procedures are required to produce 
various constants and statistics that are only minimally correlated or 
uncorrelated. Further, it is necessary to demonstrate that whichever of the 
f (D, K) functions is derived, it should be sufficiently general for all, or 
as he puts it, "useful sets" of individuals. 
In the major study, Furneaux used data from a group of 235 soldiers, 
ranging in age from 18 to 30 years (mean age 19.4 years). These subjects 
were selected from a larger group on the basis of their scores on the 
Dominoes Test. Only individuals scoring between -1.5 and 2.0 s. d's were 
selected. The lower cut-off was introduced so as to ensure that subjects 
would be able to follow complex test instructions. The upper bound was 
chosen because very few subjects scored beyond that point. Furneaux was thus 
able to obtain a fairly uniform distribution of scores. 
The test materials consisted of items from the Letter Series of the 
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Thurstone Primary Mental Abilities, arranged in 5 cycles. Each cycle 
contained items of varying difficulty, the difficulties being of the 
conventional type. These values had been computed from data available 
from a previous administration of the test. The items had to be worked 
through in a strict sequence and once abandoned or answered, could not be 
re-attempted. 
The subjects were given instructions "designed to encourage high 
motivation and the evidence suggests that this was achieved". Neither the 
instructions nor the evidence are detailed. Testing was carried out in 
groups of about twenty subjects, with three hours of testing for each group 
spread over one day. 
Solution times were measured to an accuracy of 2 seconds using a 
timing device which vas described earlier. Each of the times was corrected 
so as to eliminate time spent in reading the device and recording times in 
the answer booklets. The correction factors were obtained on the same 
subjects in an earlier part of the study. No details of this are provided. 
Of the 235 items in the original set, 80 remained in the final set, the 
rest having been eliminated because they were not attempted by all subjects 
or because they were found to be unsuitable following a conventional item 
analysis. The reduced test and Dominoes scores correlated 0.84. 
Furneaux reports having to eliminate segments of his data because of 
variations in the continuance times between early and later periods of 
testing. Failure to do this would have meant that a number of statistics, 
rather than a single index of continuance would have to be used, making 
D-scale construction much more complex. That is not clear is whether the 
discarded data led to the reduction of the total items used to 80 or whether 
the already reduced set of 80 was further reduced. Thus, it is not known 
how many items were used for scaling. 
One of the major goals of Furneaux's work was to find a uniform function 
relating solution time to item difficulty and speed, i. e. 
t=f (D, K). 
The particular scaling exercise described in the 1961 paper is that 
relating correct solution times to speed and difficulty. The most convenient 
function for this purpose takes the linear form 
y=mx+c 
In Furneaux's notation 
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FIGURE 8. T, (Av) PLOTTED AGAINST 100Dtr FOR GROUPS OF VARYING SPEED 
Note. The curves A. B. C. D show the relationships to which the data should conform: they are not the 
tit-fitting straight lines. To facilitate the examination of this graph 1-5 log units have been added to each 
value of T, (Ae) in Group D. and values of 1.0 and 0S log units in Groups C and B respectively. 
Taken-from Furneaux (1961) 
157 
where a tr = the mean item correct solution 
time for a subject'a'expressed 
in raw time units. 
m=a slope coefficient 
a Ktr = speed constant for the subject. 
Dtr = item difficulty 
On empirical testing, this function was found to be negatively 
accelerated. However, using log 10 as a transformation for the time 
measures (Tate 1950), the function achieved the linear form. 
Equation 1 thus becomes 
a 
Tr = u, mDtr +- aKtr ---2. 
where Tr = log 10 tr" 
Following a series of intricate data manipulations (described in detail 
later), a point is reached at which the model can be subjected to a crucial 
test. The scaling computations generate a Dtr scale value for each item, and 
a speed constant and mean abandonment time for each subject. The test 
requires that equation 2 is suitable for all subjects, given the data 
produced by the scaling procedures. 
This test is carried out by examining the relationship between the 
average correct solution time for subjects plotted against item difficulty. 
Furneaux's test first requires the subjects to be divided into 4 groups on 
the basis of their speed scores and then checking that the relationship 
between solution time and difficulty is similar in these sub-groups. 
The data for this test are shown in Fig. 8, taken from Furneaux (1961). 
In producing the data for Fig. 8, Furneaux divided his subjects into 4 
groups, group A being the fastest, group D the slowest. It should be noted 
that in order to distinguish these groups graphically, a different constant 
was added to each group. Hence, the plotted group data are artificially 
separated, Details as to how this was accomplished are presented in the 
note accompanying the figure. 
A second point to note about Fig. 8, is that the straight lines A to D 
are those to which the data should conform. They are not, as Furneaux 
emphasised, the best fitting straight lines. it (Av) values are the mean 
log correct solution times for each problem averaged across subjects within each 
speed group. A description of the procedures for computing these values is 
presented in the chapter on the construction of D-scales. 
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Although Furneaux has provided details of the various statistical 
tests carried out on the data in nearly every instance in the course of 
D-scale construction, he did not do so when presenting his crucial test. 
The model requires that the functions be straight lines with unit slopes. 
No test of these requirements is reported and the lines A to D are, as 
noted above arbitrarily inserted. Furneaux has not published his raw data, 
so that an independant check on his conclusions cannot be undertaken. 
Inspection of Fig. 8 reveals many more data points for group A than 
for other groups: that is, the faster the subjects, the greater the amount 
of data for them. Although this may seem unusual, it is a consequence of 
the procedures for computing Tr (Av) at higher difficulty levels. Only 
those items are included for which the data indicate that the items are 
below the critical difficulty level for the particular subject on that 
item; i. e. unambiguous inputs. This is related to the speed of the subject, 
as can be seen from Fig. 6. For very fast subjects, the lines AB would be 
shifted to the right, resulting in the region bounded by X and Z being 
shifted right. This means that the critical difficulty for that subject is 
higher and therefore more items are available which are not ambiguous. 
Despite the absence of a test of the outcome presented in Fig. 8, the 
data do appear, on visual inspection, to conform to the requirements of 
unit slope in each of the four groups, satisfying the relationship expressed 
in equation 2. 
Another of the requirements for equation 2 is a demonstration that 
variances between subjects and between items, at different levels of 
difficulty are homogeneous. Failure to achieve such homogeneity would 
severely restrict the applicability of this equation. Furneaux tested item 
and subject homogeneity by examing differences between subjects on 
unambiguous items and differences between items, on data derived from 
correct solutions which were unambiguous inputs. 
In the process of carrying out these tests, two item pairs were found 
to produce inconsistent outcomes. When these items were deleted from the 
analysis, item and subject homogeneity of variance were found. The 
respective Chi-squares were 227 (p approx 0.4,216 d. f. ) and 36.1 
(p approx 0.18,29 d. f. ) 
On the basis of these analyses, Furneaux was able to conclude that the 
value of the log correct solution time variance "is independent of 
difficulty, and identical for all subjects". He does however point out 






FIGURE 9" DISCREPANCY BETWEEN RELATIONSHIP OF T, TO 
D WHEN /a INPUTS ARE USED, AND THAT APPLYING TO /. 
The straight line A gives the relationship applying in the case 
of 1 inputs. Each point plotted shows the median observed 
value of r. which relates to the set of inputs !a having values 
of Dip within the range f i0 of the central value shown. The 
vertical lines terminate at the values of the upper and lower 
quartiles. 
Values of DIr have been multiplied by 100. 
Taken frgm. Furneaux (1961) 
16 Furneaux has emphasised the importance of only using data from items 
that are unambiguous inputs. Items with D values above the critical level 
introduce the confounding effects of continuance which then make it 
inappropriate to combine or compare them with items not subjected to these 
influences. The model does not exclude the possibility of a subject passing 
an item beyond his critical difficulty level. However, do such items need 
to be differentiated from those correctly solved at difficulty levels below 
the critical value? (The former items are symbolized Ia (tr) and the 
latter as Iu (tr)l. The question to be resolved from the data is whether 
or not a distinction is empirically important. That is, would relationships 
already uncovered, namely those of unit slope and of homogeneity of variance, 
still hold if such a distinction were not made? 
Furneaux's findings on these questions are reproduced in Fig. 9, from 
which it can be seen that the data are neither linear in slope nor of equal 
variance. There are no statistical analyses reported to support these 
conclusions and the reader has again to rely on visual inspection. 
On the basis of his study, Furneaux concludes that the data justify 
the retention of his hypotheses that 'm' in equation 2 and V- "are 
population constants". In its final form, equation 2 is expressed as 
Tr =m Dtr + KTr + Ei ----3. 
where Ei =a positive or negative component arising on a 
particular occasion i. This error component 
which is assumed to be distributed about a 
mean of 0 and variance Vtr over a large number 
of occasions. 
Furneaux has commented on the unusual nature of his finding a constant 
in an area saturated with individual differences. The existence of a 
constant does not preclude individual differences, the latter being 
absorbed in individual differences in speed and continuance. He also 
suggests that equation 3 indicates a relationship analogous to Fechner's 
Law. The potential significance of this finding has been commented upon 
by Eysenck (1967a) and Butcher (1906), as indicated earlier. 
This examination of the empirical findings of Furneaux's study has 
highIgited two broad groups of problems which make Furneaux's conclusions 
questionable. Firstly, the procedural details are inadequately reported, 
and of those published certain inadequacies remain. An instance of the 
former is the absence of the instructions given to his subjects; of the latter, 
his procedures for correcting item times for "apparatus time". The present 
writer has available all of the relevant reports (published and unpublished) 
referred to in the 1961 paper (Furneaux 1953,1955) and none of these contain 
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the necessary information. 
The second broad group of problems are those relating to the absence 
of crucial statistical tests on the data. Undoubtedly, some relationships 
and group differences found in psychological research are such that 
statistical tests would be superfluous. It is also accepted that 
significance testing is only an element in the complex process of theory 
development and that the routine use of tests of significance for the 
sake of 'respectability' has been strongly critized 
(Bakan 1966; 
Lykken 1968). Nevertheless, certairltatistical assessments would appear 
to be crucial in Furneaux's study. In particular, the relationship between 
speed and difficulty should at least have been assessed for higher order 
variance components (i. e. quadratic and cubic etc. ) to see if a strong linear 
component emerged that accounted for most of the variance. It is all too 
easy to mask such higher order trend components if only graphical data 
presentation is used. 
The questionable nature of Furneaux's findings is further highlighted 
by two other features of his procedures. The first of these will be 
considered in greater detail in a later chapter. At this point, it only 
need be noted that some of the item difficulty values had to be subjectively 
estimated in the course of scaling. Secondly, Furneaux was only able to achieve 
an adequate solution after deleting the data from two item pairs. These were 
reported to have distorted the variance of the solution time distribution 
and without their deletion, the analysis could not have proceeded. 
In view of the above observations, and given the potential importance 
of Furneaux's findings, some form of replication is warranted: unless 
independent investigations are found to support Furneaux's claims, his findings 
must remain highly questionable, due to the inadequacies of his study 
described in this chapter. 
Three forms of replication are possible, literal, operational and 
constructive (Lykken 1968). Literal replication is not possible, nor is it 
desirable given the inadequacies of group-testing data. The latter also 
makes it difficult to undertake a full operational replication, which 
requires the use of a similar sample and experimental procedures. Even if 
these constraints did not exist, constructive replication would still be 
necessary, given Furneaux's generalized claims. As Lykken states 
1' --- an experiment which replicates operationally but 
not constructively could be said to have demonstrated 
something, but not the relation between meaningful 
constructs generalizable to some broad reference 
population, which the author originally claimed to have 
established". 
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The present investigation was conceived in an attempt to test the 
generality of Furneaux's findings. It's specific concern was to investigate 
Furneaux's model in terms of it's applicability to a different set of test items 
using a different procedure for administration and a sample which also 
differed from that used by Furneaux. 
ý, Furneaux's 'Problem-solving Mechanism' 
In addition to presenting a conceptual analysis of problem-solving 
performance, and a procedure to scale test items, Furneaux attempted to 
develop within the context of neuropsychology a 'problem-solving mechanism'. 
The goals of this model were to encompass existing data as well as to 
generate testable predictions about its functioning. The mechanism eventually 
proposed was based on findings reported by Hick (1950). 
Hick (1950) was able to show that reaction-time in a multiple choice 
situation was related to the complexity of the task. This relationship 
takes the form 
RT =K log M 
where RT = choice reaction-time 
K= an individual constant 
M=a function of the complexity of 
the choice situation. 
Hick (1950) argued that if multiple choice activity involved 
successive binary classifications, a relationship of the type indicated in 
the above equation would be anticipated. The structural model proposed 
by Hick (1950) is in some ways analogous to a computer memory. He suggests 
that as the brain is composed of seemingly identical elements (cells), all 
its activities will involve some form of binary switching, an operation 
which will involve sequences of components similar in kind and duration. 
These sequential switching operations take the same basic time and involve 
the same activity. Furneaux's interpretation of Hick's (1950) hypothesis 
is that it implies that the multiple-choice reaction time provides a 
measure of the "time required for a search to be completed in the brain 
for the set of "connexions" which would initiate a required behaviour". 
Furneaux's development of this hypothesis was to suggest that problem- 
solving could be regarded as a special case of multiple-choice reaction-time. 
The hypothesis eventually devised by Ferneaux proposed an elaborate 
mechanism entailing a number of assumptions and restrictions, which, in the 
final analysis he says should not be taken too seriously. 
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The basic structure of this model is a set of elements which are 
brought into some "interconnexion" when a problem is presented. A 
randomly selected set is initially brought into operation and tested for 
correctness by a "comparator". If the comparator accepts the solution, 
it is output as a response. If the solution is rejected, the search 
process is re-instigated. A more complex set of elements is then brought 
into operation and the process continued. As such processes take time, 
and as the time taken is a function of the complexity of the problem, one 
can readily see how this model relates to Hick's (1950) equation. In 
Furneaux's model, continuance is accounted for by the comparator being set to 
operate for some period when the search process is instigated. 
Although Furneaux has tested a number of predictions from this model, 
and while only some of these have received support, there appears to have 
been no further development of his ideas. However, in 1964, Roth published 
a paper in which he reported a significant correlation between a rate of 
gain measure from a choice reaction time task and a measure of intelligence. 
On the basis of this finding, it appeared that Furneaux's problem-solving 
mechanism might merit greater attention. Furneaux had not incorporated 
a choice reaction time study in his research and was therefore unable to 
make any comparisons between his M-statistics and any of the indices derived 
from the choice situation. The present study did however present an 
opportunity to do so. Hence, the second research problem investigated here 
concerned the relationship between reaction-time and problem solving speed. 
4. Further Aspects of Furneaux's Research: 
Most of the detailed information presented in Furneaux's 1961 paper 
is confined to the investigation of correct solution times and their 
associated D-scales and M-statistics. Although he has investigated 
incorrect solution time and accuracy data only the outcomes of these 
investigations are reported. This chapter will present a, summary of these 
investigations. 
In general, Furneaux's strategy in these further analysis followed 
the samerve procedure devised for the Dtr scale. construction 
but with some modifications to specific components of the procedure. 
Ferneaux does not specify the changes which he introduced and in the absence 
of the relevant data, his findings are difficult to evaluate. 
Furneaux reports finding that the mean times to correct and incorrect 
solutions below the relevant critical difficulty levels differed, with the 
incorrect time mean being the smaller. With increasing D values, the 
differences between means increased in magnitude. The variance of the 
incorrect solution times was greater than that found for correct solutions, 
and the disparity between them increased with increases in difficulty. 
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The incorrect time data however were found to be particularly subject to 
individual differences and no simple functional relationships could be 
established. Furneaux noted that incorrect times tend to show poor 
reliability, partly as a consequence of their wide variance, and because 
there were very few incorrect responses at low difficulty levels, 
insufficient data were available to allow reliable estimates to be obtained. 
In his particular groups of subjects, the correlation between correct 
and incorrect times was 0.58 at low levels of difficulty, and fell to 
below 0.5 at higher difficulty levels. The important conclusion derived 
from these comparisons was that correct and incorrect times are not 
interchangeable. Thus any measure (for example of rate), which combines 
such times is likely to be an agglomerate score unsuited to precise 
investigation. 
Furneaux reports having had more success in the analysis of accuracy 
data. He found that using the already established Dtr scale values, and 
with Kqr values computed, it was possible to "specify a normal ogive which 
--- gives an acceptable fit to the data relating qr to Dtr -- -". The 
Dqr scale finally evolved correlated 0.92 with the Dtr scale. This finding 
led Furneaux to conclude that, for the tests used, the determinants of 
It response-time and response-quality, are much the same". Thus, it is 
legitimate to call both "difficulty" scales. It should be noted here that 
it is only D-scales for speed and accuracy that are correlated. The fact 
of their correlation does not allow a generalization that the individual 
constants KT, and Kqr are correlated to the same extent. The evidence on 
this point is presented later. 
On the basis of the data presented it is possible extract what in 
the final analysis, is a simple but often ignored principle. This 
principle . has influenced all of Furneaux's work. It states that any 
combination of data must be preceded by empirical evidence that such a 
combination is permissable. A logical analysis into irreducible components 
is a necessary but not sufficient basis for proceeding with data 
combination. Empirical evidence from a variety of sources is necessary 
before such combinations can take place. It is the.. failure to do so 
which tends to invalidate much of the current and early work on human 
problem solving. 
Further illustrations of the inadequacies of agglomerate scores are 
presented by Furneaux. He examined the consequences of using wrong 
solutions and abandonments as indices of "incorrect" performance when the 
goal of the analysis was to obtain the proportion of incorrect solutions 
in a particular group. Such a procedure, as he points out, leads to a 
multidimensional scale whereas the presumed intention was a scale with 
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TABLE 8. Intercorrelations of KTr, Kgr and Ts. 
Decimal point omitted. 
K Tr 
Ts 
Kqr -38 31 
Ts -27 
NOTES. 
a. A high value of KTr implies slow speed 
b. A high value of Kqr 
c. A high value of Ts 
implies high accuracy 
implies high continuance. 
(Data based on 209 subjects, a sub-group of the research 
sample. It was not possible to get all three indices from 
all subjects. ) 
Table taken from Furneaux (1961, Table V. 1) 
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unidimensional characteristics. For slow subjects, such a D-scale 
correlated only 0.68 with a previously established Dtr"scale whereas for 
fast subjects, the corresponding correlation rose to 0.79. 
Even under conditions where difficulty values are closely correlated, as 
in the already mentioned accuracy/correct solution D-scales, one cannot assume 
that M-statistics for the same data are closely related. Evidence on this 
point is contained, in Table 8. 
It will be obvious from the data in Table 8 that there is a substantial 
degree of independence among these scores. Furneaux has found evidence 
that within a more homogeneous group the interrelationships are even weaker. 
In view of the aforementioned evidence, as Furneaux points out, it 
would be inappropriate to conceptualize such abilities as "letter-series 
test ability". One can extend this view and question the meaningfulness of 
other conceptions of ability which presuppose a homogeneity among its 
various indices. The more appropriate conception would be in terms of speed, 
accuracy or continuance within a particular problem area. The theoretical 
and practical implications of this conclusion are profound for it means 
that a fundamental reorientation in studies of human abilities is required. 
Instead of intercorrelating agglomerate scores, the researcher needs to 
seek out relationships using homogeneous indices, rather than retaining 
the traditional crude approach. 
In his discussion of these conclusions, Furneaux raises the question 
of evidence for a "speed factor" in problem solving. Would speed constants 
derived from different types of test material intercorrelate to the extent 
that the presence of such a "factor" can be presumed to 'exist'? No studies 
known to the present writer have attempted to answer this question using 
Furneaux's measure of speed. Hence, one of the tasks of the research 
reported in this study is that of examining the interrelationship among 
measure of speed derived from two different types of test material to see 
if they show a substantial intercorrelation. It is only from studies of 
this type that an appropriately measured speed factor can be derived. 
Furneaux has examined the research literature for evidence of general 
factors of speed, accuracy and continuance. Although he gives insufficient 
details of the evidence examined he is led to conclude 
"There would thus appear to be quite a strong justification 
for talking of a subject's speed and accuracy without 
making specific reference to the kind of problem-material 
in terms of which these attributes were measured" (P. 188) 
This view is open to question. Firstly, Furneaux's review of the 
evidence is limited. He cites only two studies (Rimoldi 1951; Thurstone 
1949) which support the generality, across tests, of 'speediness'. Neither 
of these used his Ktr index, and, as he points out, the score or more 
other studies of speed (of which he provides no details), used 
16 
" 
inappropriate indices of speed. The measure of accuracy, Kqr, drived 
from the letter series test "usually displays correlations with cognitive 
test scores of the conventional kind which are higher than those 
associated with either speed (KTr) or continuance 
(C)". However, Furneaux 
does not present any evidence in support of this statement. While he 
cautions that this relationship is not invariant, he does suggest that 
since conventional scores tend to be quite highly intercorrelated, and 
since his accuracy measure is also correlated with such scores, it is 
concluded that there may be quite a strong factor of accuracy involved in 
a "wide variety of cognitive performances". Such evidence, in the view 
of the present writer, is inadequate as a basis for the broad 
generalizations made by Furneaux. 
The second set of considerations which must be taken into account 
before drawing conclusions as to the generality (across tests) of speed 
and accuracy are those concerned with the effects of instructions, and 
orectic factors on test performance. 
Furneaux is much less certain about the generality of continuance. 
In the case of this variable, he implicates the instructions given to 
subjects. If the instructions are presented in a particular way, 
persistence and continuance become synonymous. Under these conditions, 
there is some, again limited, evidence for one or two related traits. 
However, the relationships are so tenuous that Furneaux at least would 
not be surprised if continuance were found to be test specific. 
The concepts of power and level refer to attributes which, as 
Furneaux points out, are not yet defined in any generally acceptable way. 
His own use of the term level is reserved for tests designed in such a way 
as to maximize persistence. Furneaux (1953) has'devised a series of tests 
of level, constructed as a series of cycles each containing items of 
increasing difficulty, the cycles themselves increasing in overall difficulty 
as the test progresses. The subject is allowed unlimited time and is 
encouraged to persist when faced with difficult items. The items themselves 
have not been scalect according to Furneaux's own procedures for D-scaling 
(Brierley 1969) and as he explicitly recognises, the scores produced by 
these tests are subject to many of the limitations associated with 
conventional tests. Thus, he regards such scores as only an approximate 
measure of the level of difficulty at which the testee can function, given 
encouragement to persist with items experienced as difficult. While he 
suggests that such tests "measure a reasonably invariant property of the 
individual", Ferneaux does not present any evidence to support this 
assertion. 
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As has already been noted, Furneaux recognizes the potential effects 
of instructions on test performance, mediated by continuance. He also 
emphasizes the effects of orectic influences and reports one study which 
he has carried out to assess the effects of drive on- speed. The index of 
speed in this study was the difference in score obtained when subjects were 
tested under stressed and unstressed conditions. In addition to their 
speed scores, Ferneaux also obtained measures of extraversion and neuroticism 
using Guilfords S. T. D. C. R. inventory. His group of 75 students was divided 
into four sub-groups, depending on their personality test scores. These 
sub-groups were the stable introverts and extraverts, and neurgtic introverts 
and extraverts. He found that these sub-groups reacted differentially to 
stressed testing and on these, as well as other grounds, implicated orectic 
factors in test performance. 
5. A Summary of the Aims of the Present Research: 
Furneaux's (1961) paper is replete with testable assertions. However, 
the most fundamental of these is the replicability of his scaling procedures 
with different tests, subjects and forms of item presentation. Thus the 
primary aim of this study was to undertake a scaling exercise on standard 
test items to see if the outcome was consistent with that reported by 
Furneaux. 
In the course of difficulty scaling, various constants become available 
for each subject. These include speed, accuracy and continuance indices. 
It was the intention of the present study to test a number of hypotheses 
relating these data to Eysenck's (1967a) predictions about systematic 
personality differences in test performance. These hypotheses are detailed 
later. 
A third aim of this study was to examine slope measures from a choice 
reaction time task in relation to the Furneaux speed scores and to measures 
of intelligence on the grounds that a number of hypotheses about such 
relationships can be derived from the theoretical model proposed by 
Furneaux (the problem solving mechanism) and the assertions made by 
Eysenck (1967a) regarding the significance of Roth! s (1964) study. 
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VII. AN INVESTIGATION OF FURNEAUX'S DIFFICULTY SCALING PROCEDURES 
1. Apparatus, Procedures and Subjects: 
A LINC-8 computer (Digital Equipment) was used to control item 
presentation and to record item solution and solution latency. The control 
programme was written in LAP-6, a language specific to the LINC and designed 
specifically for on-line control and processing. At the time this study 
was undertaken, the LAP-6 compiler had been well tested in the U. S. A., as 
had the machine. Since then, both the compiler and the hardware have 
undergone a number of developments and modifications. For this reason, 
neither the programme nor the circuitry linking test administration 
apparatus to the computer are given in detail. 
The control programme was specially written by the author and included 
a timing sub-routine for timing responses. This was necessary because at 
that time, there was no internal clock in the LINC-8. The calibration of 
the programme clock was checked against a millisecond timer. All time data 
used in the subsequent analysis were adjusted to the nearest 1/100 secs. 
It should be noted here that every programme specifically written for this 
study was thoroughly checked by the author before it was used. For example, 
the test administration programme was checked several times by the input 
of preselected responses and latencies. 
a. Tests 
i) Personality Measures: 
The P. E. N. (Psychoticism, Extraversion and Neuroticism) Scale was 
used to provide P, E, N and L (Lie-Scale) scores for the subjects. This 
scale is composed of E, N, and L items from a pool of items developed by 
the Esysencks (Eysenck and Eysenck 1968) and the norms were obtained 
from one of the authors (S. B. G. Eysenck). At the time of this study, the 
P items had been selected following an extensive set of studies carried 
out with various normal and psychiatric groups (Eysenck and Eysenck 1968). 
A copy of the test is incorporated in the Appendix. 
ii) Intelligence Tests: 
The tests chosen for scaling were the multiple choice form of the 
Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale, Form 1 Senior, Set B (Raven 1965b), and the 
Advanced Progressive Matrices, Sets I and II (Raven 1965a). In 
addition, items from the Standard Progressive Matrices (Raven 1960) were 
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ORDER SOURCE NUMBER 
13 B 8 
14 C 2 
15 C 17 
16 C 31 
4 
21 B 10 
22 C 6 
23 C 19 
24 C 34 
6 
29 B 12 
30 C 8 
31 C 21 
32 C 36 
KEYt 
A= Standard Progressive Matrices 
B= Advanced it " Part I 
C= of to It Part II 
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There were several reason for selecting these particular tests. 
In the first instance, they were of a conventional difficulty likely 
to discriminate among the subjects available for this study. Secondly, 
they were sufficiently different from the letter series used by 
Furneaux to justify their being regarded as appropriate for a 
constructive replication. Thirdly, both are well established tests, 
in wide use. Fourthly, they appear to tap somewhat different types 
of ability. For example, Matrices (as well as Furneaux's Letter Series) 
load strongly on the fluid intelligence factor whereas vocabulary loads 
more strongly on the factor identified as crystallized ability 
(Horn 1970,1972; Cattell 1971). These two tests also have loadings on 
different factors in the heirarchial structure model, Matrices 
loading predominantly on 'g' and vocabulary tests on 'v : ed' 
(Vernon 1961). Superficially, the two tests also appear to require 
somewhat different skills. Whereas the Mill Hill items appear to be 
such that the subject either knows or doesn't know the answer, the 
Matrices require a solution to be 'worked out'. Finally, the Matrices 
are published with details of the conventional difficulty of the items, 
so that it is possible to devise 'cycles' of difficulty without first 
having to pilot the items on a comparable sample. 
The Mill Hill items were administered in their original order. 
Items from the Standard and Advanced Matrices were rearranged so as 
to form 6 cycles of 4 items each. Within each cycle, items were 
arranged in ascending order of conventional difficulty. Each cycle 
in turn increased in difficulty. The cycles were preceeded by 8 items 
from the easiest parts-of both sets of Matrices and followed by 6 items 
also of low difficulty. 
This cyclical arrangement was adopted by Ferneaux (1955) in 
constructing his level test. The purpose of such mixing was to 
encourage persistence although it has never been demonstrated that 
this arrangement achieves its goal. The arrangement of the Matrices 
items is presented in Table 9. The conventional difficulties are shown 
in Fig. 10, with presentation order and original Matrices item tumber 
in the row beneath. 
In all, there were 33 items in the Mill Hill and 38 items in the 
cyclical Advanced Matrices. 
It should be noted that the first item of the Mill Hill was used as 
an example. Hence the version used here contained one item less than 













FIGURE 11. Multiple-choice Response Apparatus 
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FIGURE 12. Choice Reaction Time Apparatus. 
The test items were photographed using positive black-and-white 
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35 m. m. film and transferred to individual slides. The slide magazine 
was positioned so that subjects could not readily discover which was 
the last item in the series. This precluded the possibility of an 
'end-spurt'. This form of presentation also prevents subjects looking 
ahead and does not allow them to return to any item once it has been 
completed. These factors are difficult to control in group testing 
with standard paper and pencil tests. 
A major advantage of the procedures adopted in this study is that 
they enable surreptitious recording of solution times. 
Test items were presented by back-projection onto a ground glass 
screen using a Kodak Carousel 35 m. m. projector. All items were of 
the multiple-choice type. The subject was required to press one of 
9 keys to indicate his solution. One of the keys was a "Don't Know" 
key used to record an abandonment. On completion of testing, the 
computer simultaneously output a teleprinter record of solution and 
solution latency and a punched tape. These tapes were subsequently 
used to provide a set of 80 - column data cards used in later data 
analysis. All such analyses were carried out on the University of 
London CDC 6600 computer. 
All peripheral equipment was constructed in the Psychology Department 
workshop at the Institute of Psychiatry. The apparatus and its dimensions 
are detailed in Fig. 11. 
iii) Choice Reaction Time: 
The presentation of the reaction time stimuli was controlled by the 
LINC-8 computer. 
The design of the apparatus followed the specifications given by 
Roth (1964). It consisted of a semicircular arrangement of 8 pea lamps, 
p a, r speX . 
all covered by green translucenttm Immediately in front of each lamp 
was a response button, 1 inch from each lamp. The lamps and buttons 
were mounted on a board which had a starting position so located that 
it was equidistant from the response buttons. Subjects were required 
to rest the index finger of the preferred hand on this point, and to 
respond by moving from this point to depress one of the response keys, 
returning to the central point at the end of each reaction. The response 
buttons were directly linked to micro-switches. The response board 
and its dimensions are shown in Fig. 12. 
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The reaction recorded was the preferred hand response time between 
the onset of one of the lights and the pressing of its corresponding 
microswitch. For the simple reaction time series (1/1), subjects were 
required to press the switch immediately to the left of the centre of 
the array: for 1 of 2 choices (1/2), either of the two middle buttons 
had to be pressed; for 1 of 4 (1/4), the four central buttons; for 
1 of 8 (1/8), any of the 8 buttons. When buttons were not required 
for a particular series, they were covered by special masks which 
covered both the pea lights and the response keys. 
The onset of the stimulus lights was controlled through the LINC-8. 
This programme also recorded response latency and which of the buttons 
was pressed. The lights were switched on for a maximum of 1 second. 
If no response was made before this, the light was switched off 
automatically and a response code of 9 recorded for that stimulus. 
These times were not included in any of the calculations. 
Each reaction time set was made up of 40 stimulus presentations. 
Each subject was given 9 sets of reaction time trails, arranged 
as follows: - 
1. Practice 5.1/8 8.1/4 
2.1/2 (Mill Hill/Matrices) 9.1/2 
3.1/4 6.1/8 
4.1/1 7.1/1 
A rest period was allowed between each set and each set was repeated 
following the administration of the Mill Hill and Matrices Tests. In 
the second series, the order of presentation was the reverse of the 
order of the first. However, the sequence of lights and inter-stimulus 
intervals were identical in both series. 
In the practice set, devised to familiarise subjects with the task 
requirements, the lights were presented in sequence, from left to right, 
1-8,8-1,1-8 etc. until 40 practice trials were completed. 
For the experimental series, the set of 40 trials was divided into 
5 blocks of 8 trials per block, although the subjects were not aware 
of this structure and no gap existed between each block other than the 
normal interstimulus interval. The sequence of lights and inter-stimulus 
intervals in blocks 1,3,5 of each set was identical but determined on 
a random basis. Blocks 2 and 4 also contained random sequences of 
lights and inter-stimulus intervals that differed from each other as 
well as from the sequences in blocks 1,3,5. This psuedo-random 
series was included for purposes of a future investigation into 
performance variation over time. 
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FIGURE 13. Schematic layout of apparatus and computer. 
1=Slide projector 2=Screen 3= 9-choice panel 
4=Reaction time lights and response buttons 
5='Ready' light 6=LINC-8 computer 
Sound-proofed Room 
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The only other constraint was that within each block, each stimulus 
should appear with equal frequency. The stimulus intervals varied 
between 2,3,4 and 5 seconds and their order was identical in each 
set. The order of stimulus presentation and the associated 
inter-stimulus intervals are given in the Appendix. 
The times were rounded to the nearest 1/1000 sec. 
b. Setting: 
Testing was carried out individually. The subject was seated in 
front of the screen and response key panel in a darkened sound-proof 
cubicle. The panel was illuminated by a focussed light built into the 
panel. The computer was located in an adjacent room and there was no 
transmission of sound between these rooms. However, a one-way screen 
permitted the subject to be observed and a special signal light was 
used to indicate that the experiment was still in progress. This 
light was controlled by the computer and acted as a signal to the 
experimenter that one section of the study was ended and that he could 
enter the subject's cubicle to instruct him on the next section of the 
study. Fig. 13 is a schematic representation of the apparatus layout. 
c. Procedures: 
The following sequence of testing was used for all subjects: 
P. E. N. (completed in a different room) 






Reaction Time - part 2 
d. Instructions: 
The full instructions are given in the Appendix. 
In line with the aims of this study, instructions were designed to 
foster the measurement of "natural" speed on the Mill Hill and Matrices. 
e. Sub ects: 
The subjects who participated in the present study were paid 
volunteers who came to the Psychology Department, Institute of Psychiatry 
to participate in this and another research project. The other project 
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was an investigation of the effects of unconditioned stimulus intensity 
on the conditioned eyelid response (Evans 1970). There was no overlap 
between the two studies apart from the common use of personality data 
and other data on subject characteristics (age). As far as is known 
participation in one could in no way interfere with the outcome of 
the other. 
All subjects were males and came from one of two larger groups. 
One group consisted of 'white collar workers', some of whom had 
responded to an advertisement in a weekly newspaper. Other members 
of this group were subjects known to the department who had previously 
participated in other projects. None of them had previously completed 
the Mill Hill or Advanced Matrices. The other group were students at 
a variety of institutions of higher education. None of these were 
psychology students, and so far as could be ascertained, had not been 
tested on the instruments used in this study. 
It is obvious that the study sample cannot in any way be said to be 
representative of any group in particular. Given their occupational 
status, they were likely to be of at least average ability in standard 
tests of intelligence but probably of above average ability. Being 
volunteers, they also constituted a group with certain undetermined 
biases. These factors no doubt restrict the generalizability of any 
conclusions to be drawn from the results. However, as the main concern 
was with the scalability of test items, and as Furneaux regards the 
speed/difficulty relationship as population independent, the sampling 
constraints are not likely to be a major factor in the scaling given 
this 'normal group'. There is an important constraint on sampling 
imposed by the apparatus. The use of computer-controlled testing 
requires subjects to be brought to the apparatus. The machine is not 
portable. This is a constraint which was particularly important when 
this study was undertaken. With the advent of remote access terminals, 
such constraints are likely to be of lesser significance. 
119 subjects were tested. This group was reduced to 110 for reasons 
given below. 
Subject No. Reason for exclusion 
7 P. E. N. not given 
8 P. E. N. incomplete 
21 " it 
24 Anxious, partially deaf, reaction times 
lost due to failure to respond. 
52 Apparatus fault 
55 11 
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TABLE 10. Basic data for the 110 male subjects. 
NORMS* 
VARIABLE MEAN S. D. RANGE MEAN S. D. 
Age 29.16 10.67 18-65 -- 
P 1.86 1.68 0-7 2.50 2.71 
E 11.28 4.22 2-20 12.75 4.12 
N 9.00 4.66 0-19 7.33 4.37 
L 2.93 2.27 0-10 -- 
* Normative data provided by Dr. S. B. G. Eysenck. 
Lie scale (dissimulation) data not available. 
Male norms only. 
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FIGURES 14-17: 
FIGURE 14. Frequency distribution for Age. 
FIGURE 15. Frequency distribution for Extraversion. 
FIGURE 16. Frequency distribution for Neuroticism. 
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FIGURES 18 - 30: 
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These FIGURES show the frequency distributijns for the 
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TABLE 11. Distribution of answers for each of the 
6 alternatives on the Mill Hill. 
Item Numbers in column 1; Abandonments in column 10. 
Frequency of responses to each alternative in columns 
2-7. 
TABLE 12. Mean log. times for each of the answers 
on the Mill Hill. Row and column identification as 
for TABLE 11. 
TABLE 13.6Standard deviations for the log solution 
times on the Mill Hill. Row and column identification 
as for TABLE 11. 
TABLE 14. Distribution of answers for each of the 8 
alternatives on the Matrices. 
Item Numbers in column 1; Abandonments in column 10. 
Frequency of responses to each alternative in columns 
2-9. 
TABLE 15. Mean log. times for each of the answers 
on the Matrices. Row and column identification as 
for TABLE 14. 
TABLE 16. Standard deviations for the log solution 
times on the Matrices. Row and column identification 
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63 P. E. N. incomplete 
68 Apparatus fault 
112 Reaction times lost due to failure 
to respond. 
It is interesting to note that the "apparatus fault" was due to the 
experimenter's failure to reset the slide projector to the starting 
position. This problem is readily overcome by a small sub-routine 
which would step the magazine to the appropriate slide in preparation 
for the next subject. 
The incomplete P. E. N's were due to a failure to check that both 
sides had been filled in. One P. E. N. was not printed correctly and 
this error and the others were not noticed by the receptionist whose 
responsibility it was to gather these data from subjects. 
The basic data on the 110 subjects are presented in Table 10. 
Distributions of the subjects on the main variables are presented in 
Figs. 14 to 17. 
2. Preliminary Results: 
The results given in this section are the preliminary results of this 
study. A detailed presentation of the data will be given in a later 
chapter. 
Tables 11 to 16 present the distribution of responses for each test 
and the means and standard deviations for each solution in the group of 
110 subjects. 
Figs. 18 to 30 show the distributions for the basic study variables. 
3. Item Difficulty : The Mill Hill: 
The procedures for scaling items in terms of their time difficulty are 
detailed by Furneaux in his 1961 paper. Despite the detail his exposition 
does not permit a direct application for scaling new test material. The 
lack of clarity will be apparent as this chapter proceeds. Brierley (1969) 
also noted some of the obscurities in Furneaux's statements and adopted 
his own interpretation when scaling items. The present author has consulted 
both these sources in attempting to scale the Mill Hill and Advanced 
Matrices data. 
In this chapter, the details of the analysis presented by Furneaux 
will be summarised for each major step. This will be followed by a 
statement of outcome in the present study. This detail is necessitated 
by the lack of clarity in Furneaux's description. It will enable the reader 
to evaluate the validity of the present procedures. Such detail should 
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also facilitate any later attempt to utilize Furneaux's procedures. 
Finally, as will be seen later, this approach makes apparent some of the 
problems in Furneaux's procedures. 
There will be no attempt to reproduce the raw data for this part of the 
study as they would occupy too much space. Altogether, on the 110 subjects 
there were 15,620 units of data (71 test items producing 142 units per 
subject - i. e. solution alternative, solution time). All of Furneaux's 
procedures were set up as computer programmes written by the author. It 
is not possible to accomplish a full Furneaux scaling in one pass through 
the computer. A number of separate programmes must be used as the output 
has to be examined at each stage. Every programme was thoroughly checked 
before the output was used. 
In the course of his presentation, Furneaux noted that raw solution 
times did not satisfy the assumptions necessary for the further 
development of his approach. He therefore used a log 10 transformation. 
It should be noted that while he adopted a different symbol for the log 
time measures (Tr for logs, tr for raw times) he did not use the log notation 
consistently. In the presentation which follows, all times are in their 
log 10 form. 
Ferneaux : Stages I and II: 
1. Compute the proportion of correct solutions for all items for all 
subjects. 
2. Select a group of items with the lowest conventional difficulty. 
These are called the REFERENCE items. 
3. For all subjects who have solved at least half of the reference 
problems, compute mean correct solution time on the reference problems. 
4. For subjects who have abandoned any item, compute mean abandonment 
time for all abandoned items. (Procedurally, this is the most useful 
first step and is the only one which does not have to be repeated). 
5. Compute mean abandonment time for the group and divide subjects into 
high and low continuant subjects (i. e. above and below mean, respectively). 
6. Divide high continuant subjects into three groups in terms of their mean 
time to correct solution for the reference problems. 
7. "Group F" subjects are those who show the fastest mean time to correct 
solution on the reference problems; "Group M" is the designation of 
the moderately fast subjects. 
8. Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent computations are carried 
out on data from Group M. With ready accessability to a computer, it 
is useful to carry out the computations for all subjects, especially 
those in Group F as they are required at a later stage. This is a 
simple programming task. 
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9. Compute the mean correct solution time for each reference problem 
for Group M. These times are taken as a first approximation of the 
time difficulties of the items (Drr). 
10. Compute a speed constant for each subject. From each correct 
reference problem, subtract the DTr for that problem. Add these 
differences and divide by the number of differences. The result is 
the KTr (speed constant) for each subject. (KTr is thus an average 
deviation score for correct solutions. The more negative the value, 
the faster the subject on the reference items). 
11. Compute a critical difficulty value for each subject (c DTr). Select 
the smallest abandonment time on any item for the subject. From this 
value subtract the largest difference found in 10 above. The 
resulting value is a first approximation to the critical difficulty 
for that subject. 
12. Two checks should now be carried out. 
A. It is necessary to ensure that the lowest value of c DTr for any 
subject is greater than the highest DTr for any reference item. 
Furneaux does not specify what action should be taken if this test 
is failed. It does however indicate that the reference items 
were ambiguous inputs and that a new reference set should be 
chosen and steps 1 to 12A repeated. 
On the basis of this writer's experience, it is essential that 
this part of the scaling be satisfacto4ly completed before 
attempting 12B. Failure to do so results in unnecessay further 
computations. 
The aim at this stage should be to maximize the number of items 
and subjects for whom these items are unambiguous inputs. A useful 
initial guide in selecting the reference items is their conventional 
difficulty, but this did not produce fully satisfactory results in 
the present study. Additional useful information is provided by 
mean and variance of correct time : items of low mean time and 
variance tend to lead to a more rapid solution of Stages I and 
II scaling. 
B. The relationship between item. difficulties in Groups M and F should 
be linear. Again Furneaux does not specify what corrective action 
should be taken. 
The Present Study : Stages I and II: 
The computations specified by Furneaux were carried out on 10 
conventionally 'easy' items. Although the Group M and F item difficulties 
showed the predicted linear relationship, few subjects satisfied the test 
in 12A above, suggesting that these items were ambiguous inputs and therefore 
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TABLE 17. Time difficulties for the reference items 
on the Mill Hill for groups M and F. Based on 12 and 
25 subjects, respectively. 
ITEM DTr(", ) DTr(F) 
1 . 8697 . 6600 
2 . 7643 . 5190 3 . 7464 . 5985 4 . 7634 . 5241 5 . 8409 . 6697 6 . 8343 . 6284 8 . 8032 . 5671 
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TABLE 18. Critical difficulties for groups M and F 
at the end of Stage II, Mill Hill. 
GROUP M GROUP F 
SUBJECT 
CDTr SUBJECT CDTr 
44 . 9151 113 1.2046 50 . 9266 67 1.0411 87 . 9468 62 1.1264 107 1.2432 73 . 8105 85 . 9646 19 . 8361 104 1.0838 117 . 9847 54 . 9571 53 1.1241 76 1.3034 34 . 9440 109 1.0448 114 . 9485 29 1.1993 92 1.0822 
77 1.0550 36 1.0580 
47 1.0860 82 . 9156 27 . 7980 101 . 8436 81 
. 8115 35 . 7518 66 
. 7329 86 
. 8170 14 . 6937 93 . 9239 28 . 6914 91 1.0015 
23 . 7065 115 . 8011 18 . 8050 
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inappropriate as reference items. Furneaux foresaw this as a possible 
problem but appears from his report not to have encountered it. However, 
his foresight might well have been a consequence of his encountering 
similar problems. Brierley (1969) does not mention any problems at this 
point, but he had adopted a different initial procedure, dividing his small 
group of subjects into an M and an F group. He did not first select 
continuant subjects, presumably becuase of the small sample. 
Following this initial failure, a number of attempts to obtain a 
satisfactory set of reference items was made. Computationally, an order 
of proceeding different to Furneaux's was adopted, beginning with step 5 
which identifies the high continuance subjects. 
The mean abandonment time was 1.0739 log secs. However, not all subjects 
with abandonment times above the cut-off can be included in subsequent 
analyses : the later procedures require the variance in abandonment times 
to be computed. Therefore, high continuant subjects who abandoned 1 or less 
items have to be excluded at this stage. 50 subjects remained following 
this initial analysis. 
The distribution of abandonments is presented in Fig. 24. From this 
it can be seen that data from 27 subjects (0 or 1 abandonments) could not 
be used in the initial scaling. This was the first sign of a major problem 
in Furneaux's approach, the high rate of data loss as the analysis proceeds. 
This problem will be considered in detail in a subsequent chapter. 
The sub-division of continuant subjects used in this study did not 
follow Furneaux's procedures exactly. With only 50 subjects available, it 
was decided to divide them into F and M groups of 25 subjects each. It will 
be recalled that Furneaux divided his subjects into 3 groups (the F and M 
groups containing 40 subjects). It was felt that if Furneaux's procedure 
was adopted, too few data would be available for later analyses. The present 
procedure also differed from that used by Brierley (1969). He omitted the 
step which requires the subjects to be divided into high and low continuant 
groups, thereby departing as well from Furneaux's specifications. 
The achievement of Furneaux's criteria for Stages I and II (steps 
12A and B) was accomplished only after extended trial-and-error. Several 
attempts were made before it was possible to satisfy these criteria for 
7 items (No's. 1,29 3,4,5,6, and 8), and even then, the data for only 
12 group M subjects could be used. The time difficulties for these items 
are given in Table 17 for Groups M and F. Critical difficulties for the 
subjects in these groups are presented in Table 18. 
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From these Tables, it can be seen that the greatest difficulty for a 
Group M reference item was . 
8697 and the lowest critical difficulty for 
any subject was . 9151. For Group F the respective values were . 
6697 and 
. 
6914. These data satisfy step 12A of Stages I and II. 
The second test is more problematic. With only 7 items and 12 and 
25 subjects, it is inappropriate to use regression analysis to determine 
the relationship between the two sets of item difficulties. Furneaux did 
not record how many items were involved in his analysis. Brierley (1969) 
used only 10 items. However, as this was only a preliminary test on a first 
approximation, the present writer accepted the precedent of the previous 
workers. 
The regression coefficient was computed using the B. M. D 05R programme 
(Dixon 1970) for polynomial regression analysis for a 4th degree polynomial. 
The data from this analysis are presented in Table 19. For this analysis, 
data from Group M were used as predictors. 
The regression analysis produced a linear coefficient of 1.05 
(s. e. 0.35, r= . 
80) which compares favourably with Furneaux's finding 
(linear coefficient 1.08) and with that reported by Brierley ( . 96). 
Neither of these writers tested for higher orders of curvilinearity. The 
present results indicate major linear and cubic components and visual 
inspection of Brierley's data also suggests that a cubic component was 
present. 
While the statistical limitations of these analyses must be emphasized, 
the results appear adequate at this point, so that the next stage of scaling 
can proceed. The only reservation concerns the significant cubic component, 
but its implications are not very clear. As the difficulty values are only 
approximations which will be refined in later stages of the analysis, a 
significant cubic component does not at this point invalidate Furneaux's 
main conclusion : it would only do so if a substantial cubic component was 
found in the relationship between item difficulty and speed at the 
completion of scaling. 
Furneaux : Stage III: 
1. For every subject, compute speed constants using correct response 
times for reference items. (Repeat of steps 9 and 10, Stages I and II). 
What is not explicit at this point is how the necessary critical 
difficulties that are needed should be computed. Either one can use 
the DTr values already computed for Group M on the reference problems, 
or, they can be recomputed from the data that are available for all 
subjects. The solution adopted in the present study is described in 
the next section. 
TABLE 19. Results of a 4th degree orthogonal polynomial 
analysis on item difficulties for Groups M and F. 
Item difficulties x 100. 
Intercept -24.6 
Regression Coefficient 1.05 
Standard Error 0.35 
Correlation . 80 
Analysis of Variance for a 4th Degree Polynomial 
Source d. f. Mean Sq. F 
Linear 1 144.09 61.50 
Quadratic 1 13.36 5.70 
Cubic 1 62.19 26.54 
Quartic 1 . 81 
Deviation 2 2.34 




2. Compute critical difficulties for each subject as detailed in 
Stages I and II (11). 
3. Discard those subjects whose critical difficulty is smaller than 
the largest difficulty value for the reference problems. 
4. For the retained subjects and for all items, there will be a set of 
times to correct solution. From each of these times, subtract the 
speed constant for that subject. There will result a matrix of 
reduced times, with a row for each subject and a column for each item, 
but with empty cells for those items failed or abandoned. 
5. The DTr value for each problem is then computed by averaging solution 
times for each problem across all subjects (i. e. find the mean for 
each column). 
6. At this point it is possible to compare the resulting DTr values with 
the critical difficulty for each subject. For some subjects and some 
problems the DTr values will be greater than the lowest c DTr values. 
It therefore becomes necessary to remove the speed adjusted solution 
times from the matrix and to recompute new DTr values. This is an 
iterative process in which subject response times to particular items 
will be included or excluded at different times until 'an acceptable' 
state is reached. What is meant by 'acceptable' is problematic. Both 
Furneaux and Brierley agree that the terminal point for Stage III 
has to be decided by subjectively ascribing DTr values to some of the 
items. 
The Present Study : Stage III: 
In introducing the Stage III procedures, Furneaux states: 
"For every subject in the experimental group a 
value of a KTr can now be computed, using his 
Or responses to the reference problems 
according to the method described in Stage I. 
His value of c Dtr is then calculated, again 
using the methods of Stage I". 
As pointed out above (Stage III 1), this prescription is ambiguous. 
Brierley's interpretation of this procedure requires the use of item 
difficulty values from Group M to obtain speed constants for his subjects. 
This is the procedure adopted here. Steps 1 to 4 of this stage are then 
readily completed. However, as Furneaux notes, for nearly all subjects, 
some of the speed adjusted correct times were "relevant to Ia (tr) inputs. 
A series of interations are thus necessary to remove such data and their 
effects from the analysis". 
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TABLE 20, Item difficulties on the Mill Hill following 
10 iterations. 
STABLE ITEMS, ITERATION 1. 























TABLE 20. Continued. 
ITEMS WITH MULTIPLE DIFFICULTY VALUES. 
Item No. Range* No. of Subjects.; 
11 8888 39 
9013 41 




16 10768 14 
11020 16 
18 10249 19 
10494 16 
9977 14 
20 11115 17 
9857 8 
21 9965 11 
9701 12 
10080 13 
22 10097 16 
9956 15 
28 10190 5 
11260 7 
* Range x 10000 
A computer programme to undertake these in erations was developed 
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and used on the relevant data. A series of 10 iterations produced some 
interesting observations, not reported by Furneaux or Brierley, presumably 
because more than 1 or 2v erations would be exceedingly laborious without 
a computer. The use of the computer in the present study in fact highlighted 
a problem encountered by both these investigators, the solution of which 
brings into question the scaling procedures. 
The ensuing discussion refers to Table 20. In this Table, the 
'No. of Subjects' column refers to the number of subjects whose solution 
times contributed to the item difficulty index. 'Range' refers to the range 
of difficulties generated during the 10 interations. 
21 items showed stable difficulty values from the first few ivterations 
onwards. 8 items showed recurrent levels of difficulty, depending on the 
number of iterations. Item 14 for example returned a difficulty value 
of 1.0438 every fourth ixteration. 
4 items (26,271 32,33) showed a different pattern in the analysis: 
after only 1 or 2 iterations, it was no longer possible to obtain difficulty 
values for them. This problem arises as a consequence of the method used. 
If the mean correct solution time for an item is higher than the highest 
critical difficulty obtained by any subject who solved the item, then no 
subjects remain for the analysis. Hence these difficulty values, for 
this group of subjects, are indeterminate. 
In commenting on this stage of the procedure, Furneaux states: 
"At the conclusion of this process aD value of 
probably moderate accuracy will have been assigned 
to the majority of the eighty items. Some, however, 
will have D values greater than the values of c Dtr 
relevant to even the fastest and most continuant of 
subjects, and thus can only be calibrated as having 
Dtr values greater than such and such. For a 
similar reason, others will have to be calibrated 
in terms of only a very few data, and thus 
inaccurately" (p. 181). 
Brierley, confronted with such guidance admits that 
The precise difficulty estimate depends because 
of these problems on the course of the successive 
approximations to a small degree. In these 
circumstances, a degree of judgement was allowed 
as to whether these awkward values were allowed 
or not". (p. 198). 
From these comments, it is apparent that the central problem at this 
point is the absence of any rule for allocating difficulty values to the 
items with recurrent and indeterminate difficulties. Once subjectivity 
is allowed to operate, it becomes possible to assign difficulty values which 
will facilitate the finding of a solution which conforms to the investigator's 
expectations. Thus, the arbitrarineds at this point must call into 
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question the final outcome, given that these D values are used as the 
basis for computing the final D values, and despite the fact that Furneaux 
describes them as "of probably moderate accuracy". 
The use of an extended number of isterations demonstrates that even 
apparently successful D value determination at this stage may be misleading. 
What value is observed will depend on how many ijterations are undertaken. 
Item 20 (in Table 20) could have been assigned aD value of . 98 or 1.11, 
or 98 and 111 if, as both Furneaux and Brierley did, the D values are 
multiplied by 100. 
In the present study, it was decided to use the average of the 
recurrent D values as the DTr for the item. This procedure was adopted 
for the 8 items with recurrent values. The remaining 4 'indeterminate' 
items were allocated the difficulty values obtained for them in the 
initial phase of i*teration. 
All DTr data are presented in Table 23. 
Ferneaux : Stage IV: 
1. Find the largest abandonment time for each subject. 
2. From this value, subtract the subject's speed constant. The result 
is the critical level for abandonment (i. e. unambiguous abandonment 
c DTs)- 
3. Select only abandonment times for items where D is greater than 
c DTs. Compute the variance of these measures (VTs). This variance 
should be homogeneous among subjects, given the log transformation. 
4. Compute the mean (Ts) of these abandonments for each subject and 
subtract this from each abandonment time. This difference is 
symbolized as 
is. 
5. Compute the mean Ts for-each item across' subjects, giving Ts (Av. ). 
6. Ts (Av) should not correlate with DTV. 
7. Pool the Ts values for all subjects. The resulting distribution 
should be normal. For each subject next compute the difference 
Ts -2 VTg at'all values of DTr. This is the effective 
minimum of Ts. 
8. This value of T. is then used in the computation of c DTr described 
in Stages I and II (11). Again, an ivterative procedure is adopted. 
This iterative process should produce a larger number of Iu (Tr) 
for each subject; DTr values for some problems should change and 
Kam for all subjects should change. 
The Present Study : Stage IV: 
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In the implementation of Stage IV procedures, it was necessary to 
first exclude all subjects who abandoned 1 or fewer items. This was 
necessary because abandonment time variances have to be computed. As a 
result, this stage was initiated using the data from 83 subjects. A 
further 50 subjects were then excluded as a result of step 2 which requires 
the retention of only those subjects whose abandonments were unambiguous 
(i. e. beyond the maximum item difficulty). It is important to note here 
that the substantial loss of data may be partly due to the uncertainty of 
some item difficulties computed in the previous stage. That is, because 
some item difficulties are estimated subjectively, more subjects will be 
lost if the item is given a high difficulty value than if the item is given 
a-lower difficulty value. - 
Step 3 also requires that the variance in the abandonment time data 
of the remaining subjects should be homogeneous. Furneaux tested this 
using Bartlett's test for homogeneity of variance and only satisfied this 
criterion when his data were transformed to logs. In carrying out this 
test, the data from each subject are treated as independent samples. Each 
unambiguous abandonment is taken as a unit in the sample. Bartlett's test 
is then used to assess the homogeneity of the variances of abandonment times 
among the subjects. 
Bartlett's test was applied to the subjects remaining in the present 
analysis, using the formulae in McNemar (1969, p. 285). The resulting X` 
of 25.98 is not significant (32 d f). (X2 (Chi-square) for 32 df computed 
from Winer (1970, p. 665)). The meaningfulness of this test on the present 
data is however highly questionable. 13 of the 33 variances were based on 
data from 2 items. While McNemar (1969) does not comment on size of the 
samples used in Bartlett's test, Winer (1970 p. 95) states that this test 
should not be used when the number of units in any sample is below 3 and 
most should be more than 5. Only 3 subjects satisfied the latter criterion. 
The unsatisfactoriness of the data is due partly to the uncertain difficulty 
estimates, as noted above, and also partly to the few abandonments. ( This 
latter point is discussed in a later chapter). 
A further requirement at this point is that item difficulties and the 
Ts (Av) values for the items should not be correlated. Data for this test 
are presented in Table 21, from which it can be seen that only 10 data sets 
were available. The rank correlation for these values is - . 02 which is 
clearly consistent with Furneaux's specification. For his own data, 
Furneaux found a correlation 0.11. It is possible to infer from the d. f. 
in his significance test (i. e. 31) that 32 items were used. This suggests 
that he too lost a substantial amount of data at this point, although he 
did not comment on this. 
221 
TABLE 21. Ts(Av) for items and their DTr values. 
Item No. No. of Subjects Ts(Av)* DTr. * 
17 1 -3662 11992 
20 1 0545 10486 
24 14 0429 14417 
26 4 -1427 12037 
27 23 0281 14847 
29 4 0331 11316 
30 1 -0821 9858 
31 30 -0604 14374 
32 21 0434 13616 
33 2 1919 11649 
* Data x 10000 
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Steps 8 and 9 at this stage require the computation of the lower 
bound of the abandonment time distribution for each subject. With this 
value available, it is possible to recompute individual critical 
difficulties and hence refined estimates of item difficulties. The present 
attempts to accomplish this proved unsuccessful. Firstly, subjects with 
fewer than 2 abandonments had to be excluded. Secondly, only those 
abandonment times, corrected for speed and above the critical abandonment 
level (c DTs) (i. e. unambiguous abandonments) for each subject can be 
employed. When the remaining data were subjected to these exclusion 
criteria, only 35 subjects provided usable data. Of these, only 5 had 
c DTs measures which were larger than the difficulty level for the most 
difficult of the reference items. It would obviously not be meaningful 
to obtain difficulty measures for the items using data for so few subjects. 
Any further attempts at scaling had therefore to be abandoned. 
This somewhat abrupt ending was anticipated to some extent because of 
the substantial and progressive data loss entailed in the scaling 
procedures. Given that the programmes used to compute the various measures 
were thoroughly checked, it is doubtful if the reason for termination 
resides in computation errors. Other more plausible explanations are possible. 
The first is the high data loss as a consequence of a substantial proportion 
of subjects abandoning 1 or 0 items. This may in turn be a consequence of 
the test situation. Both these points are discussed more fully in a later 
chapter. A further reason, as suggested earlier, is the uncertainty of 
the item difficulty estimates for a substantial number of the items. Were 
the present outcome an isolated instance, then doubt would be cast on the 
entire scaling procedure used in this study. The ambiguities in Furneaux's 
presentation could have been reinterpreted and the scaling would then have 
to be repeated. However, Brierley (1969) had to terminate his analysis at 
the same point and for the same reasons as the present writer. It will also 
M atrlLCS 
be seen later that scaling of the Hii3nlil 1. had to be abandoned at the same 
point, again for the same reasons. The outcome of scaling for the Mill Hill 
is therefore unlikely to be simply a chance occurrence. 
Despite the premature ending of the scaling exercise, it was still 
possible to compute more refined estimates of the speed constants for all 
subjects, using the difficulties for the reference items which were obtained 
at the end of Stage III, Step 6. These refined estimates are presented in 
Table 22. 
With the somewhat inadequate data available at this point, it is still 
possible as well to undertake a "crucial" test of Furneaux's model, viz. 1the 
relationship between item difficulty and correct solution time, specified 
in the following equation: 
°`Tr `M DTr + aKTr 
TABLE 22. Speed constants for subjects on the Mill Hill and 
Matrices. Data x 100, corrected to the neared whole number. 
Sub MII MT Sub III MT Sub MII I-IT Sub MH MIT 
1 -25 -19 34 -24 -31 66 -17 -09 96 -28 -03 2 -20 -21 35 -17 -37 67 -32 -05 97 -22 3 
3 -25 -20 36 -22 -01 69 5 -14 98 -08 -24 4 -26 -27 37 -28 -20 70 -11 -04 99 -22 -18 
5 18 16 38 -12 09 71 -25 -25 100 -01 -17 6 -22 -14 39 -32 -28 72 -10 -03 101 -19 -07 
9 -22 -20 40 -21 -22 73 -15 -30 102 12 26 
10 -37 -18 41 -01 -13 74 -28 -30 103 07 -05 11 -09 -10 42 -22 -27 75 -25 -11 104 -02 -29 12 -19 -18 43 -22 -23 76 01 -25 105 -16 -11 
13 -35 -31 44 -09 -09 77 11 10 106 -08 -10 14 -15 -10 45 -24 -22 78 04 18 107 -08 10 
15 -19 -13 46 -05 18 79 13 -20 108 09 13 16 -38 -20 47 117 41 80 -26 -20 109 02 07 
17 -10 09 48 -38 -46 81 -18 -03 110 -06 -08 18 -11 -12 49 -33 -21 82 -22 04 111 04 -03 
19 -28 -06 50 -08 -07 83 -08 06 113 -35 -45 20 07 20 51 -07 -13 84 -19 -29 114 -23 -09 
22 -11 -20 53 -25 -10 85 -03 -13 115 -12 -17 
23 -13 -23 54 -01 -22 86 -16 -19 116 -27 -29 
25 -06 11 56 -30 07 87 -08 05 117 -27 -09 26 -23 06 57 -31 -21 88 -20 -10 118 -29 -23 
27 -21 -14 58 -28 -13 89 -09 -05 119 -20 -21 
28 -14 -17 59 -09 -07 90 -27 -16 
29 08 00 60 -16 -26 91 -13 -07 
30 -04 -14 61 -21 -18 92 -22 -03 31 -18 -10 62 -32 -16 93 -14 08 
32 -24 -27 64 -11 -05 94 -06 03 




Obviously, the adequacy of this test is a function of how accurately 
the various parameters have been estimated. For the Mill Hill data, the 
main limitations have already been cited. The speed constants are 
probably more adequate than the estimates of item difficulties although 
neither are fully acceptable. 
The procedure for conducting this test requires the subjects to be 
divided into 4 groups on the basis of their speed constants, the groups 
ranging from fastest to slowest. For each group on each item, Tr (Av) 
values are computed and plotted against item difficulty. If the model 
holds for the data, then, as Furneaux states 
"For each sub-group separately the slope of the 
best fitting straight line should have a value 
of 1.0". 
As was noted earlier Furneaux did not conduct any formal test of this 
relationship. He simply relied on an inspection of the data. 
The data for this test are presented in Table 23. 
Some preliminary comments are necessary before presenting the results 
of these tests. 
The data from the 110 subjects were divided into 4 sub-groups 
(1,2,3,4, fast to slow) on the basis of their speed measures. Two 
subjects were randomly excluded to enable equal numbers in each group. This 
in turn facilitated the computations. Thus, each group consisted of 27 
subjects. Tr (Av) was then computed separately for each sub-group on each 
item, as shown in Table 23. This table also contains the data for all 
subjects. 
The next task was to select the item difficulties. This was problematic 
because of the uncertain value of difficulty for some items and the 
indeterminate nature of the difficulties for the remainder. Because of these 
factors, it was decided to eliminate all such items in carrying out the 
"crucial" test. One further item (No. 23) was excluded because it's Tr (Av) 
value was based on data from only 4 subjects in group 1. The items-excluded 
are marked Y in Table 23.15 items remained for the final analysis. 
The determination of the slope of the best-fit line to the data also 
posed some problems. Firstly, the data to be used do not satisfy all the 
assumptions necessary for computing regression coefficients. Secondly, there 
is no basis for deciding which of the two variables is predictor and which 
criterion. There are two regression lines and no basis for deciding which 
is to be used. This problem can be overcome by using the correlation as the 
index of slope if the two variables are standardized to have unit variance. 
TABLE 2 3. Mill Hill items. Tr(Av) values for all subjects and for the 4225 
sub-groups. Data X 100, correct to 0 decimal places. Log times. 
GROUP 
ITEM D No 
1 88 43 
2 73 43 
3 79 42 
4 74 43 
5 86 38 
6 84 43 
7 80 43 
8 79 43 
9 79 42 
10 83 40 
11y 90 40 
12 81 40 
13 85 43 
14y 106 16 
15 91 32 
16y 109 15 
17y 120 8 
18y 102 16 
19 110 10 
20y 105 12 
21Y 99 12 
} 
22y 100 16 
23y 97 10 
24y 144 1 
25 101 10 
26y 120 14 
27Y 148 5 
28y 107 16 
29y 113 6 
30Y 99 2 
31y 144 1 
32y 136 15 
33Y 116 9 
All 1 2 3 If 
Tr(Av) N Tr(Av) N Tr(Av) N Tr(Av) N Tr(Av) N 
89 log 91 26 go 27 86 27 90 27 
73 109 77 26 74 27 73 27 67 27 
79 106 75 26 80 25 80 26 78 27 
74 110 75 27 74 27 74 27 74 27 
87 102 85 25 84 26 88 26 89 23 
84 110 84 27 85 27 82 27 85 27 
79 107 82 26 82 25 76 27 74 27 
78 110 75 27 76 27 80 27 79 27 
79 108 81 26 81 27 75 26 79 27 
80 101 80 25 86 25 77 25 79 25 
87 109 89 27 93 26 85 27 84 27 
79 104 8o 25 80 26 76 26 79 25 
80 109 84 26 85 27 76 27 73 27 
97 94 96 19 100 26 91 25 101 23 
90 85 97 14 '92 22 85 22 88 25 
103 103 106 23 101 26 106 26 100 27 
104 58 91 11 111 12 109 17 101 17 
95 8o 93 16 96 21 95 19 96 23 
lo4 69 111 11 1o4 18 101 22 103 17 
99 60 io4 10 99 16 102 18 90 15 
94 58 103 10 96 16 92 15 88 16 
95 61 92 10 95 16 97 15 98 19 
97 34 119 4 93 9 82 8 103 13 
113 39 114 4 118 13 100 8 114 13 
99 44 102 7 99 13 101 13 95 11 
110 40 103 2 111 9 108 12 111 17 
118 26 132 6 96 5 116 5 121 9 
111 34 128 9 111 7 98 7 106 11 
105 51 117 6 100 14 107 14 102 16 
108 17 89 1 112 4 111 6 106 6 
125 17 131 4 122 3 112 5 135 5 
122 37 113 7 136 7 123 14 116 9 
112 29 
6 
102 5 127 10 103 7 107 7 
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TABLE 24. Regression analyses on difficulty and solution 
times for the Mill Hill data. Based on difficulty estimates 
for 15 items. Tabled data corrected to 2 decimal places. 
GROUP 
All 1 2 3 4 
Regression I, 
Coefficient 0.87 1.02 0.84 0.84 0.86 
S. E. Regr. 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.11 
Intercept 9.55 -1.43 13.49 10.60 9.09 
Correlation 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.91 
Z 3.25 0.25 3.2 2.0 1.27 
Z values for regression coefficients computed as: - 
Z= 
1-Reg. Coeff. 
S. E. Regr. 
Z values greater than 1.96 are significant at the 5% 
level (2-tail). 
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TABLE 25. Mean squares for a 3rd degree orthogonal 
polynomial analysis of variance on Mill Hill data 
for all subjects and the four sub-groups. Figures 






1054.24 1453.03 979.17 948.52 1030.43 
3.31 . 64 13.43 "06 9.40 
6.74 31.65 1.41 31.33 2.10 
Deviation (11) 2.20 7.29 3.55 8.99 18.17 
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The usual equation for the slope coefficient is given as 
b rXy S 
5y 
where rxy is the correlation 
S. and Sy are the variances of x and y. 
If SX = Sy =I (standard form), then 
b=r; (see McNemar 1969, p. 133-137) 
Finally, there is the problem of the linearity of the best fit line. The 
regression has to be shown to be predominantly linear, particularly if 
r is to be used as an index of slope. r itself is a limited index however 
as its magnitude is1inflated by the part-whole nature of the data. 
For the present data, the relationship between difficulty and Tr (Av) 
was examined using the B. M. D. 05R polynomial regression programme (Dixon 1970). 
It is used here as an indicator of the relationships, rather than as a valid 
statistical procedure for testing the viability of Furneaux's procedures. 
Item difficulty was used as the predictor in these analyses. The data for 
all subjects are plotted in Fig. 31 and for the four sub-groups in Fig-32. 
The results of the regression analyses are presented in Table 24. Also 
included in this table are the Z values for the test of departure from unit 
slope. 
From the data in this Table, it would appear that the departures from 
unit slope are not significant for groups 1 and 4, whereas those for all 
subjects and groups 2 and 3 are significant. In terms of Furneaux's model 
the data from group 1 and 4 appear to support his assertions about the 
relationship between difficulty and solution time. These data are based 
only on the coefficients for one of the two possible regression analyses. 
The correlations in this Table suggest that the data for all groups 
show only trivial departures from unit slope and indicate that if these data 
are transferred to standard scores, the outcome would be closer to Furneaux's 
criterion. However, these correlations are somewhat inflated by part-whole 
effects. 
A question not considered by Furneaux is the adequacy of the linear 
fit to the data. The use of a polynomial regression procedure enables an 
approximate assessment to be made. The index used is the mean square 
derived from the analysis of variance. These data were obtained using the 
BMD 05R polynomial regression programme. The outcome for all subjects and 
each of the four groups is presented in Table 25. From this Table it can be 
seen that in each case, the most substantial term is the linear. Higher 
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TABLE 26. Time difficulties for reference items for 
Groups M and F on the Matrices. Based on 12 and 15 
subjects, respectively. 
Item D Tr(M) DTr(F) 
2 . 8363 . 6897 
3 . 6809 . 4912 
4 . 9906 . 7210 
5 . 7608 . 6250 
6 1.0026 . 8206 
7 . 9413 . 7518 
9 1.0699 . 8487 
21 1.1594 . 8685 
25 1.2750 1.0266 
26 1.5090 1.2839 
232 
TABLE 27. Critical difficulties for Groups M and P 





88 1.6928 67 2.4006 
14 1.7.94 104 2.4006 
31 1.8161 60 1.9268 
19 2.1807 33 1.8261 
89 1.7662 23 1.7658 
70 2.0992 40 1.6176 
81 1.7060 37 1.8707 
72 1.6054 86 1.4553 
26 1.6354 28 1.8033 
109 2.1095 100 1.4522 
25 1.8682 62 1.6297 





TABLE 28. Results of a 4th degree polynomial regression 
analysis on item difficulties for Groups M and F on 
Matrices. Item difficulties x 100. 
Intercept -8.49 
Regr. Coeffic. 0.88 
Std. Err. 0.35 
Correlation 0.98 
Analysis of Variance for a 4th Degree Polynomial 
Source M. Mean Sq. F 
Linear 1 4232.32 359.56 
Quadratic 1 27.02 2.30 
Cubic 1 37.87 8.22 
Quartic 1 24.88 2.11 
Deviation 5 11.77 
TOTAL 9 
234 
TABLE 29. Item difficulties on the Matrices following 
10 iterations. 
ITERATION 1y STABLE ITEMS ITEMS WITH MULTIPLE 
DIFFICULTY VALUES 
Item No. of Subjects. Item Range Subs. 
1 35 10 1.6403 27 
2 . 
35 1.6315 25 
3 35 
4 35 11 1.8510 14 
5 34 1.8402 13 
6 35 
7 30 16 2.1027 5 
8 34 2.0330 3 
9 25 
12 1 29 1.5098 29 






















F-ratios for the linear components for all groups would be highly 
significant, none of the other ratios would be so. It would however be 
inappropriate to conduct formal statistical tests on these data. 
The conclusions from the foregoing analyses are presented at the end 
of the next chapter. 
4. Item Difficulty : Advanced Progressive Matrices: 
The procedures for scaling the Matrices items were identical to those 
adopted for the Mill Hill. Once the basic set of computer programmes is 
available, only minor modifications are needed to accommodate the Matrices 
data. This commentary will present the salient features of the Matrices 
analysis. 
63 subjects abandoned 2 or more items and the data from the 31 most 
continuant of these were selected for the preliminary analysis of the 
response items. 
The mean abandonment time on the Matrices was 1.8799 log secs. (On the 
Mill Hill this was 1.0739 log secs. ). In 'real' time, the respective means 
were 75.74 and 11.83 on the Matrices and Mill Hill. The distribution of 
abandonments is presented in Fig. 25. 
For the Matrices data, it was eventually possible to select 10 reference 
items (No's. 2,3,49 5,6,7,9,21,259 26) which approximated Furneaux's 
criteria. The difficulty values for these items for groups M and F are 
presented in Table 26. They were obtained from the data for 12 subjects, 
after 6 attempts. Group F data are based on 15 subjects. Critical 
difficulties for the subjects in these groups are presented in Table 27. 
From these Tables it can be seen that the greatest difficulty for a 
Group M reference item was 1.5090 and the lowest critical difficulty for 
any subject was 1.5876. For Group F. the respective values were 1.2839 and 
1.3402. These data satisfy step 12A of Stages I and II. 
The regression analysis produced a linear coefficient of . 
88 (s. e. . 05). 
From Table 28 which summarizes the analysis, it can be seen that only the linear 
component is substantial. 
The 
. °'i°terations of 
the Stage III analysis also produced three sets of 
item difficulties. The outcome of this stage is summarized in Table 29. 
31 items showed stable difficulty values, 4 varied as a function of the 
iteration process and 3 items were of indeterminate difficulty. 
The test for homogeneity of variance was carried out on the data for 
35 subjects whose abandonments were beyond the maximum item difficulty- 
A X2 of 51.41 (34 d. f. ) was found significant at p less than . 05, 
indicating that these variances are not homogeneous. Again, the meaningfulness 
236 
TABLE 30. Ts(Av) values for items and their D 
values. Matrices. Tr 
Item No. Subjects Ts(Av) DT 
r 
11 11 -. 0271 1.8456 
12 17 -: 0705 2.5559 
16 6 . 0835 2.0679 
19 22 . 2495 1.7937 
20 14 . 0041 2.0389 
23 22 -. 0385 1.6708 
24 19 . 0220 2.3308 
28 11 . 0898 2.3722 
30 2 -. 1151 1.9409 
31 6 -. 1126 1.9035 
32 23 -. 0110 2.2323 
TABLE 1. Matrices items. Tr(Av) values for all subjects and for the 
237 
4 sub-groups. Data X 100, corrected to 0 decimal places. Log times. 
GROUP All 123 If 
ITEM D Nb Tr(Av) N Tr(Av) N Tr(Av)I N Tr(Av) N Tr(Av) N 
1 105 35 lo4 108 102 27 log 25 106 27 103 
2 86 35 88 110 87 27 90 27 89 27 88 
3 69 35 69 110 67 27 72 27 69 27 69 
4 97 35 97 102 97 25 100 27 97 24 99 
5 81 34 80 110 81 27 77 27 81 27 81 
6 102 35 100 105 102 25 101 25 101 26 98 
7 95 30 96 109 96 26 98 27 95 27 97 
8 134 34 132 82 138 19 131 22 132 18 130 
9 107 25 108 103 114 25 105 26 111 25 105 
toy 164 26 161 94 161 19 158 26 166 24 163 
1ly 185 13 173 71 169 20 172 19 177 16 182 
12y 256 1 206 34 198 9 212 13 193 5 223 
13 124 33 120 97 117 25 119 25 121 22 126 
14 139 34 143 104 136 26 144 26 142 24 151 
15 150 30 148 79 146 19 144 21 156 18 151 
16y 207 4 206 45 200 8 198 15 215 11 220 
17 110 34 108 105 109 25 105 27 108 25 111 
18 144 32 142 100 144 27 136 26 139 22 151 
19 179 16 173 69 168 17 175 21 173 14 179 
toy 204 2 207 21 215 5 217 4 191 6 209 
21 111 35 117 109 115 27 110 27 111 27 112 
22 137 34 136 103 136 25 129 26 137 24 143 
23 167 21 168 70 170 18 159 18 169 16 172 
24y 233 3 208 44 193 9 203 9 205 11 225 
25 125 34 120 103 121 26 120 26 118 23 121 
26 149 35 148 1o6 144 26 149 27 151 24 152 
27y 191 8 182 66 185 15 179 19 170 15 195 
28y 237 1 198 25 174 5 199 4 201 6 207 
29y 151 29 150 91 152 22 145 24 147 21 158 
30 194 11 177 88 163 22 180 22 175 21 194 
31y 190 8 189 49 183 13 189 13 186 9 199 
32y 223 1 225 6 205 1 223 1 234 1 230 
33 103 35 102 108 98 26 105 27 104 26 106 
34 105 35 lo4 107 104 26 102 27 107 27 108 
35 98 35 97 110 99 27 98 27 98 27 98 
36 81 35 82 110 83 27 78 27 89 27 83 
37 121 35 119 105 115 26 113 26 127 27 123 
38 106 34 109 104 111 23 109 27 114 26 107 
238 
TABLE 32. Regression analysis on difficulty and solution 
times for Matrices data. Based on difficulty estimates 
for 27 items. Tabled data corrected to 2 decimal places. 
GROUP 
All 1 2 3 4 
Regr. Coeff. . 93 . 87 . 90 . 92 1.02 
S. E. Regr. . 02 . 04 . 02 . 03 . 02 
Intercept 7.29 13.87 9.58 9.99 -1.13 
Correlation . 99 . 98 . 99 . 98 . 99 
z 3.5 3.25 5.0 2.67 1.00 
Z greater than 1.96 significant at the 5% level (2-tail) 
TABLE 33. Mean squares for a2 degree polynomial analysis 
of variance on the Matrices data for all subjects and the 
four speed sub-groups. Figures in brackets are the d. f. 
GROUP 
All 1234 
Linear (1) 21018.99 18359.46 19821.93 20631.41 25513.66 
Quadratic (1) 66.08 287.46 6.02 136.97 3.58 
DEVIATION (24) 7.04 21.87 13.52 21.98 11.28 
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of such an analysis on these data is questionable, given that 16 of the 
35 variances were based on 2 items and a further seven on 3 items 
(Winer 1970). The X2 for 34 d. f. was computed from the formula given in 
Winer (1970, p. 665). 
For the Matrices items, it was also found that difficulty and Ts (Av) 
were uncorrelated. However, because of the comparatively few abandonments 
only 11 items contributed to this analysis, producing a correlation of 
-. 06. When those items based on the data for two or fewer subjects are 
excluded, the resulting correlation is approx . 2. Again, the 
meaningfulness of the coefficient is questionable, being based on data for 
8 subjects. These analyses are nevertheless consistent with Furneaux's 
specifications. The items entered into this analysis, together with the 
Ts (Av) values and item difficulties are presented in Table 30. 
As with the Mill Hill further attempts to refine the difficulty values 
of the Matrices items proved unsuccessful, for the same reasons. In the 
present instance, only 7 subjects remained with critical difficulties 
greater than the maximum difficulty for a reference problem. However, it 
was again possible to calculate new speed constants for all subjects. 
These constants were presented in Table 22. 
The "crucial" test on the Matrices data were carried out in the same 
way as for the Mill Hill. The same limitations apply to the Matrices 
analysis as was the case with the Mill Hill. The data for this test are 
presented in Table 31. All analyses were carried out on items other than 
those marked 'Y' in this Table. The 'Y' items are those of uncertain 
difficulty or those whose Tr (Av) values were based on less than 10 subjects. 
27 items remained for the analysis. The outcome of the regression 
analysis is presented in Table 32. 
The regression coefficients for all groups as well as the total sample 
are very close to Furneaux's criterion of unit slope. However, as suggested 
by the Z values reproduced in the table, all coefficients except that for 
group 4 show significant departures from unit slope. None of the 
correlations, as indicies of slope for standard scores with unit variance, 
show substantial departures from unity, the lowest correlation being . 98. 
The polynomial regression analyses show that by far the largest 
component is the linear. Although cubic trends were not computed, all the 
residual mean squares, as well as those for quadratic effects are very 
small compared to those for the linear component. The various mean squares 
are presented in Table 33. 
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5. Discussion: 242 
The present investigation represented an attempt to examine the 
applicability of Furneaux's scaling procedures to sets of data from two 
different tests. It was noted that some of the crucial empirical findings 
reported by Furneaux were unsupported by relevant statistical tests. In 
the process of conducting the present investigation, it was observed that 
despite their seeming rigour and detail, Furneaux's specifications for the 
scaling procedures contain some ambiguities. In implementing these 
procedures, a number of problems arose, the most important of which was 
undoubtedly the substantial data loss as the analysis proceeded. As a 
consequence of this loss, the analysis could not be taken to its conclusion. 
A further consequence was that certain essential statistical tests could 
not be applied because of the ensuing violation of the underlying 
assumptions. The analyses undertaken in this part of the study were 
undoubtedly in violation of these assumptions and it must therefore be 
emphasized that the conclusions must be qualified. 
On the basis of the analyses reported in the last two chapters, it 
was found that the logarithm of solution time for correct responses is 
linearly related to Furneaux's operational definition of item difficulty. 
The slope of the line relating these two indices approximates unity when 
the regression coefficients are computed from the raw scores (log time). 
If thes4scores are expressed in standard form with unit variance, then, as 
indexed by the correlation between them, the approximation to unit slope is 
even better. It should also be noted that this relationship emerged even 
though the estimates of item difficulty were not as refined as they could 
have been had no appreciable data loss arisen. 
The regression coefficients for the 8 sub-groups ranged from 0.84 to 
1.02 on the two tests. Although only 3 of the 8 coefficients did not differ 
significantly from unit slope, it has to be noted that these slopes were 
based on a proportion of the items and that the difficulty values are not 
as refined as the values computed by Furneaux. With these limitations in 
mind, it is suggested that these values are sufficiently close to unity to 
provide some support for Furneaux's assertions. It could of course be 
argued that Furneaux did not attempt a statistical assessment and that his 
use of arbitrary values for difficulty could easily have shifted the slopes 
of his data to unity. 
This, in fact, is a major problem of Furneaux's approach which has 
major implications for the speed/difficulty relationship. It is possible 
that for the lower difficulty region, the relationship with speed is linear 
but that for the upper difficulty region the slope is different, so that 
overall, the regression line is curvelinear. If the researcher believes 





























































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 34a. Abandonments on the Mill Hill and Matrices 
No. of Frequency 
Abandonments Mill Hill Matrices 
0 14 18 
1 13 29 
2 13 . 18 3 10 . 18 4 14 16 
5 10 4 
6 5 4 
7 11 1 
8 










. 0 19 f 
TABLE 34b. Distributions of total scores at the 
upper end of the Mill Hill and Matrices. 
Mill Hill Matrices 
Total Score f Total Score f 
33 1 38 0 
32 2 37 0 
31 5 36 1 
30 4 35 7 
29 4 34 ii 
28 1 33 8 
TABLE 35. Abandonments on the Mill Hill and Matrices. 
Number of abandonments on each test associated with 








1 2+ TOTALS 
4 4 14 
2 9 13 
23 50 83 
29 63 110 
range have to be subjectively estimated, then it is possible to chose 
difficulty values which give an overall linear slope, whereas in reality 
the slope overall is curvelinear. In view of the earlier comments of both 
Furneaux and Brierley, and the observations in the present study, it is 
suggested that as yet there are insufficient grounds for asserting that 
over the full range of difficulty values, the speed/difficulty relationship 
is linear. Further, the present evidence that the most substantial portion 
of variance is linear does not contradict this view. It will be recalled 
that the test was undertaken only on a proportion of the items and that 
these were in the lower difficulty range. 
In the cqurse of the analyses reported here, it became obvious that 
a major factor in this study was the loss of data due to insufficient 
abandonments. This problem is discussed in the next chapter. 
6. A 'Post Hoc' Analysis of Abandonments: 
a. Introduction: 
The frequencies with which subjects showed different numbers of 
abandonments are given in Tables 34 and 344. The distributions for these 
data were shown in Figs. 24 and 25. 
The number of abandonments associated with each item of the Mill Hill 
and Matrices were given in Tables 11 and 14 and the mean and standard 
deviation of the log abandonment times in Tables 12,13,15 and 16. 
On the Mill Hill and Matrices, about 24w ' and 42% respectively, of 
data 
the subjects abandoned 1 or 0 items. As a consequence, the Available for 
difficulty scaling were substantially reduced. This, as well as a number 
of other factors led to only approximate values for item difficulty. The 
purpose of this chapter is to examine some of-the main factors likely to have bee 
responsible for the premature termination of the difficulty scaling. It is 
important to note here that in the only other study which used Furneaux's 
procedures, that of Brierley (1969), difficulty scaling could not be 
completed, probably for the same reasons as affected the present study. 
In this chapter, two general problems will be considered. The first 
concerns the possible reasons for the reduced abandonments data and the 
second, the likely effects of these factors on the item difficulty 
estimates. 
b. Factors likely to have influenced the number of abandonments: 
i. One of the factors likely to account for the low level of 
abandonments is the 'easiness' of the items relative to the ability 
level of the subjects: if the majority of the items are 'easy', then 
there would be no need to abandon attempts at solution. An examination 
of the total score distributions for both tests would not support this 
246 
contention. Both distributions have 'tails'. On the Mill Hill, only 
one subject got all answers correct whereas no subjects got all items 
correct on the Matrices. The 'tails' of both distributions are given 
in Table 34b. 
ii. In discussing why he encountered a limited number of abandonments, 
Brierley (1969) suggested that with paper and pencil tests (such as 
those used by Furneaux), subjects may well feel that they can return to 
an omitted item, even though this is discounted in the instructions. 
This is however unlikely to be the case with Furneaux's study because his 
subjects had to enter a timing record after each item and this must to 
some extent have discouraged them from returning to abandoned items. 
Further, although Furneaux does not present any evidence on this point, 
he does state that "once an item had been abandoned it could not be 
attempted again". With automated presentation, as was made clear in the 
instructions given to subjects, a"". response is irrevocable. Brierley 
(1969) reports " -- many subjects indicated that in these circumstances 
it was better to press-an equally available answer button which may well 
turn out to be the right one" (p. 201). The problem of guessing, and 
related to it, the multiple choice format of the tests, are implicit in 
these comments, and will be considered next. 
It should be noted that the standard procedures (Thorndike 1971, 
p. 59-61) for introducing corrections for guessing in multiple choice 
tests are not relevant here. These procedures apply to total scores 
and cannot cope with individual items, the focus of this type of research. 
It is apparent, with hindsight, that the instructions were not 
sufficiently explicit and prohibitive with regard to guessing. In 
Brierley's (1969) study, subjects were told 
"Try your best to work out each test but if 
you decide you can't find the answer, you 
can press the'"don't know" button -- 11 (p. xxvi). 
In the present study, the relevant section of the instructions on 
both tests. stated: 
"If at any stage you feel uncertain about your 
answer, or if you would like to go on to the 
next problem, press the red button ------ 
And remember that if you are at all uncertain 
of your answer or that you would like to leave 
the problem, press the red button --- 11 
It is obvious from both excerpts that guessing was not strongly 
discouraged, although the present instructions appear, superficially 
at least, to have been more prohibitive. It is of course possible 
that the subjects who did not abandon items which were incorrect may have felt that the solutions offered were correct. Unfortunately, the 
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circumstances of testing did not permit them to be questioned on this 
point. 
In future studies of this type, it will be necessary to make the 
instructions much more explicit. It may also be possible to introduce 
a system for controlling guessing, as is done in research on signal 
detection thresholds. However, such a modification would need to be 
thoroughly tested beforehand as there may well be systematic 
individual differences in response to prohibitions and inducements. 
One alternative that should be given serious consideration here 
is the introduction of some method for assessing subjective certainty 
that the answer is correct. It may then be possible to discriminate 
among correct, incorrect, abandoned and 'have a go' answers. 
The type of experimental situation in both Brierley's and the 
present study was not amenable to either reinforcing the initial 
instructions or to monitoring the subject's certainty. In both 
investigations, subjects were seated in sound insulated test rooms and 
it would have been disruptive to intrude, even if such intrusions did 
not produce other complications such as the timing of the intrusion and 
eliminating it's effects from the data. 
iii. The use of a multiple-choice format may have been important in 
producing an 'abandonments problem'. In the present study the Mill Hill 
provided 6 alternatives, the Matrices 8, with the respective 7th and 9th 
alternatives being 'abandonment'. Brierley's test offered 14 alternatives, 
one of which was abandonment. With the letter-series, the theoretical 
maximum number of alternatives is 26 but in practice, the item content 
serves to narrow this range considerably, depending on the problem. 
Given that a guess is less likely to be correct the greater the number 
of alternatives, the larger the number of alternatives the more likely 
it is that guessing will be discouraged. It is possible that because 
of the number of alternatives for his items, Furneaux did not encounter 
any substantial problems with guessing. Certainly any future study of 
this type should consider carefully the choice of answering procedure. 
iv. The motivation of subjects to persist is an important and subtle 
factor in the 'abandonments problem', in that it has implications for 
the peculiar scaling procedure described by Furneaux. 
In the description of his study, Furneaux emphasizes that high 
motivation is important. As he states: 
"Instructions were designed to encourage high 
motivation, and the evidence suggests that this 
was achieved. Stress was laid on the need to 
persevere with items found to be difficult, 
rather than attempt to reach the end of the test". 
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Parenthically it should be noted that the instructions he gave were 
not reported and that he did not provide any of the evidence alluded 
to. Given the group test situation, one might also question whether or 
not subjects will persist when all around them they can see others 
proceeding through the test. Overt timing is also unlikely to facilitate 
persistence. 
Following Furneaux's comments, both Brierley and the present writer 
devised instructions to encourage persistence. Brierley's subjects 
were instructed thus: 
"There is no special need to hurry and you can go 
at the speed you fancy best but don't waste time 
on anything" (p. xxvi). 
In the present study, subjects were told 
It -- you can take as much time as you like to find 
the answer. Do not feel that you need to hurry". 
In considering the role of motivation, Brierleyuggests that the 
use of an automated procedure in conjunction with instructions designed 
to encourage motivation to persist, led to comparatively long solution 
times for some subjects, thereby raising the upper critical difficulty 
level. Although subjects in this study did not spend as long (in the 
absolute sense) on items as did Brierley's subjects, at least one spent 
nearly 8 minutes on one item and it was not uncommon to have solution 
times as long as 4 minutes. Such times need of course to be considered 
against the more common range of solution times of a few seconds to 
1 minute. 
In-so-far as instructions and automated procedures are condusive 
to high continuance, they produce certain consequences for scaling, 
notably, they will tend to increase the time difficulty of the items. 
This in turn means that the lower bound of the unambiguous abandonments 
range is raised. Because of this, the number of abandonments that could 
have been unambiguous will be reduced. The ensuing loss of data then 
has the consequence of making further refinements in scaling impossible 
because further refinement depends crucially on the availability of a 
sufficient number of unambiguous abandonments. 
Another consequence of the instructions, in-so-far as they are 
effective, will be to increase the amount of time that a subject is 
likely to spend on an item. Given that he follows instructions, the 
more likely it is that a correct solution will be forthcoming, reducing 
further the chance of an abandonment. 
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Another factor likely to be of importance in individual testing, 
particularly if it is automated and therefore private, is that the 
testee is not subjected to the implicit pressure to work quickly that 
is present in group testing. That is, seeing other subjects completing 
the test, turning pages more rapidly etc. might have diverse effects on 
solution and abandonment times that are not present in individual 
testing. The extent to which such pressures affected subjects, and 
hence their responses in Furneaux's study cannot be known. It is however 
possible that the group as opposed to private individual testing may 
have a differential effect on the magnitude of solution or abandonment times. 
v. It is likely that in both this and Brierley's study, the number of 
subjects tested was a further important factor in the incomplete scaling. 
Given the intricate mechanics which lead to data loss during Furneaux-type 
scaling, it is obviously important to test a very large number of subjects. 
Furneaux began with 235 subjects. It is not known how many remained to 
contribute to the item difficulties, but he at least appeared satisfied 
that the numbers were sufficient to produce reliable difficulty values. 
The fact that he was able to test this large a number of subjects shows 
two important limitations of automated individual testing. These are 
restricted mobility and restriction to individual testing. Whereas 
Furneaux was not confined to one physical setting and could test groups, 
both Brierley and the present writer had to bring subjects to the 
laboratory and test them individually. Future- researchers will have 
to balance the greater precision and flexibility of automated testing 
against the more economic procedure of group testing, which inevitably 
carries with it more uncontrollable factors. With the development of the 
hardware and software for remote access to a central computer, together 
with microcircuitry and miniature video screens, it might well be possible 
in the future to test more than one subject at a time, thereby over- 
coming some of the limitations of automated testing. 
c. The effects of abandonments on item difficulty: 
A major question which needs to be considered is the extent to which the 
exclusion of the 0 or 1 abandonments subjects has influenced the outcome of 
the analysis. (It will be recalled that such subjects were excluded from 
scaling exercise). Two aspects of this question will be considered here. 
The first aspect concerns the extent to which the same subjects were {or 
responsible the comparatively large numbers of 'no abandonments'. The 
relevant data are summarized in Table 35. From this Table it can be seen 
that only 6 subjects abandoned 0 items on both tests. It can also be seen 
that there is a low level of predictability working from either test to the 
other. For example, ö f the 13 subjects who only abandoned 1 item on the 
Mill Hill, 2 showed/abandonments, 2 showed 1 and 9 showed 2 or more Matrices 
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abandonments. This observation is further supported by the correlation 
of . 21 between abandonments on 
these two tests (p less than . 05). Although 
the correlation is significant for the N of 110, its value as a predictor 
is minor. 
Assuming the validity of Furneaux's analysis, there is of course no 
reason to expect consistency across tests, unless it has been demonstrated 
beforehand that items in each are of equal difficulty and that subjects are 
of equal speed. 
The second aspect to be considered is the extent to which the exclusion 
of subjects with 1 or 0 abandonments affected the crucial test proposed by 
Ferneaux. The most appropriate way to do this is to contrast subjects 
excluded from the analysis with those who were included in the computation 
of both DTr and Tr (Av), the two variables used in the crucial test. To do 
this systematically would be exceedingly cumbersome. Different numbers of 
subjects, even those with abandonments data, contributed to the difficulty 
estimates for each item. Similarly, different subjects contributed to the 
Tr (Av) values for each item. Thus, for reasons inherent in Furneaux's 
scaling procedures, an exercise of this type would be complex and probably 
as time consuming as the scaling exercise itself. As it is doubtful that 
such an exercise would have contributed anything of significance in any case, 
this analysis was not undertaken. 
d. Conclusions: 
In this chapter, an attempt has been made to consider some of the reasons 
for the premature cessation of scaling using Furneaux's procedures. A number 
of factors have been discussed including the problem of guessing, the effects 
of motivating instructions, the use of individual testing and the numbers of 
subjects tested. The extent to which each contributed to the abrupt ending 
cannot be known: however, it is suggested that each probably had some 
impact. A further question considered was the predictability of abandonment 
from one test to the other. Although the correlation between abandonments 
on both tests was statistically significant, it was of such a low order as 
to be of very limited value. Finally, given the nature of the scaling 
procedures, it is very difficult to know the effects of the exclusion of 
subjects for different aspects of the analysis. 
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VIII. AN IINESTIGATION OF SPEED, PERSONALITY AND TEST PERFORMANCE: 
This section of the thesis is devoted to an analysis of the data on 
personality and test performance. 
The original intention of this part of the study was to use the data 
on speed, accuracy and continuance to examine personality-related 
functioning on tests of intelligence. As a result of the incomplete Furneaux 
scaling, only speed constants could be derived for each subject. The 
relationships between speed, several other variables to be described shortly, 
and personality measures are considered in this part of the thesis. These 
variables were derived from the procedures described earlier. 
1. Data: 
The original data set available from this study was reduced to the set 
presented in Table 36. The reasons for the reduction are given in this 
chapter. The distributions for the variables were given in Figs. 14 to 30. 
The distributions are based on 110 subjects. 
Age: 
This variable was transformed using the square root transformation to 
achieve a closer approximation to normality. This was necessitated by the 
procedures used ;n the statistical analysis (see section on Statistical 
Assumptions in the Data Analysis). 
P-score: 
For the analysis involving the use of the personality variables, the 
P-score was excluded. There were two main reasons for exclusion. Firstly, 
the items defining P in the P. E. N. were in the process of being refined and 
the scale was not yet standardized. Secondly, there are no specific 
hypotheses implicating P. 
E, N, and L-scores: 
Derived directly from the P. E. N. 
Total Correct Mill Hill and Matrices: 
Raw scores for the subjects on these tests. 
The version of the Matrices used in the present study cannot of course 
provide an I. Q. because it's structure is unlike that of either of the 
original tests which provided the items. The common techniques for 
computing I. Q's from raw scores involve a linear transformation to a 
deviation quotient with an arbitrary mean and standard deviation, or by a 
linear transformation from the percentile equivalents of the raw scores. 
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TABLE 36. Final list of variables used in the present 
study. 
VARIABLE CODE* TRANSFORMATION 
AGE AGE SQ. ROOT 
EXTRAVERSION EXTVSN - 
NEUROTICISM NEUROT - 
'LIE' SCALE LIESCL SQ. ROOT 
TOTAL CORRECT, MILL HILL HTOTAL - 
TOTAL CORRECT, MATRICES MTOTAL - 
TOTAL TIME, MILL HILL HTIME LOG x 100 
TOTAL TIME, MATRICES MTII4E 
SPEED, MILL HILL HSPEED x 100 
SPEED, MATRICES MSPEED 
ABANDONMENTS, MILL HILL HABTS SQ. ROOT 
ABANDONMINTSV MATRICES MABTS it 
SLOPE SLOPE xL 1OO 
SIMPLE REACTION TIME 1/1-RT 
1 of 2 CHOICE TIME 1/2-RT 
1 of 4 CHOICE TIME 1/4-RT 
1 of 8 CHOICE TIME 1/8-RT 
ERRORS, MILL HILL HERROR SQ. ROOT 
ERRORS, MATRICES MERRROR SQ. ROOT 
*These codes identify the variables in the data tables. 
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It is the common practice for tests which-span a wide age range to set up 
norms for each age or age-span, in effect, adjusting the scores for age 
differences in performance. In the present study, only raw scores have 
been used in the primary data. However, as will be seen later, these 
scores were subjected to an age adjustment through partial correlation and 
such adjustments produce data which in effect correspond to I, Q. A similar 
procedure was used for the sub-set of items that comprised the Mill Hill 
test used in this study. 
Total Time on Mill-Hill and Matrices: 
The total raw time taken by each subject to complete the tests, 
irrespective of type of solution, was computed and the log taken. Each 
log score was then multiplied by 100. 
Speed Mill Hill and liatrices. 
KTr from the Furneaux scaling study. Each subject's KTr multiplied 
x 100. 
Abandonments Mill Hill and Matrices: 
Raw scores for the subjects. 
Slope and Reaction Times: 
Data from the pre-and post-reaction time series were combined and 
averaged. As the distributionsof these times appear to be normal (see 
Figs. 27 to 30) no transformations were necessary. 
To compute the slopestfor the best fit straight line, a modified 
version of BMD 05R (Dixon 1970) was used. This computed the slope of the 
best fit line though 1/1,1/2,1/4,1/8 means for each subject, following 
the procedure of Roth (1964) and Frank (1963). 
The intercepts for the best fitting line were also computed for each 
subject but were eliminated from the final analysis because they correlated 
+ . 97 with simple, reaction time. 
Errors on Mill Hill and Matrices: 
Raw number ofeerrorsw transformed by square root. 
The final data set consisted of 19 variables. 
2. Reliabilities: 
The arrangements for testing, in which-subjects were paid to participate 
in several studies apart from the present investigation, did not allow 
proper reliability estimates to be made for the main variables in this 
study. However, it is possible, from other sources, to get some idea of 
the level of reliability of a number of the variables. 
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of the P. E. N., the E and N scales of the E. P. I. have re-test reliabilities 
of . 
88 and . 
84 after 1 year and the L scale is usually above . 70 (Eysenck 
and Eysenck 1964). 
The Mill Hill is a compound test consisting of two components, a 
written definition section and a multiple choice section. No reliabilities 
are given for the separate sections but the parallel form coefficient 
(Form I and II Senior) is quoted as . 98 for adults 
(Raven 1965b). 
The Matrices test used in the present study was made up of items from 
various versions of the Matrices but predominantly of items from sets I and 
II of the Advanced series in the revised version (Raven 1965a). Raven 
reports a retest coefficient of . 91 
(interval not specified) for a group 
of 243 adult students. While this may well be an over-estimate, it is 
unlikely that the level of reliability is so low as to make the use of the 
present test scores unacceptable. 
It is not possible to know the extent of unreliability of the 
Furneaux speed scores. 
Although the reaction time data showed high inter-correlations between 
pre-and post-testing (ranging from . 
83 to . 90), these correlations can only 
give an approximate indication of. the likely reliability of the measures 
used in the data analysis. 
The limited information on the reliability of the variables must 
detract somewhat from the findings of this study but it is doubtful that 
the measures used here are unreliable to the extent of making this a 
meaningless piece of research. However, the absence of such data does mean 
that the various correlations cannot be corrected for attenuation. While 
this does not matter for prediction purposes (Mc Nemar 1969' does have 
implications for some of the theoretical aspects of this study. This issue 
will be discussed further in relevant sections of this thesis. 
3. Number of Subjects: 
The Furneaux scaling study utilized data from 110 subjects. For the 
second part of this study, 8 subjects with high L-scores were excluded. 
The decision to do so was based on the supposed nature of high L, namely, 
that subjects with high L-scores are responding inappropriately on the 
P. E. N. The cut-off point was decided upon following an examination of the 
L-score distribution (Fig. 17). From this histogram it can be seen that the 
distribution drops sharply for L-scores of 7 or more. Only 8 subjects had 
scores greater than or equal to 7 and they were excluded. Thus data from 
102 subjects are reported on here. 
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It should be noted that the distributions are based on the original 
N of 110, but their form is unlikely to be appreciably altered by the 
exclusions. 
4. Data Analysis : Procedures and Assumptions: 
All data in this study were analysed using the University of London 
CDC 6600 computer. The main programme for the analysis was "Multivariance" 
(Finn 1968), adapted for use in this machine by Owen White, Institute of 
Psychiatry. "Multivariance" is a multi-purpose package which can undertake 
univariate and multivariate statistical analyses, including univariate and 
multivariate analyses of variance, covariance, regression and discriminant 
analysis. It can cope with a variety of designs, including repeated 
measures. 
The multivariate models underlying these techniques have been developed 
by Bock and others (Bock 1963, Bock and Haggard 1968). The particular 
programmes used for the present data analysis have a number of advantages 
over similar packages, particularly because they make fewer assumptions in 
the analysis of repeated measures (Bock 1963) and because of the internal 
facilities of the package which allow a wide variety of data transformations. 
As with the univariate case, multivariate procedures are developed on 
assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance. However, while there 
is sufficient evidence that the univariate F-test is fairly robust 
(Bonneau 1960; Box 1953; Jones 1966), there is still uncertainty as to the 
robustness of multivariate procedures (Jones 1966), mainly because it is 
still very difficult to carry out appropriate simulation studies. 
Cooley and Lohnes (1971) in discussing the assumption of multivariate 
normality suggest that if it is really necessary, transformations should be 
used if data depart drastically from normality. They suggest transformations 
on the marginal distributions but even if these are normal, this still does 
not ensure multivariate normality. To date, there are no suitable tests of 
this assumption. 
The multivariate analogue of the univariate homogeneity of variance 
assumption takes the form of assuming equality of population dispersions 
in the form of equal variance - covariance matrices (Cooley and Lohnes 1971). 
These authors note that many research workers tend to ignore the issue of 
homogeneity on the grounds that the multivariate test for equality of 
vectors "is probably fairly robust under departures from its assumptions" 
(p, 228). Bock (1966) describes a multivariate test for a common covariance 
matrix, which is a multivariate extension of Bartlett's test. 
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It would seem to the present writer that while caution is obviously 
necessary, the writings on multivariate procedures appear to manifest the 
same type of sensitivity which was apparent when univariate techniques were 
being developed. The Bartlett test was used to provide reassurance and it 
is likely that the multivariate homogeneity test would be used in the same 
way. In this context, it is worth quoting Box 
(1953): 
"To make the preliminary test on variances is rather 
like putting to sea in a rowing boat to find out 
whether conditions are sufficiently calm for an 
ocean liner to leave. portl ". 
Winer (1970, p. 96) has also made the point that at least for the 
univariate case, almost all tests for homogeneity tend to be sensitive to 
departures from normality (p. 96). 
While the majority of the variables in this study show distributions 
which appear to approximate normality, others do not. The latter have been 
subjected to log transformations following Winer's (1970) recommendation. 
However, such transformations do not remove the problem of non-normality, 
and this must remain as one of the limitations to the present analysis. 
Further, no attempt was made to assess for homogeneity of variance and this 
too, must remain as an important limitation, even though in both instances, 
it is not yet possible to know the full implications of any of the violations. 
Jones (1966) distinguishes between carrying out an analysis, for which no 
distributional assumptions are necessary, and generalising from a completed 
analysis to a specific population, for which such assumptions are essential. 
The sampling of subjects for this study, as noted previously, as well as the 
possible violations of certain statistical assumptions must inevitably 
reduce the generalisability of the present results. 
A further analysis problem with the present data is that the variables 
constitute, in, effect, a form of repeated measurements. The problem with 
such measures is that the errors are correlated making the error term in 
the F-ratio inappropriate. In univariate (ANOVA) analyses, this problem 
requires an assumption of constant correlation between trials. This 
assumption is particularly difficult to satisfy in repeated measures data 
because of the tendency for correlations to be higher for temporally close 
measures than it is for more distant measures. The assumption is even more 
difficult to satisfy for multivariate (MAtNOWA) problems because it is highly 
unlikely that there will be a constant correlation for a variety of4dependent 
variables. One of the major advantages of "Multivariance" is that it imposes 
no restriction on the correlational pattern (Bock 1963; Bock and Haggard 1968). 
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ANOVA and a 'step-down' F-ratio for each dependent variable. Whereas the 
ANOVA F is not independent, the step-down F is, making it the only 
appropriate test for data of the type generated by this study. There is 
however a further problem which needs to be considered here. Normally, 
the step-down F cLchieves independence by partialling out of trial 2, the 
variance for trial 1; trial 3 effects are tested by removing the variance 
associated with trials 1 and 2 etc., removing one degree of freedom with 
each step. For the present data, the step-down F is not exactly appropriate 
in that there are no a priori grounds for sequencing the data. While there 
are procedures for overcoming this problem ( e. g. the use of MANOVA profile 
analysis procedures - Bock 1963), it would be even more difficult to satisfy 
the necessary assumptions. Hence it is necessary to retain the step-down F 
usually applied with repeated measures designs (O. White - personal 
communication). 
The details of the analysis are presented later. At this point it is 
necessary to note that as a consequence of the factors referred to above, 
restrictions are placed on the generalisability of the results. 
A number of the hypotheses tested in this study depend on the 
interpretation of correlations. A statistical problem arises in doing so 
because as Hays (1963) has pointed out, the usual test of significance 
assumes independence in sampling. It is also to be expected that some 
proportion of coefficients will be 'significant' by chance. Finally, if 
the correlations among a set of variables are fixed, then their correlations 
with other variables has a predetermined lower limit (Hays 1963). 
In the present study, the goal was not a "search for significance" but 
the testing of a number of predetermined theoretically based hypothesis 
derived from a well-developed theory. Under such conditions, Hays (1963) 
suggests that the correlations should be interpreted with 'considerable 
latitude" (p. 557). Quite what he means is not very clear. It has been 
pointed out by many writers (Rozeboom 1960; Lykken 1968; Eysenck 1960; 
Plutchik 1974), that interpretation depends partly on significance levels 
and partly on theory-based expectations. (This applies to correlational as 
well as to other statistical analyses). Further, the interpretation of 
correlations depends on the number of subjects, the likely influence of 
attenuation due to unreliability, part-whole effects, and range restriction 
which can arise as a consequence of sampling. In the present study, one and 
two-tail tests will be considered and the traditional 5% probability values 
will be given and taken into account alongside the other factors when the 
results are interpreted. 
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A number of research hypotheses could not be tested because of the 
failure to complete the Furneaux scaling. For example, it would be expected 
that for individuals similar in speed and accuracy, those who are more 
continuant should achieve more correct solutions than those who are less 
continuant on a given set of problems. Similarly, for such a set of problems, 
those who are fast (as defined by KTr) should achieve more rapid solutions 
than those who are slow. (This hypothesis would not be circular as KTr is 
based on a small sub-set-of the total sample of problems). 
The present study was originally conceived so that the testing of those 
and other hypotheses would be feasible. The failure of the Furneaux scaling 
meant, inevitably, that the full set could not be tested. Instead, the 
present study could only focus on a much narrower set of conjectures and a 
set of data which, viewed against the earlier criticisms of such data, are 
less than adequate. 
The following hypotheses remain and arise directly from the earlier 
reviews of the theoretical and research literature. 
I. "Speed of information processing" will correlate negatively with 
intelligence. 
Operationally, it is hypothesized that the measure of slope will show 
reliable negative correlations with the age corrected scores on the Mill 
Hill and Matrices Tests. 
This hypothesis is less secure for the Mill Hill than it is for the 
Matrices. Eysenck (1967a) describes the Mill Hill as providing 
"Vocabulary scores which are clearly the product of learning, and which 
usually correlate very highly with other I. Q. tests". Cattell (1971) 
and Horn(1970) however, class vocabulary as one of the measures which 
defines crystallized intelligence. Vocabulary is part of the 'v : ed' 
complex and although it is differentiated from 'g' some vocabulary 
variance is removed by 'g', (Vernon 1961). Thus, if slope does correlate 
with Mill Hill Scores, it is hypothesized that this will be a weaker 
relationship than that for the Matrices. 
II. Cognitive speed and speed of information processing will correlate 
positively and reliably. 
Operationally, cognitive speed is defined by the KTr". This 
hypothesis follows from Eysenck's (1967a) assertions about cognitive 
speed and speed of information processing. 
III. In-so-far as 'quickness' on cognitive tasks is an individual 
characteristic, there should be a reliable correlation between the indices 
of speed derived from the two tests. 
The correlationsbetween KTr on the Mill Hill and Matrices provide the 
main data for this test. 
In-so-far as speed is related to ability, there should be reliable IV. 
relationships between indices of speed and I. Q. 
This hypothesis would predict negative correlations between the 
Furneaux speed scores on each test and the I. Q's. obtained from the 
tests, given the direction of scoring of each of the speed indices. 
V. There will be differences in vocabulary as a function of E, with 
introverts showing a better performance than extraverts. 
This hypothesis can be tested by examining the relationship between 
Mill Hill scores and E. 
VI. There will be no relationship between E and intelligence. 
This hypothesestcan be tested by examining the relationship between 
Matrices scores and E. 
Hypotheses V and VI follow from comments in Eysenck (1967a). 
VII. The total time spent on the Mill Hill and Matrices will show a 
negative relationship with E. 
This hypothesis is proposed again following Eysenck (1967a). He 
states that where choice is available, extraverts opt for speed, 
introverts for accuracy. The instructions given to the subjects made 
it explicit that there was no need to hurry and there was no obvious 
way in which subjects could know they were being timed. Further, no 
'end-spurt' is likely. to have occurred as subjects could not see the 
slides in the magazine of the slide projector. Finally, the individual 
test situation meant that subjects could not pace themselves against 
others. 
VIII. There will be no relationship with N for any of the test scores. 
IX. There will be no relationship between N and the time taken to 
complete each test. 
Hypotheses VIII and IX should be supported given that no deliberate 
stress was introduced in the instructions. (See comments on hypothesis 
VII above). It is possible however that some subjects may have been 
"test sensitive" and as this, was not monitored during the study, these 
hypotheses are not proposed as strong tests of the theory. 
X. Speed constants from the Mill Hill and Matrices will be linearly 
related to E with a negative sign. 
The two hypotheses proposed here again stem directly from 
Eysenck (1967a). 
XI. Introverts will make fewer errors on the Mill Hill and Matrices 
than will extraverts. 
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TABLES 37 -39: 
TABLE 37. Means for the study variables. 
TABLE 38. Standard deviations of the study variables. 
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While this prediction follows from Eysenck 
(1967a), the present 
test of this hypothesis is not adequate. Ideally, the-items should 
be of equal difficulty for such comparisons 
to be made. This was the 
original intention which had to be relinquished 
following the incomplete 
item-difficulty scaling reported earlier. However, it is possible to 
control statistically for a number of other variables 
(age, total score 
on Mill Hill and Matrices etc. 
) which normally need to be controlled 
if such an hypothesis is to be tested. 
XII. Introverts will abandon fewer items on the Mill Hill and Matrices 
than will extraverts. 
These hypotheses also require properly calibrated items in order 
to be adequately tested. Hence these hypotheses are also proposed as 
weak tests of the theo'ry. 
6. Preliminary Analysis: 
The means, standard deviations and product moment correlations for the 
full data set of 19 variables are presented in Tables 37,38 and 39 
respectively. 
For the table of correlations, any coefficient greater than . 193 is 
significantly greater than zero at the 51% 
(two-tail) level and any 
coefficient greater than . 256 is significant at 
the 1% level (two-tail). 
These levels are based on the large sample test 
(McNemcr 1969) which is 
valid for samples greater than 100. The standard error of 
'r' for the present 
sample is . 099. For one-tail 
tests, the respective 5% and 1% magnitudes of 
'r' are . 164 and . 233. 
A later table (Table 42) presents the correlations with age partialled 
out. The standard error for these coefficients is . 100 which is effectively 
the same as that for the raw correlations, so that the same levels can be 
used for both sets of correlations. 
From the correlations in Table 39 it can be seen that 12 of the variables 
showed a significant correlation with age (two-tail). These variables were 
N, totals correct on Mill Hill and Matrices, abandonments on the Mill Hill, 
slope, all reaction time measures and errors on both tests. 
The correlation between N and age was anticipated. Eysenck and Eysenck (1964) 
reported such a finding in the E. P. I. norms. Table 40 shows the age trend 
for N in groups comparable to the present sample. While the Eysencks found 
a significant correlation between E and age, no such correlation was found in 
the present data. However, when groups comparable to present subjects were 
examined, no consistent relationship between E and age was found in the 
standardization subjects. This is apparent from Table 40. 
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TABLE 40. Ep Nq and age. Data from E ysenck and Eysenck 
(1964); 
S. B. G. Eysenck - unpublished norms. Corrected 
to nearest 
whole number. 
E. P. I. 
E N AGE 
Subjects Mean s. d. Mean s. d. Mean s. d. 
Student teachr. 27 8 23 8 20 6 
Students 25 8 21 9 21 5 
Clerks 24 8 19 8 35 12 
Civil Servants 27 8 18 11 35 11 
Managerial 25 8 16 9 44 11 
P. E. N. (Males) 
Students 13 4 94 
Total* 13 4 74 
*Excluding stud ents. Ages not given in norms. 
TABLE 41. Means and standard deviations for E. and N in the 
normative group, and for E, N. and L in the present sample. 
The number of subjects is indicated by In'. Data for males 
only. 
E N L*' 
Norms. n Mean , sod* Mean so do Mean so do 
AAL** 512 13.16 3.9 7.24 4.5 
0** 500 12.33 4.3 7.42 4.3 -- 
TOTAL 1012 12.75 4.1 7.33 4.4 -- 
Students 700 13.17 3.9 9.38 4.4 -- 
Present 
Subjects 102 11.31 4.3 9.22 4.7 1.42 0.7 
*Sq. root transformation 
**0 = others; AAL = market research sample 
(Eysenck and. Eysenck 
1968) 
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Total score on the Mill Hill was found to correlate substantially with 
age (+ . 52). This was to be expected, 
irrespective of how the Mill Hill is 
interpreted (as gc or as learned vocabulary - see Horn 197Qi. 
Given the age range of the subjects, the negative correlation between 
age and Matrices scores (- . 27) was also anticipated by previous research 
(Horn 1970). 
The direction of these correlations is also consistent with gf/gc theory, 
Whereas age was significantly correlated with total time to complete 
the Mill Hill (- . 23) it showed only a chance relationship with time to 
complete the Matrices. 
The significant correlation between age and abandonments an the Mill 
Hill (- . 35) is probably in part of function of the tendency for scores to 
increase with age. The more correct solutions;, the less likely it is that 
there will be items to abandon. Similarly, in a test of fixed length, the 
fewer the errors there are likely to be (r age/HERROR =- . 39). However, 
whereas age appears to have no relationship with abandonments, there was a 
significant tendency for subjects to make more errors as age increased. 
As expected, age showed positive correlations with all reaction time 
measures, the tendency being for(-increasing age to be correlated with 
increasingly slower reactions to tasks involving an increasing number of 
choices. The correlations between age and time to react to 1/1,1/2,1/4, 
1/8 choices are . 23, . 28, . 37 and . 
41 respectively. Not surprisingly, the 
correlation between age and slope is also statistically significant (r = . 
45). 
From the evidence reviewed earlier (Birren 1964; Botwinick 1973), it was 
suggested that these relationships are not due to the motor component in the 
reactions but rather to the central processes between the onset of the 
stimulus and the initiation of the response, as well as a"variety of other 
factors (Birren 1964), including preparatory interval and time allowed for 
choice. Whether or not these various factors are due to an underlying 
decrement in in processing rate with increase in age cannot be 
answered here. In part, the answer to this question depends on the 
interpretation of the slope coefficient, and, as has been suggested earlier, 
such an interpretation is questionable. It could be argued that if slope is 
an index of rate of information processing, and if cognitive speed is 
essentially the same thing, both should be affected by age. However, in the 
present. study neither index of cognitive speed (H SPEER, M SPEED) showed a 
reliable relationship with age. 
In the foregoing discussion, all the relationships referred to are of 
course the linear relationships between the variables. Although a large 
number of the correlations were statistically significant, the majority were 
also relatively small. It is possible that the magnitude of these correlations 
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to discover if this was the case. The main function of this preliminary 
analysis was to determine if it was necessary to partial out the linear 
effects of age from the correlations. There can be little doubt that this 
needs to be done before examining the other relationships which are covered 
by the research hypotheses. The fact that the pattern of results is consistent 
with the findings of other researchers suggests the present data have some 
degree of consistency. 
The present data were also examined for their correspondence to the 
normative group in terms of E, N, and L. The data for these comparisons 
are given in Table 41. It should be noted that the norms (S. B. G. Eysenck - 
unpublished) do not include data for L and age. 
Apart from L, the distributions for the personality variables were 
found to be essentially normal. Further, the E and N scores for the present 
subjects are consistent with those of the normative sample. Although there 
are minor differences, any tests on these are likely to be statistically 
significant because of the large numbers of subjects involved. Psychologically, 
the differences are trivial. 
From the tables of intercorrelations with age partialled out (Table 42) 
it can be seen that whereas in the raw data, the correlation between E and 
N (- . 187) was not quite significant 
(two-tail), when age is partialled out 
the correlation (- . 27) is significant at the 1% level. This indicates that 
comparisons within either personality dimension are likely to be confounded 
by differences on the other. The statistical procedures to cope with this 
problem are detailed later. 
A number of findings not specifically covered by the hypotheses are 
worthy of attention. The ensuing discussion utilises data from the two 
correlation matrices (Tables 39 and 42). 
Total scores on the Mill Hill and Matrices were found to be uncorrelated 
(r = . 04) when age was not taken into account. After partialling out age, 
a statistically reliable correlation (r = . 23) is found. In effect, there 
is weak tendency for"I. Q. " on vocabulary to be positively related to I. 
on a 'g' type test. Although this correlation may appear to be somewhat 
low, it is not substantially lower than those found in studies using the 
Standard Matrices and full Mill Hill. Foulds and Raven (1948) for example, 
report correlations ranging from . 
44 to . 
60 depending on the age of the 
subjects in a group less restricted in range of scores. 
For the present subjects, it was found that the more time spent on the 
Mill Hill, the lower the total score is likely to be (raw r=- . 
459 age- 
corrected r=- . 39). The converse is found with the Matrices 
(uncorrected r=- . 19, corrected r= . 24). 
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TABLE 43. Intercorrelations between Slope and Total 
Scores on the Hill Hill and Matrices, with and without 
age variance removed. 
Slope 
Age in Age out p (1-tail) 
mill Hill . 097 -. 179 . 04 
Matrices -. 253 -. 154 . 06 
TABLE 44. Intercorrelations of Slope and Speed measures 
on the Mill Hill and. Matrices. 
Mill Hill Speed Matrices Speed 
Age in Age out Age in Age out 
Slope -. 106 -. 075 . 092 . 061 
TABLE 44a. Intercorrelations between indices of speed on 
the Mill Hill and Matrices and their respective IQ's 
Mill Hill Total 
Matrices Total 
Mill Hill KTr 
Age in Age out 
-. 32 -. 32 
Matrices X Tr 
Age in Age out 
---. 06 -. 03 
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The general pattern of relationships described in the preceeding 
paragraphs would suggest that the two tests used in the present study involve 
differential abilities. The Mill Hill and Matrices share little variance 
(although the magnitude of their correlation is probably reduced in the 
present study by range restriction). 
Results : Hypotheses Not Involving Personality Measures 
Hypothesis I: 
This hypothesis predicted a significant negative correlation between 
slope and score on the Matrices, with the possibility of a weaker relationship 
with Mill Hill Scores. The data for this hypothesis are presented in 
Table 43. 
From this Table it can be seen thattwhereas the present data support 
hypothesis I for the Matrices when the effect of age is not excluded, the 
age corrected results, while in the expected direction, do not provide 
conclusive support for the hypothesis (even on a 1-tail test at p= . 05). 
As was argued earlier, the age correction has the effect of converting the 
raw scores to an I. Q. Therefore, the present results do not appear to 
support Roth's (1964) finding for the Matrices. 
This conclusion must be qualified. Firstly, there is little doubt that 
the I. Q. range of the subjects is restricted, which would haveithe effect of 
reducing the magnitude of the correlation between I. Q. measures and slope. 
Secondly, the correlation has not been corrected for attenuation. This too 
must mean that it's magnitude is reduced. It is therefore possible that with 
these corrections, the coefficient would be statistically significant. 
Against these considerations it must be noted that Roth (1964) did not 
correct for age and that his inclusion of a neurologically suspect group 
would have artificially extended the I. Q. range in his. group. Both these 
factors could have the effect of increasing the magnitude of the correlation 
to the extent that itl, achieved statistical significance. Whether or not 
these inflating effects would be offset by his failure to correct for 
attenuation cannot be known. 
On the basis of these considerations it would appear that the outcome 
of this study is at least equivocal if not contrary to the hypothesis. 
Given the, large sample, it was more likely that a significant relationship 
would be found here. The fact that it was not, leads the present writer to 
conclude that the hypothesis is untenable with respect to-the Matrices. 
One of the important possible reasons for this inconclusive (if not negative) 
outcome is, the difference, in instructions for the reaction time, and the 
I. Q. tests, (but see below). Whereas. the subjects were instructed to respond 
quickly for the reaction time measurements, the instructions for the Mill 
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Hill/Matrices were not 'speed stressed'. As Cattell (1971) has suggested, 
certain speed relationships will emerge only when "ability scores are made 
under "speed" instructions and in scoring timed performance". 
(p. 65). 
As the test used by Roth (1964) was 'timed', this may have also been a 
factor in accounting for his findings. 
On the one-tail test, the correlation between slope and Mill Hill is 
significant at the . 05 level, thereby tending to support one aspect of the 
research hypothesis. The one-tailed test is justifiable here in that the 
direction of the effect was predicted on the basis of previous work. 
Hypothesis II: 
This hypothesis proposed that cognitive speed and 'speed of information 
processing' will correlate reliably. The data for this hypothesis are 
presented in Table 44. 
These results fail to support the hypothesis. It is also doubted that 
introducing the various corrections discussed in relation to Hypothesis I 
would lead to an appreciable change in the strength of relationships. It 
would therefore appear that 'cognitive speed' and 'rate of information 
processing' are unrelated. Again, it is possible that instruction and task 
differences could account for this finding, given that reaction time is 
implicitly and explicitly speeded whereas the Furneaux speed scores are based 
on unstressed-speed items. 
Hypothesis III: 
This hypothesis proposed that there should be a reliable correlation 
between the speed indices on the Mill Hill and Matrices. 
From the tables of intercorrelations it can be seen that, with the 
effect of age not excluded, a correlation of . 59 is, found that is not 
substantially altered when age is partialled out (. 60). These data therefore 
support the view that individuals who are fast on one test tend to be fast 
on another. Several qualifications have however to be noted. The most 
important of these is that the present conclusion is limited to solution 
speeds on what are conventionally easy items. It is not possible to 
generalise this conclusion to more difficult items as, at least according to 
Furneaux, difficult items bring into operation the more complex interactions 
of accuracy and continuance. Further restrictions on the generality of this 
conclusion arise from the sampling constraints in the present study, both in 
terms of tests and subjects. 
It is interesting to note that the present correlation emerged even though 
there was no stress on "speediness" of response and that the correlation is 
uncorrected. It is also interesting that this relationship emerged despite 
the age heterogeneity of the present sample. 
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The correlational data in Tables 39 and 42 also indicate that the time 
individuals spend in doing one test is a fairly good predictor of the amount 
of time they will spend on the other 
(uncorrected r= . 
61, corrected r= . 
67). 
Further, the Furneaux speed scores in each test appear to be good indicators 
of how much time subjects take in working through each test 
(Mill Hill Speed/ 
Time on Mill Hill, uncorrected r= . 
81, corrected r= . 
81; Matrices Speed/ 
Time on Matrices, uncorrected r= . 
85, corrected r= . 
85). These correlations 
have not been corrected for part-whole effects which would tend to inflate 
them slightly. 
The Furneaux speed score on one test also appears to be a good predictor 
of time taken on the other test. Mill Hill speed correlates . 56 with time to 
complete the Matrices and Matrices speed . 
66 with time to complete the Mill 
Hill. These correlations are age-corrected. 
Hypothesis IV: 
This hypothesis proposed that there should be reliable negative 
correlations between indices of speed and measures of I. Q. on the two tests. 
The data for this hypothesis are given in Table 44a. 
From these results itfan be seen that whereas speed on the Mill Hill is 
related to I. Q. on the Mill Hill, no relationship was found with the Matrices. 
While it must be acknowledged that these I. Q's are crude measures, in terms 
of the discussion in Section A, nevertheless, a significant relationship did 
emerge for the Mill Hill. 
8. Results Involvincr Personality Measures 
The preliminary analyses of the present data indicated that E and N were 
not independent in the research sample. Therefore, unless special precautions 
are taken, it is possible for differences within a dimension to be confounded 
by differences between dimensions. That is, relationships with extraversion 
could be a consequence of different levels of E being associated with 
different levels of N. 
A further problem with personality data, particularly with N, is the 
likelihood of curvelinear trends. One way to cope with both problems is to 
sub-divide the sample so that statistical analyses can examine both trends 
and interactions. An ideal sub-division of this type would have a sufficient 
number of subjects at each extreme of the two dimensions. However, given the 
normal distribution of both E and N, an excessive number of subjects would 
have to be tested. This was not possible in the present study. A less 
adequate procedure had therefore to be adopted. 
The subjects were sub-divided into 9 groups, depending on their E and N 
scores. To achieve the necessary sub-division, cut-off scores were obtained 
following a visual inspection of the bivariate (E and N) distribution. In 
doing so, it was necessary to try and ensure that cell numbers were not so 
273 
TABLE 45. Personality sub-groups, numbers in each, and 
cut-off scores. The suffix 1 refers to the low score 
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TABLE 48. Means for each variable at each level of E, 
averaged across N. 
TABLE 49. Means for each variable at each level of Ng 
averaged across E. 
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small as to make the analysis unreliable but not so large as to swamp the 
effects likely to arise from the extreme scorers. 
The final sub-groups, 
together with the cut-off scores are shown in Table 45. 
If 'ambivert' is, defined as an individual with a score which falls 
between ±I standard deviation from the normative mean on each of the E and 
N dimensions, then a small number, of ambiverts will have been included in the 
extreme groups. These individuals are likely to have the effect of reducing 
the means of the extreme groups. The consequences of this for the analyses 
used will be considered shortly. 
Two types of analysis were employed on the data. The first consisted 
of an orthogonal polynomial analysis of trends in the means of the E and N 
sub-groups for the dependent variables. These analyses examined both 
interactions and main effects. The second type of analysis consisted of 
univariate analyses of variance and covariance on. the dependent variables, 
again testing interactions, and main effects. Both types of analysis were 
performed by "Multivariance". The programme carried out a, multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANO&A) and covariance (MANCOTA) on the linear and 
quadratic trends in the data as well as univariate analyses of variance 
(ANOVA ) and. covariance on each of the dependent variables. In the 
two latter analyses, "Multivariance" also produced conventional and step-down 
F-ratios for the differences in sub-group means. 
While. the above mentioned procedures cope with the main analysis problems, 
they have certain side-effects which operate to reduce the chances of finding 
significant trends and mean differences. The use of less than optimal extreme 
groups leads to a "compressing" of the means of the extreme groups towards 
the overall mean. This has the effect of narrowing the extent of trend and 
reducing differences in sub-group means. Hence, in presenting the results 
of statistical tests, the 5% level will be used as the cut-off for significance. 
As was pointed out in an earlier chapter, there is a difference between 
statistical and psychological significance. -Conclusions relating to the 
latter cannot be totally constrained by the former: psychological significance 
depends very much on the theoretical context of the findings (Eysenck 1960; 
Lykken 1968). 
The means and standard deviations for each variable for each cell are 
given in Tables 46 and 47 respectively. The number of the cell is given in 
the extreme left-hand column of each Table. 
Tables 48 and 49 give the combined means for each level of E (averaged 
over N) and for each level of N (averaged over E) respectively. 
The 3x3 grouping does not take account of the likely differences in 
L-score: in the analyses this was taken into account, as detailed later. 
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TABLE 50. Results of NANOVA on Age and L-score for the 
personality groups. 1v 2 refers to linear and quadratic 
respectively. 
F p d. f. 
Interaction 1.61 . 12 8: 164 
(EiNl, E1N2, E2N1, E2N2) 
Ni, N2 2.57 "04 4s184 
E1, E2 2.80 . 03 4: 184 
TABLE 51. Results for ANOVA on Age and L-score for the 
personality groups. (See TABLE 55 for error terms). 
Interaction Mean Sq. F1 p F2 p d. f. 
Age 1.329 1.72 . 153 1.72 . 153 4 
L . 74S 1.54 . 197 1.52 . 202 4 
N 
Age 3.640 4.70 . 011 4.70 . 011 2 
L . 265 . 55 . 561 . 577 . 564 2 
Age 1.349 2.39 . 098 2.39 . 098 
2 
L 1.567 3.23 . 044 34 . 044 
2 
d. f. for error 93. F1 = univariate i'p F2 = step down F. 
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TABLES 52-59: 
TABLE 52. ANOVA, 3x3 analysis, interaction. 
I 
TABLE 53. ANOVA, 3x3 analysis, N main effect. 
TABLE 54. ANOVA, 3x3 analysis, E main effect. 
TABLE 55. ANOVA, 3x3 analysis, error terms. 
TABLE 56. MANCOVA, 3x3 analysis, interaction. 
TABLE 57. IIIANCOVA, 3x3 analysis, N main effect. 
TABLE 58. MANCOVA, 3x3 analysis, E main effect. 
TABLE 59.14ANCOVA, 3x3 analysis, error terms. 
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TABLE 60. Results of multivariate F-tests on linear and 
quadratic trends for ExN, E, and N. MANOVA = multi- 
variate analysis of variance; MANCOVA = multivariate 






. 86 . 76 
1.02 . 45 
1.17 . 26 
MANCOVA 
d. f. F p d. f. 
60: 311 . 80 . 85 60: 303 
30: 158 . 97 . 52 30: 154 
30: 158 1.23 . 21 30: 154 
Notes The interaction term tests reflect the tests on 
El, Nl; E1, N2; E2, Nl; E2, N1; E2, N2 where 1 and 2 are the 
respective linear and quadratic components, and E and N 
extraversion and neuroticism respectively. 
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FIGURES 35 - 37. 
FIGURE 35,1-12. 
1. Age at each level of E 
2. Age at each level of N 
3. L-score at each level of E 
4. L- score at each level of N 
5. Mill Hill Total at each level of E 
6. Mill Hill Total at each level of N 
7. Matrices Total at each level of E 
ä. Matrices Total at each level of N 
9.1/1 Reaction Time at each level of E 
10.1/1 Reaction Time at each level of N 
11.1/8 Reaction Time at each level of E 
12.1/8 Reaction Time at each level of N 
FIGURE 36,1-4. 
1. Plot of cell meant for Age, 3 levels of E at 3 levels of N 
2. Plot of cell means for Age, 3 levels of N at 3 levels of E 
3. Plot of cell means for L, 3 levels of E at 3 levels of N 
4. Plot of cell means for L, 3 levels of N at 3 levels of E 
FIGURE 37,1-4. 
1 ?. Cell means for Mill Hill Total, 3 levels of E at 3 levels of N 
3 &-4. Cell means for Matrices Total, 3 levels of N at 3 levels of E 
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In the first stage of the analysis, the personality sub-groups were 
examined for possible differences in age and L-score trends. 
The results for this 
analysis are given in 
Table 50, and the means for age and L-score for the 
personality groups are presented in Fig. 35: 1,2,3 and 
4 and Fig. 36, 
1,2,3 and 4. 
The results of the overall MANOVA on age and L-score indicate no 
significant interactions. However, the trends within each of the personality 
groups appear to be different, those for N being only marginally significant 
(p = . 04) and for E somewhat more so 
(p = . 03). These trend differences are 
readily seen in Fig. 35: 2 and 4. These curves indicate that whereas for N, 
age decreases linearly with increasing neuroticism, L-score either shows a 
slight tendency to curvelinearily or no relationship with N. When the means 
are examined using the univariate F (Table 51), the only mean that is 
significantly different is that for age (F = 4.70, p= . 011,2 : 93 d. f. ). 
Thus, whereas the N groups differ significantly on age, no such differences 
emerge for L. 
The analysis for the E groups presents a different picture. The trends 
for age and L-score (Fig. 35: 1 and 3) both appear to be linear, decreasing 
with increasing extraversion. However, the univariate F test indicates that 
only the L-score means differ (marginally) so that while there is no 
relationship between E and age, there is a tendency for L-scores to decrease 
with increasing extraversion. Partialling age out of the analysis for L 
has no appreciable effect (Univariate F=3.2272, step-down F=3.2439). 
On the basis of this analysis, it appeared necessary to use covariance 
procedures when examing the major dependent variables in this study. However, 
in order to assess the effects of age and L-score as covariates, the data 
were also analysed by MANOVA and ANOVA. While such further analyses would 
be prohibitive without computers and Multivariance, they are easily 
accomplished when these facilities are readily available. 
The results from the two sets of analyses are given in Tables 52 to 60. 
'Le runs 
Tables 55 and 59 give the error timc for the ANOY'A and ANCOVA analyses 
respectively. 
From Table 60 it can be seen that the overall tests of linear and 
quadratic trends, for the interactions and main effects are not statistically 
significant. That is, the15 dependent variables as a group do not show 
significant linear or quadratic trends in the personality sub-groups. 
However, a number of the individual variables show significant mean differences 
on the univariate ANOVA and ANCOVA. These variables are listed in Table 61. 
The outcome for each of the significant relationships is considered below. 
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TABLE 61. Summary of significant results. Extracted from TABLES 
52 to 59. Significant values underlined. 
ANOVA ANCOVA 
VARIAB. F1 P1 F2 p2 Fl p1 k'2 p2 
HTOTAL ExN . 187 . 944 . 187 . 944 . 559 . 693 . 559 . 693 
N 2.077 . 131 2.077 . 131 . 728 . 486 . 728 . 486 
4.923 . 002 4.923 . 002 3.279 . 0L2, 3.279 . 242 
MTOTAL ExN 3.546 . 0-1 3.505 . 01 2.545 2.266 . 065 
N 1.492 . 230 1.443 . 242 3.644 . 03 3.644 . 03 
E . 550 . 418 . 815 . 444 2.764. . 065 2.103 . 128 
1/1 RT ExN :;. 306 . 673 . 669 . 616 . 676 . 611 . 601 . 663 
N 3.059 . 22 1.361 . 262 1.96 . 147 . 895 . 413 
E 3.128 . 049 1.667 . 195 2.054 . 130 1.132 . 325 
1/6 RT ExN 055 . 956 . 945 . 442 . 315 . 565 . 963 "433 
N 2.200 . 117 . 366 . 695 . 938 . 395 . 043 . 955 
E 1.203 . 304 2.616 . 079 . 542 "554 3.315 . 942 
Fl = univariate F; F2 = step-down F. pl = univariate probability; 
p2 = step-down probability. 
Degrees of freedom: ANOVA interaction =4 
Eand N =2 
error = 93 
ANCOVA interaction =4 
Eand N =2 
error = 91 
H TOTAL: 298 
The significant ANOKA for E indicates that the three sub-groups produced 
significantly different mean scores on the Mill Hill. 
The trend in this 
group is obviously linear 
(See Fig. 35: 5) and shows that as extraversion 
increases, so does Mill Hill Score (F = 4.9, p= . 009). When the effects 
of age and Iscore are partialled out of the data by means of ANC0 A, the 
differences among the means are significant (F = 3.279, p= . 042). In the 
regression analysis which preceeded the ANCO'A, it was found that whereas 
age accounted for 25.61% of the variance in Mill Hill scores, L-score 
accounted for less than 1% (. 0076%). 
M TOTAL: 
The ANOVA for this variable yielded a significant interaction 
(F = 3.50, p= . 01). 
This can be readily seen in Fig 37: 3 and 4 
Covarying age and L-scale reduced the significance of this interaction 
considerably (F = 2.54, p= . 045) as can be seen in the ANCOVA results, the 
final value being marginally significant. When then subjected to the 
independent step-down analysis, this interaction was no longer significant 
(F = 2.266, p= . 068). It is possible that with either stressed testing and/ 
or more subjects at the extremes of E and N, this interaction would have 
indicated that Matrices scores are a joint function of levels of E and N. 
However, with this interaction emerging as non-significant, it is appropriate 
to consider the significant relationship between N and Matrices score. 
(Step-down F=3.64, p= . 03). It should be noted that N only emerged as 
important when age and L-score were taken as covariates. These covariates 
accounted for 8.64% (age) and 2.77% (Ir-score) in the Matrices. In effect, 
they account for only a small portion of the Matrices variance. 
Reference to Fig. 35: 8 suggests that stable individuals appear to obtain 
the highest and the mid group the lowest scores on the Matrices. While it is 
possible that the 0.65 mean difference between groups N2 and N3 is statistically 
significant, this appears to be highly unlikely, so that the main difference 
appears between stable individuals and others. It is interesting to note 
here that for this sample of subjects (and conditions of study), the level 
of E makes no appreciable difference, given N scores in the N1 range. This 
can be seen in Fig. 37: 3. 
1/1 - RT : 
In Fig. 35: 9,10, it will be seen that extraverts and high neuroticism 
subjects show faster mean simple reaction times than do the other personality 
groups. These differences are only marginally significant in the ANOVA 
(F = 3.089, p= . 05 for N; F=3.128, p= . 049 for E) and are non-significant 
when age and L-scale are covaried. These covariates account for 4.270/o and 
2.88% in simple reaction time. 
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TABLE 62. Correlations betseen E and N with Mill Hill and 
Matrices scores. 
EN 
Age in Age out Age in Age out 
Mill Hill -. 364 -"318 -. 215 -"04i 
Matrices -. 121 -. 181 -. 037 -. 140 
1 8-RT: 
On the 8-choice reaction time (see Fig. 35: 11,12) a similar pattern 
appears. However, it is only when age and L-score are partialled out that 
E emerges as an important source of effect, the statistical test being 
marginally significant (F = 3.315, p= . 042). From Fig. 35: 11, it can be 
seen that it is the group of extraverts who react most quickly on this task. 
For this variable, age accounts for the most substantial amount of variance 
(14.85%), the L-score variance being 1.95%. 
g. Results for Personality Variables : Findings Related to Hypotheses 
Hypothesis V: 
This hypothesis proposed that there would be a negative relationship 
between extraversion scores and vocabulary. 
The correlations relevant to this hypothesis are given in Table 62. 
From this Table it can be seen that irrespective of age, there is a 
tendency for higher vocabulary scores to be associated with introversion. 
.1n 
fl 
The hypothesis is further supported by the ANOVA and ANCOVA analyses 
presented earlier. While the significance of the mean differences is only 
marginal, it is probable that a stronger effect would have been found if 
test scores were not restricted in range and if more extreme groups were used. 
It might be argued that the correlation between vocabulary and E is 
mediated by intelligence, given the positive correlation between the two tests. 
To examine this possibility, the partial correlation between E and vocabulary 
was computed with Matrices I. Q. partialled out. The resulting correlation 
(Mc Nemar 1969) of - . 29 remained significant with p less than 1%. 
Hypothesis VI: 
This hypothesis proposed that E would be unrelated to intelligence (see 
Lynn and Gordon 1961). The correlation between these variables (r =-. 18) 
is not significant on a two-tail test, although it would be on a one-tail 
test. No significant effects were found on the ANCOVA (See Table 62). 
Hypothesis VII: 
The negative correlation between time on test and extraversion follows 
from the study by Jensen (1964) and is appropriately tested by a one-tail 
test. In the raw data, E correlated - . 16 and . 03 with time on Mill Hill 
and Matrices, respectively. When corrected for age, the respective 
correlations were . 12 and . 06. Hence, the present data do not support the 
previous results, as was also indicated by the ANOVA/ANCOfA analyses. 
Hypotheses VIII and IX: 301 
It was anticipated that N, under the conditions of the present study, 
would show no significant relationship with any of the 
test results. 
However, N appeared as an important factor in scores on the ANCOJA for the 
Matrices I. Q. An examination of the data suggested that stable individuals, 
irrespective of their E scores obtain higher I. Q's on the Matrices. This 
was the only significant result to emerge for N for all the research variables. 
Hypothesis X: 
The sub-hypotheses here proposed that the Furneaux speed constants 
would show reliable correlations with E. 
On the basis of previous research 
and taking account of the scoring the relationships would be expected to be 
negative. One-tail tests are appropriate for these hypotheses. 
The present data failed to support these hypotheses, even in relation 
to the sign of the correlations, the respective r 's for the Mill Hill and 
Matrices being . 09 and . 11. 
Hypothesis XI: 
These hypotheses which relate. E to errors on both tests were proposed 
as weak tests of the theory. It was hypothesised that given the conditions 
of testing, extraverts would make more errors than introverts. The 
correlation should be positive in sign given the direction of scoring. Both 
hypotheses were supported in the age adjusted correlational data, the 
correlation for the Mill Hill being + . 19 and that for the Matrices being 
+ . 18. These correlations are significant at p 
less than . 05 on the one-tail 
test. 
When tested on the ANCOVA mean number of errors in the tests did not 
differ. 
Hypothesis XII: 
As with the previous hypothesis, it was anticipated that extraverts 
would abandon more items on both tests. A positive correlation was proposed. 
From the data obtained in this study, it was found that only on the Mill 
Hill was there a positive correlation between E and abandonments (r =+ . 18). 
The correlation between E and Matrices abandonments was found to be . 03. 
The relationship between Mill Hill and Abandonments was not significant when 
subjected to the ANCOVA analysis. 
10. Discussion of Results and Conclusions: 
The studies reported in this thesis have focussed on two broad topics, 
the research on item difficulty scaling described by Furneaux (1961) and the a 
attempts by Eysenck (1967a, 197.3 to extend-the compass of his model and 
theory to performance on intelligence tests. The link between these is mental 
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speed and the facility in the Furneaux model 
that allows the influence of 
personality differences to be taken into account. 
In psychological research, the translation of an idea into operations 
presents many problems which serve to limit the strength of codclusions. 
The major weaknesses of this study have been detailed and it is against the 
background of these limitations that the findings have to be evaluated. 
A central problem in test construction is difficulty scaling and a 
number of models have been proposed as solutions to this problem. None of 
these has as yet been shown to be satisfactory. The simpler models suffer 
from the narrowness of their scope and the more complex models, for example 
those with four or more parameters, are still incompletely developed. It 
may well emerge that there is no single "best" model but rather that different 
models will be found which satisfy the needs of special decision situations. 
Nevertheless, any given model will still need to be tested under different 
conditions. This will only be achieved by a process of critical research 
which stretches the model to assess it's viability in varied circumstances. 
Furneaux's approach, despite it's many psychologically appealing 
features, has attracted little attention. Some of the reasons for this have 
been discussed. On close inspection, facilitated by the present attempts to 
test its applicability to different sets of data, other limitations have 
emerged. Group testing was used to gather data, statistical analyses were 
limited, insufficient information was supplied and arbitary decisions were 
taken before conclusions emerged. These features raise strong doubts about 
the model. 
The present study fal4ed in its attempt to constructively replicate the 
full Furneaux scaling. There is little doubt that this failure was a 
consequence of the interaction of many factors, including the narrow ability 
range of the subjects, a failure to control guessing, the instructions and 
the form of testing, among others. 
In the end, only approximate and restricted scaling was possible for 
a limited range of items. Subjecting these data to the crucial tests 
specified by Ferneaux nevertheless yielded results strongly in the direction 
of his original findings. The relationship between solution time and speed 
appeared predominantly linear with slopes that were close to unity. 
Statistical tests on these outcomes showed that some of the slopes were 
significantly different from unity. The validity of such tests on the data 
was questioned and any interpretation has to take into account the fact that 
the data were only approximations. On balance, it is suggested that the 
present results provide some support for the view that even under non-speed 
stressed conditions, solution time is linearly related to item difficulty 
for a proportion of items on the Mill Hill and Matrices. 
q 
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The premature termination of scaling did not allow more extensive testing 
of Furneaux's approach. This raises the question of whether or not other 
aspects of Furneaux's findings would have been supported. 
This question 
cannot be answered here. 
Given that the knowledge accumulated in this part of the study will 
lead to a refinement of future research on the Furneaux model, one needs to 
consider the question of the advisability of further research. To the present 
tw. b 
writer, the answer to this question resides in the outcome of White's 
(1973) 
research. White's model has all the conceptual advantages of the Furneaux 
model, is mathematically more elegant and, once the computer programmes have 
been fully developed, it will be computationally less fussy. It will also 
not require arbitrary decisions. On these grounds, it is suggested that 
further attempts at solving the difficulty problem are likely to be more 
fruitful if White's approach is persued. Researchers are likely to feel 
more secure about the outcome of their efforts if such a course is adopted. 
Eysenck's (1967a; 1973a) approach to the measurement of I. Q. is based 
on a theory in which speed is of central importance. Unlike Cattell(1971), 
he does not attempt to differentiate types of speed. According to Eysenck's 
theory, individual differences in cognitive speed are a major source of 
variation in test performance and the notion of speed is generalised to 
encompass concepts such as rate of information processing. The theory also 
extends into the realm of orectic factors, error checking and continuance 
being two of the central concepts in the extension. 
A proper investigation of the interaction of speed, accuracy and 
continuance in test performance requires a careful determination of each 
parameter for each individual before any hypotheses can be tested. This 
could not be accomplished in the present study. However, it was possible to 
examine certain other ramifications of the theory. 
The conceptual and theoretical problems in using the choice reaction 
time slope as an index of "rate of gain of information" were considered in 
detail and it was concluded that the theoretical basis for doing so is 
extremely tenuous. Given a reliable correlation between I. Q. and the slope 
index of "rate", it is still necessary for an adequate theory to cope with 
such a relationship. The original study by Roth (1964) was examined in 
detail and was found to be methodologically questionable. 
Several aspects of the relevant findings in this study need to be 
considered. Directionally, the correlations between Mill Hill and Matrices 
I. Q. and slope were consistent with Roth's findings. On one-tailed tests, 
only the Mill Hill I. Q. was found to be significantly correlated with slope. 
nns 






MILL HILL SPEED MATRICES SPEED 
FIGURE 38. Summary of interrelationships in the present 
data. 
Statistically significant correlations 
-- Directionally consistent correlations 
--- Statistically non-significant correlations 
inrc 
The large number of subjects however predisposes even small correlations 
to be significantly different from zero. In terms of variance, the 
significant correlation shows only a trivial amount of common variance 
(3.20161). Set against these observations are the methodological limitations 
of the present study. Reaction times were explicitly speeded, the cognitive 
tests were not. Also, the present subjects represented only a narrow ability 
range. It is likely that these factors served to minimise the strength of any 
correlation. 
The finding of a significant correlation between Mill Hill and slope 
may partly explain Roth's observations. Roth used a complex measure of 
I. Q., the Amthauer Test made up of a number of sub-scales. His significant 
correlation could have been due solely to the correlation between slope and 
the vocabulary components of the test. That is, slope was correlated not 
with the 'gf' or 'g' but with'gc' or 'v' parts of the battery (but see 
later comments). 
These considerations lead the present writer to suggest that at both 
the theoretical and the empirical level, the relationship between slope and 
I. Q. is equivocal and inevitably points to the need for further research and 
theoretical analysis. 
Further investigations should aim to use factorially 'pure' measures, 
perhaps selected on the basis of their gf/gc loadings, administered to 
subjects of a wide ability range, controlling carefully the instructions 
given and the procedures used for timing. Sex differences and speeded and 
unspeeded instructions should be incorporated as major factors in the design. 
As will be noted later, it is also crucial to control the difficulty level 
of the tests. 
The pattern of findings relating Speed, Slope and I. Q. are summarised 
in Fig. 38. The solid lines in this figure represent significant correlations. 
In the present data, Speed scores were reliably correlated with Mill Hill 
but not Matrices I. Q. One interpretation of this finding is that speed, as 
here measured, is only correlated with certain types of ability and not with 
others, especially those usually regarded as measures of 'g' or 'gf'. This 
interpretation is over-simplified in that it does not take into account the 
difficulty of the tests. If one test is more difficult than the other, 
speed relationships may emerge with one but not with the other. This could 
be a consequence of total score on the more difficult test bringing into 
operation the interaction of speed, accuracy and especially continuance. 
To examine this interpretation, the distribution of difficulties on the 
Mill Hill and Matrices was examined, using the crude approximations of item 
difficulty computed for both tests in the earlier scaling study. These 
distributions are shown in Table 63. 
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TABLE 63. Distribution of item difficulties on the 
Mill Hill and Matrices and the cumulative frequencies. 
MH MT ME MT 
D f f cum cum 
Less than 70 0 1 0 1 
71-80 6 0 6 1 
81-90 7 3 13 4 
91-100 5 3 18 7 
101-110 7 7 25 14 
111-120 4 1 29 15 
121-130 0 3 29 18 
131-140 1 3 30 21 
141-150 3 3 33 24 
151 or greater 0 14 33 38 
d- item difficulty range 
MH - Mill Hill, MT = Matrices. 
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On the basis of these data, it is apparent that there is an overlap, but 
that the Matrices has a very much wider range of item difficulties, mainly 
at the upper end of the range. In fact, 38% of the 
Matrices items are beyond 
the upper difficulty limit of the Mill Hill. 
(These comparisons are 
justified by the common sample of subjects). Whereas there were 33 items 
available to carry the correlation with Speed on the Mill Hill, only 24 items 
were available to do so for the Matrices. Further, as a proportion of these 
items would be beyond, the critical difficulty of subjects on both tests, 
there are even fewer (comparatively) items to carry the correlation on the 
Matrices at each level of difficulty. This is illustrated by the cumulative 
frequency columns in Table 63. It can be seen that for difficulty levels 
below 100,18 items were available on the Mill Hill and 7 on the Matrices. 
At difficulty levels below 120, there were 29 items on the Mill Hill and 
15 on the Matrices. It is thus possible that one reason why Speed and 
Matrices I. Q. were uncorrelated was due, in effect, to range restriction on 
the Matrices as a consequence of an insufficient number of relatively easy 
items. 
It is thus apparent that careful consideration has to be given to the 
levels and the range of item difficulties in each test. The present data, 
although crude, at least indicate some of the complexities involved. 
Similar issues arise when examining the correlations between I. Q's on 
the two tests. Here again, a superficial interpretation is that the tests 
are measuring differential abilities, as witnessed by their low 
intercorrelation. Evidence of this type is for example, used as the basis 
of gf/gc theory. Here as well, it may simply be that, as Furneaux implies, 
prior evidence is needed that item difficulties are equivalent before such 
a conclusion is warranted. 
Earlier in this chapter it was suggested that Roth's findings could 
be accounted for by the presence of a vocabulary component in the Amthauer 
Test. Consideration of item difficulty suggests another interpretation, 
namely, that the correlation between Slope and I. Q. is also mediated by the 
easy items in the battery. This interpretation could follow from the 
present finding of a reliable correlation between the Mill Hill, with it's 
greater proportion of easy items, and Slope. The relative absence, in the 
Matrices, of a sufficient number of easy items, might also account for the 
failure to find a strong relationship between Slope and Matrices. 
The failure, however, to find a reliable correlation between Mill Hill 
Speed and Slope, and Matrices Speed and Slope contradict this interpretation. 
That is, if the Speed/I. Q. relationship is mediated in the same way, it 
would be anticipated that for the Mill Hill at least, Speed and Slope should 
correlate, which they do not . For the present data at least, those factors 
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responsible for the correlation between I. Q. and Speed on the Mill Hill 
appear to be different to those which are responsible for the correlation 
between Slope and Mill Hill I. Q., and the lower (but non-significant) 
correlation between Slope and Matrices I. Q. The present data thus appear 
to indicate the independence of Speed and Slope. 
Eysenck (1967a) has asserted that if intelligence "is conceived of as 
speed of information processing", then reaction time data, expressed as 
slope "do not appear to contradict a theory of intelligence based on the 
-motion (sic) of mental speed". The present findings would suggest that 
whatever is being measured by "speed" is not being measured by "slope", 
unless one postulates a two component model of speed (say, along the lines 
proposed by Cattell (1971)), in which case it would appear that Furneaux 
speed is not measuring cognitive speed as conceived by Eysenck. 
The existence of a speed factor in psychological tests and it's 
relationship to ability have long exercised psychologists. The evidence 
for such a factor in a number of tests appears to be quite strong : it's 
relationship to ability, in-so-far as the evidence is concerned, is 
debateable partly because of the lack of a clear conception of speed and 
how it should be measured. It is also uncertain as how generalisable with 
regard to sex, age and test differences such a relationship might be. 
The data from the present study provide the basis for inferring a strong 
speed factor in conventionally easy items on two moderately related tests 
irrespective of age. This factor emerged despite the absence of an emphasis 
on fast performance. The strength of this finding is bolstered by the use 
of refined speed measures and improved conditions of testing when compared 
to previous research. 
The Furneaux speed index also appears as a strong predictor of how much 
time individuals will spend on tests and for the present data at least, it 
does not appear to matter much which index is used to predict time taken on 
which test. 
While it might be conjectured that time spent on a test is likely to 
influence total score, in that the longer the time the greater the chance 
of getting a correct solution, such a simple generalisation did not emerge 
in the present data. For the Mill Hill, time doing the test was found to 
be negatively correlated with total score whereas on the Matrices, the 
converse picture emerged. Also, whereas the Furneaux speed score showed 
the same relationship with Mill Hill I. Q. as did time spent, the Matrices 
speed score was unrelated to Matrices I. Q. 
M 
It was not possible to conclude that the present results were either 
consistent or inconsistent with Furneaux's conceptual and theoretical 
analysis of problem solving. To do so would have required data that could 
not be obtained from the present study. It is however important to note 
that the differential relationships which emerged would have required an 
intricate theory to generate differential predictions about performance 
on the two tests used. Like total score, total time on a test is likely 
to be a function of the interaction of many factors, including instructions, 
item difficulty, subject level, speed, accuracy and continuance. 
The second broad topic investigated in this study was concerned with 
relationships between personality variables and test performance. Whereas 
the previous findings were based on data from a large number of subjects, 
the findings discussed below were restricted by the small numbers available 
in each personality combination and the absence of homogeneous extreme groups. 
Eysenck (1967a) has proposed that vocabulary test scores are a function 
of learning efficiency which in turn is affected by consolidation processes. 
The latter are affected by individual differences in arousal. Eysenck's 
theory holds that introverts, due to their greater cortical arousal, will 
consolidate more effectively than extraverts and that when compared on tests 
of learning, introverts should produce higher scores. The correlational data 
from this study support this hypothesis and the evidence suggests that this 
holds irrespective of age within the age range of this study. The present 
data also suggest that the relationship is linear and is unaffected by the 
level of N or intelligence. It will be important to examine the 
generalisability of his finding to females. 
Relationships between E and intelligence are difficult to specify. To 
the extent that intelligence tests include material that is learned, a 
negative correlation between E and I. Q. would be anticipated; if the test 
requires extended effort without long rest periods, extraverts might be expected 
to obtain lower scores; if the test situation allowed subjects to opt for 
speed or accuracy, extraverts would, according to Eysenck (1967a) chose the 
former with the result that their scores would be lower. Given these 
complexities, predictions need to be guided by the outcomes of other studies. 
In the only comparable study, Lynn and Gordon (1961) found no correlation 
between E and Matrices Score and on this basis a hypothesis of no relationship 
was introduced here. This hypothesis was supported by the data. 
Predictions concerning the relationship between E and the various time 
measures in this study were based on Eysenck's (1967a) comments and the 
finding reported by Jensen (1964). None of the hypotheses were supported. 
An examination of the raw data (Table 48) showed the expected increase in 
time as a function of increasing E but none of the trends or the mean 
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differences was found to be significant on statistical testing. The 
Furneaux speed scores (Table 48) showed the converse pattern for E on the 
Mill Hill, the higher the E the slower the subjects but on statistical 
assessment, no significant findings emerged. In the earlier discussion of 
studies which reported significant relationships between E and time measures, 
it was pointed out that the various studies suffered from methodological 
shortcomings. The failure to find significant personality related patterns 
here would tend to support this contention. However, given some of the 
inadequacies of this study, it may well be that the hypotheses were not 
adequately tested here. Alternatively, it may be that under conditions 
contrived to minimise speed stress, personality effects are not strongly 
manifest, at least on some parameters of test performance (but see below). 
Eysenck's theory and available data also lead to the prediction that 
in the "free response" situation, there will be a tendency for extraverts 
to make more errors than introverts. Such hypotheses are most appropriately 
tested under carefully specified conditions. Thus, it might be that subjects 
need to be matched on continuance and number of abandonments before error 
rates are tested for personality differences. As this was not, possible here, 
only weak hypotheses were professed. From the correlational analysis, for 
both Mill Hill and Matrices, the theoretical expectations were supported. 
On the ANCOMA, no significant differences emerged. Again the present study 
may be at fault: with more extreme personality groups and a wider I. Q. range, 
significant differences could well have emerged. 
The evidence from this study also provided some support for the 
hypothesis that abandonments and E would be positively correlated. It was 
only on the Mill Hill correlational analysis that such a relationship was 
found. The considerations mentioned above apply here as well. 
The design of the present study was calculated to minimise the effects 
of N on test performance, hence the paucity of-hypotheses relating to the N 
dimension. However, observations in this study emphasise the importance of 
age in relation to N. Several significant correlations between N and the 
study variables disappeared when age was partialled, out. Despite the 
procedural aims and the absence of significant correlations, it was observed 
that Matrices I. Q. showed significant differences as a function of N. On 
closer examination it appeared that it was. primarily the stable individuals 
who obtained the highest I. Q's. Several suggestions maybe advanced to 
account for this: it is possible. that despite the instructions, mid and high 
N subjects found the Matrices "anxiety provoking" and their performance was 
thereby disrupted. Alternatively, the greater difficulty of the Matrices 
may have generated such effects in the mid and high-N subjects. These 
speculations are difficult to support. 
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Psychological theories, because of the complexity of psychological 
phenomena and relationships, do not readily 
lend themselves to crucial tests. 
Rather, we conduct research which helps "--- make an appropriate adjustment 
in the degree to which one accepts, or believes, the hypothesis or hypotheses 
being tested" (Rozeboom 1960). 
The research reported in this thesis was concerned with three related 
problems in intelligence testing, item difficulty scaling, mental speed, and 
the relationship between test performance and personality. All three problems 
are located in the work of Furneaux and Eysenck and are encompassed within 
the theoretical framework proposed by Eysenck in a series of papers. 
Despite the restrictions of this study, it has provided some evidence 
that is consistent with Furneaux's analysis of problem solving. Given some 
of the questions raised by Furneaux's procedures, the present writer at least 
would prefer to see the conceptual analysis extended by more refined and 
objective procedures both at the level of data collection and at the level 
of data analysis. 
The many attempts in the past to link reaction time to intelligence 
have met with only limited success. The attempt to do so via information 
theory is unfounded at the theoretical level and equivocal at the empirical 
level. There was no evidence in the present study that the slope 
transformation applied to choice reaction time data has anything to do with 
mental speed, at least as it is conceived by Furneaux. 
From the perspective of the present data, the problem of speed 
remains a "vexed question" (Cattell 1971), and is destined to remain so 
until the conceptual and operational difficulties are overcome. The research 
on the latency of evoked potentials would seem to be the most promising of 
the recent advances. A conjunction of this research with White's (1973 
+ 
model would seem to be a potentially fruitful combination, particularly if 
it cast within the framework of Eysenck's theory of personality. While the 
present results were not all consistent with the theory, there were sufficient 
points of contact between the two to suggest that personality factors account 
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INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS: 
WHEN SUBJECT IS SEATED IN FRONT OF THE REACTION TIME APPARATUS, say: 
"The experiment is divided into three main sections. In the first part, 
these green lights are going to come on, one at a time, in the following 
order: - 
(POINT TO TIM LIGHTS AS YOU COUNT) 
I-2-3- If -5-6-? -8 
Eight will then repeat itself, then lights 
7-6-5-4-3-2-1 
will come on in that order. Then 1 will come on again and the series will 
again repeat itself, and so on. 
You put your finger on the spot, (POINT) and the moment the light comes 
on, press the red button in front of the light as quickly as you can and 
then return your finger to the spot and wait for the next light to come on". 
Ready? 
(IF THE SUBJECT DOESN'T UNDERSTAND, EXPLAIN AGAIN) 
"The lights will start now". 
AT THE END OF THE FIRST SERIES SAY 
"That is the end of the first part". 
COVER UP ALL BUT THE TWO CENTRE LIGHTS AND THEN SAY: 
"In the next part, one of these two lights (POINT) will come on. They will 
come on in any order. Again, you start with your finger on this point and 
the moment the light comes on, press the red button as quickly as you can 
and return your finger to the start to wait for the next light. Remember 
you are to press the buttons as quickly as you can. 
Ready ? 
The series will begin now". 
REPEAT THIS PROCEDURE FOR THE REMAINING THREE SERIES, (ONE OF EIGHT, ONE 
OF ONE, ONE OF FOUR). 
WHEN REACTION TIME IS COMPLETED, SUBJECT IS ASKED TO SIT IN FRONT OF NINE - 
CHOICE SCREEN. SUBJECT CAN REST AT THIS STAGE. 
SHOW SUBJECT THE EXAMPLE OF THE MILL-HILL ITEM. THEN SAY 
"In the next section, you are going to see something like this projected on 
to the screen. What you have to do is to find one of the smaller words which 
has the same meaning as the large word at the top. That is, a synonym. 
Notice that the smaller words have numbers next to them. When you have 
found the word which you think has the same meaning as the one at the top, 
press the button here (POINT) which has the same number as the word which 
you think is the answer. So for this example here, number If, "join" means 
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the same thing as "Connect", so you would press button 
If to indicate that 
it is the correct answer. 
The first few words are quite easy and they then begin to get more 
difficult. If at any stage you feel uncertain about your answer, or if you 
would like to go on to the next problem, press the red button and the next 
problem will come up on the screen. 
Two more points. Firstly, these buttons are quite sensitive, so do 
not press one until you are centain that it is the one you want to press. 
Secondly, for this, part of the experiment, you can take as much time as 
you like to find the answer. Do not feel that you need to hurry. And 
remember that if you are at all uncertain of your answer, or that you would 
like to leave the problem, press the red button. 
Do you have any questions ? If not, we can begin now". 
IF THE SUBJECT SAYS 'NO', PRESS THE START BUTTON AND WAIT UNTIL THE SERIES 
IS COMPLETED. 
(SHORT REST HERE IF REQUIRED) 
SHOW SUBJECT THE MATRICES EXAMPLE AND SAY: 
"In the next part, you are going to see something like\this (POINT) on the 
screen. What you have to do is to find which of these smaller pieces 
(POINT) fits into the space in the large diagram at the top. (POINT TO 
For example, if you look across the top row, you will notice that there are 
three small squares, then two small squares and then one square. The same 
occurs in the second row. Now notice that in the third row, there are three 
small squares, then the two squares, so we would expect firstly to find a 
piece with one small square. 
Now, if we havea look at the lines, we see that the first row has 
one line going through the squares, the second row has two lines going 
through the squares and the third row has three lines. So that in the empty 
space we would expect to find a piece which has three lines and one small 
square. If we look below again, we see that number 5 is the only piece which 
has the small square and three lines. So number 5 is the correct answer, and 
we would therefore press button 5. 
IF THE SUBJECT HAS DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING, EXPLAIN AGAIN.,, 
"As with the last set, you can take as long as you like to do the problem. 
If you feel uncertain of the answer, or if you would like to leave the 
problem and go on to the next one, press the red button, and the next 
problem will come up automatically". 
"Do you have any further questions ? If not we can begin immediately". 
IF THE SUBJECT SAYS 'NO', PRESS THE START BUTTON AND WAIT UNTIL THE 
SERIES IS COMPLETED. 
(REST PERIOD HERE IF DESIRED) 
ASK THE SUBJECT TO RETURN TO THE CHAIR IN FRONT OF THE REACTION - TIME 
APPARATUS. SAY: 
"In this last section, you are going to do much the same as you did in the 
first part. 
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You put your finger on this spot, and the moment the light comes on, 
you press the red button as quickly as you can and then return your 
finger to the spot. 
In the first part, one of the four lights will come on. Remember to 
press the button as quickly as you can". 
Ready ? Starting now". 
REPEAT THE PROCEDURE FOR THE REMAINING SETS (ONE OUT OF ONE, ONE OUT OF 
EIGHT, ONE OUT OF TWO . 
P. E. N. INVENTORY 
P= 




Please answer each question by putting a circle around the 'YES' 
or the 'NO' following the question. There are no right or wrong 
answers, and no trick questions. Work quickly and do not think 
too long about the exact meaning of the question. 
REMEMBER TO ANSWER EACH QUESTION 
1. Are you more distant and reserved than most people? YES 
2. Do you find it hard to get going some mornings? YES 
3. Do most things taste the same to you? YES 
4. If you say you will do something do you always keep your 
promise, no matter how inconvenient it might be to do so? YES 
5. Can you get a party going? YES 
6. Can you usually make up your mind easily? YES 
7. Do you enjoy hurting people you love ? YES 
8. Once in a while do you lose your temper and get angry? YES 
9. Would you do almost anything for a dare? YES 
10. Have you ever been afraid of losing your mind? YES 
11. Are you generally in good health? YES 
12. Do you occasionally have thoughts and ideas that you would not 
like other people to know about? YES 
13. Would you enjoy hunting, fishing and shooting? YES 
14. Do you do much day dreaming? YES 
15. Was your mother a good woman? YES 
16. Are ALL your habits good and desirable ones? YES 
17. Do you nearly always have a "ready answer" when people talk 
to you? YES 
18. Do you find it hard to keep your mind on what you are doing? YES 
19. Have you had more trouble than most? YES 
20. Do you sometimes gossip? YES 
21. Are you rather lively? YES 
22. Are you ever "off your food"? YES 
23. Do you worry a lot about catching diseases? YES 
24. Would you always declare EVERYTHING at the customs, even if 
you knew that you could never be found out? YES 
25. Do you like plenty of bustle and excitement around you? YES 
26. Do you often feel fed up? YES 
27. Do you like mixing with people? - YES 
28. Have you had an awful lot of bad luck? YES 
29. Have you ever been late for an appointment or work? YES 
30. Do you get depressed in the mornings? YES 
31. Are there several people who keep trying to avoid you? YES 
32. Of all the people you know, are there some whom you definitely 
do not like ? YES 
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Would you call yourself happy-go-lucky? YES NO 
Does your mood often go up and down? YES NO 
Do you let your dreams warn or guide you? YES NO 
Do you sometimes talk about things you know nothing about? YES NO 
Can you usually let yourself go and enjoy yourself a lot at a 
gay party? YES NO 
Do you sometimes feel you don't care what happens to you? YES NO 
Is there someone who is responsible for most of your troubles? YES NO 
As a child, did you always do as you were told immediately and 
without grumbling? YES NO 
Do you like people around you? YES NO 
Do you ever feel "just miserable" for no good reason? YES NO 
Do people generally seem to take offence easily? YES NO 
Do you sometimes get cross? YES NO 
Do you like going out a lot? YES NO 
Are you often troubled about feelings of guilt? YES NO 
Would you take drugs which may have strange or dangerous effects ? _YES NO 
Do you sometimes laugh at a dirty joke? YES NO 
Do you like practical jokes? YES NO 
50. Do you feel self pity now and again? YES NO 
51. Did you love your mother? YES NO 
52. Are you completely free from prejudices of any kind? YES NO 
53. Do you normally prefer to be alone? YES NO 
54. Do you worry a lot about your looks? - YES NO 
55. Do you have enemies who wish to harm you? YES NO 
56. Do you sometimes boast a little? YES NO 
57. Do you find it hard to show your feelings? YES NO 
58. Do you often feel very weak all over? YES NO 
59. Do your friendships break up easily without it being your fault? YES NO 
60. Do you always answer a personal letter as soon as you can after 
you have read it? YES NO 
61. Would you call yourself talkative? YES NO 
62. Do you sometimes feel uneasy indoors? YES NO 
63. Do people mean to say and do things to annoy you? YES NO 
64. Do you sometimes put off until tomorrow what you ought to do 
today? YES NO 
65. When you were a child did you often like a rough and tumble game? -YES NO 
66. Have you always thought of yourself as different to others? YES NO 
67. Was your father a good man? YES NO 
68. Have you sometimes told lies in your life? YES NO 
69. Do you like telling jokes or funny stories to your friends? YES NO 
70. Have you ever wished you were dead? YES NO 
71. Would you have been more successful if people had not put 
difficulties in your way? YES NO 
72. Would you rather win than lose a game? YES NO 
73. Do you make friends easily with members of your own sex? YES NO 
74. Do you usually work by fits and starts? YES NO 
75. Would it upset you a lot to see a child or animal suffer? YES NO 
76. When you make new friends do you usually make the first move? YES NO 
77. When you are in a crowded place like a bus do you worry about 
dangers of infection? YES NO 
78. Do things sometimes. seem as _if 
they were not real? YES NO 
